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Abstract 
This paper deals with the phenomenon of militarised refugee camps and settlements. 
Firstly an analytical framework drawing on Norbert Elias’ sociological theory is estab-
lished. Society is understood as the interplay of political, economic and symbolic reproduc-
tion. Contradictions in these three dimensions form the background of organised armed 
conflict. Using the formula of “self-perpetuation of warfare”, the author shows that mas-
sive violence and consequent flight sharpen existing contradictions. Flight represents the 
exclusion of certain groups from political, economic and symbolic systems of reproduction 
in the home country. Processes of marginalisation are frequently repeated in the host coun-
try. Exclusion and marginalisation produce motivations to engage in armed conflict. Yet 
motivations need to be complemented by organisational capacities of armed actors in order 
to translate into actual fighting. The author argues that certain characteristics of refugee 
situations support the organisational capacities of rebel groups. The framework is applied 
in a case study of the refugee crisis in Guinea. 
Secondly, it is shown that the problem of militarised refugee populations is concentrated in 
a few countries in Africa and the Middle East. Then the author examines the impact of 
humanitarian aid and the host state in the cases of Israel/Palestine and the Great Lakes Re-
gion of Central Africa. Humanitarian aid may significantly increase capacities of rebel 
groups but tends to be a minor factor. The decisive variable is the host state. The analysis 
links the phenomenon of refugee-warriors to a common characteristic of the host states: 
instability and heavy informalisation of politics. In the quest for power, host state actors try 
to increase their power resources by establishing alliances with armed refugee actors. 
Countries in which refugee-warriors can become active are typically those where the ruling 
regime faces strong opposition, where political structures are authoritarian and competition 
for power is hardly institutionalised, and where informal political structures extend into the 
security sector.  
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Introduction 
In 1994, faced with an advancing guerrilla movement made up of second and third genera-
tion refugees, the Rwandan regime initiated massacres of the country’s ethnic Tutsi popu-
lation that were to go down in history as the third genocide of the 20th century. Within less 
than three months, some 800,000 civilians were killed. The government troops were even-
tually forced to retreat and took with them some two million civilian refugees. Among the 
roughly one million refugees who fled to eastern Zaire were numerous government offi-
cials as well as between 50,000 and 65,000 remaining members of the Forces Armées 
Rwandaises (FAR) and the Interahamwe militia, the main perpetrators of the genocide 
(Emizet 2000:165).1 They immediately regrouped in the vast refugee camps in the border 
region and soon started carrying out cross-border attacks on Rwanda. In the camps openly 
controlled by militia, humanitarian assistance became the main source of revenue within 
the insurgents’ economy, benefiting them both by ensuring supplies and controlling the 
civilian refugee population. Due to the unwillingness and incapability of the Zairian gov-
ernment and the international community to intervene, the new Rwandan army and an al-
lied Zairian rebel group invaded the country’s eastern Kivu provinces in 1996, closing 
down the refugee camps and triggering a conflict that two years later took on an extended 
regional dimension, involving at least five states.  
The events in eastern Zaire triggered severe criticism of humanitarian refugee aid (Luttwak 
1999, cf. Macrae 1998), criticism which has to be seen in the context of a parallel shift of 
scholarly attention to the causes of war. For most of the Cold War period, the concept of 
proxy wars which explained armed warfare within or among Third World states as results 
of the international bipolar order had been dominant. When wars on the periphery did not 
come to an end after the fall of the Iron Curtain, but new ones broke out instead (Rabehl 
2000:10), old and new paradigms stressing internal dynamics received attention. One of 
the most successful new approaches now firmly established in scholarly discourse was 
introduced by Jean/Rufin’s “Economie des guerres civiles” (1999, first published 1996). 
Jean/Rufin strongly emphasised the importance of external sources of revenue, particularly 
“humanitarian sanctuaries”, for rebel movements. Their approach stressed the political 
                                                 
1
 Official refugee figures stood at 1.2 million, but the real figure was probably somewhere between 800,000 
and 900,000 (Adelmann 1998:61). As for the armed elements, Emizet (2000:165) estimated figures of 
20,000 to 25,000 FAR soldiers and 30,000 to 40,000 Interahamwe. Including those who actively partici-
pated in the genocide and held posts in the church and the goverment, Waal estimated the number of 
genocidaires in Zaire at 120,000 to 150,000 (Waal 1997:211). The then-UN envoy to Rwanda estimated 
that 60 to 70 percent of the “refugees” in Zaire refused to return “because they would face charges in 
Rwanda for the genocide” (quoted in Boutroue 1998:Annex Chronology). The latter figure seems to in-
clude the family members of those personally involv
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roots of war but inspired scholars to regard war as an economic order, i.e. to consider eco-
nomic reasons responsible for the continuation of war (cf. Lock 2000, cf. Collier 2000, cf. 
Keen 2000). 
Criticism of refugee assistance ranged from a mere recognition of the dilemma, i.e. the fact 
that it enables civilians to stay alive and sustains combatant organisations (Barber 1997) to 
claims of refugee aid being “the most destructive” form of international intervention, as it 
intrinsically prolonged conflicts (Luttwak 1999:41f). Luttwak argued that wars end be-
cause the combatants and their civilian basis are exhausted, and that exhaustion is pre-
vented by refugee aid. According to him, handouts and medical care not only supply rebel 
organisations, but do as well maintain sectarian identities in the long run, as no need arises 
for integration or accommodation of opposing interest. Barber (1997:12) additionally 
stressed the instrumentality of instigating massive population displacements in order to 
attract humanitarian support, thus identifying aid as an actual incentive for violence. Oth-
ers, in contrast, considered humanitarian assistance a rather negligible factor in contempo-
rary war economies (cf. Shearer 2000). Despite differing conclusions, all of these ap-
proaches reduce the role refugees played in a given conflict to humanitarian assistance, or 
at best to the way in which humanitarian assistance contributed to a more diversified war 
economy.  
The focus on humanitarian assistance is understandable and legitimate. Humanitarianism is 
the primary international response to armed conflict within Third World states, and its le-
gitimacy depends on the question whether aid indeed prolongs conflict and provides incen-
tives for violence. The emphasis on the economics of war has led scholars such as Barber 
(1997) and Luttwak (1999) to consider refugee aid the basic reason for refugee involve-
ment in armed warfare, an assumption which deserves further scrutiny. The question is 
why refugees become armed actors in conflicts. This again translates into a set of sub-
questions. What motivates refugees to fight in wars? Which forces create these motiva-
tions? Are these forces at work in the home country, in the host country, or both? How do 
motivations translate into action, i.e. actual fighting? What significance does refugee assis-
tance have for the creation and maintenance of combat capabilities? To what extent are 
humanitarian organisations responsible? What is the role of the host country and the host 
state, and which host country characteristics increase the probability that refugees engage 
in armed conflict? Which of these factors, i.e. refugee motivations, humanitarian aid, and 
the host country, is the most important? And finally, what are the implications of these 
reflections for international refugee assistance? 
Attempts have been made to analyse the issue of refugees and wars from a perspective that 
centres on refugees rather than war economies. Opitz (1988:42-52) already noted that refu-
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gees are produced by identifiable social forces rather than being a by-product of war, and 
that there is a connection to processes of state- and nation-building. Zolberg et al. (1989), 
introducing the notion of “refugee-warriors”, hypothesised that the reasons for which peo-
ple become refugees also explain why they engage in cross-border violence (ibid:229). 
Rather than stressing factors that account for material means of combat, Zolberg et al. thus 
emphasised “root causes” motivating individuals to engage in violence. The most elaborate 
“framework for exploring the political and security context of refugee populated areas” so 
far, put forward by Karen Jacobsen (2000), emphasised conditions in the host country. 
Jacobsen rightly insisted that “refugees are not passive victims, but are political actors, 
with their own sets of interests and strategies which transform the RPA [Refugee Popu-
lated Area, F.G.]” (ibid:18), and that “before embarking on the search for solutions, it is 
helpful to develop a political understanding” (ibid:20) of the transformation the affected 
host polities are undergoing. She inductively develops two sets of variables. The first one 
refers to the situation prior to the refugee influx, and consists of the categories of domestic 
political and economic relations, regional geopolitics and national security concerns, and 
past and present relations between the host government and humanitarian actors. The sec-
ond one refers to features of the influx, summarised as settlement patterns, incurred socio-
political and economic changes, and security problems, particularly the presence of refu-
gee-warriors. She lists categories useful in guiding an analysis, but the framework remains 
fragmentary and little systematic in nature, not least because it lacks a theoretical under-
pinning. It remains unclear whether and how the categories are logically interrelated, 
whether there is a hierarchy of factors, and which are the key dynamics driving the vio-
lence. 
Adelmann (1998) similarly analyses “refugee-warriors” as a specific phenomenon to be 
distinguished from intra-state insurrectional groups (ibid:51), i.e. essentially unrelated to 
general dynamics of war. While acknowledging the importance of home country dynamics, 
specifically those preventing a return of the refugees, he attributes primary responsibility to 
the international community and the host state. Both are blamed for not offering alterna-
tive, non-violent solutions to the refugees’ plight and tolerating the refugees’ cross-border 
activities.2 Adelmann considers the insecure political and economic status as the immediate 
source of refugee motivations, while host states are held responsible for tolerating refu-
gees’ cross-border activities (ibid:63f). He concludes that further research is necessary to 
explain why host states allow these activities. 
                                                 
2
 The alternative solution Adelmann (1998) has in mind is that the international community arranges for 
resettlement to (mostly Western) third countries. As large-scale resettlement has historically been an ex-
ception and is thus empirically of minor relevance, I will not further explore that argument. This decision 
does not mean that resettlement was not a potential solution to the problem. 
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The above-mentioned publications establish categories that could guide an analysis and 
provide initial ideas of the factors that could inform an answer to the questions formulated 
above. Further theoretical reflections are necessary to integrate these so far disparate ap-
proaches and to separate factors of minor importance from the most relevant ones. The 
topic suggests an analysis grounded in theoretical considerations on war. Such an approach 
could link the issue of refugee involvement in wars to general causes of war and thus allow 
systematically exploring the issue. It should further facilitate an analysis of refugee in-
volvement in war in the home country and in the host country within the same framework. 
Recent scientific approaches to war propose to separate the reasons for which a war began 
from those perpetuating it. Refugees become actors once violent confrontations have 
turned them into refugees.3 If refugees play a role in conflict, this role should thus be re-
garded as a perpetuating rather than an initiating factor. In theoretical terms, in war seg-
ments of a society formerly able to co-operate to a certain extent relate inherently conflic-
tive to each other. That is, wars create a violent societal order further perpetuating armed 
conflict (cf. Siegelberg 1994:192). This widely acknowledged general tendency of war to 
become self-perpetuating has so far been mainly explored by war economy analysts, which 
is the main reason why so much emphasis has been put on humanitarian aid. Further at-
tempts have been made to expose the dynamics of other dimensions as well (on the psy-
chological dimension cf. Waldmann 2000). Some authors consider displacement, or social 
uprooting, to be an important aspect, as it produces motivations to engage in armed strug-
gle (on Sierra Leone cf. Muana 1997).  
Adopting this perspective, we can establish the hypothesis that refugees are a manifestation 
of self-perpetuation, i.e. that war re-creates its own social bases and thus stabilises a socie-
tal order of war. Root causes for refugee involvement in war can be attributed to dynamics 
in the home country producing refugees and preventing their repatriation (cf. Zolberg et al. 
1989). Host country conditions add to or reinforce these root causes (cf. Adelmann 1998, 
Jacobsen 2000). Host country politics (cf. Adelmann 1998) and humanitarian aid (cf. Bar-
ber 1997) are decisive for allowing root causes to translate into organised conflict. The 
reasons for which host country political forces tolerate cross-border operations from their 
territory are an important cause of refugee involvement in that type of violence (cf. Adel-
mann 1998, Rufin 1999:20).  
                                                 
3
 Most of the world’s refugees fled because of wars. “Individuals continue to flee countries which engage in 
the persecution of political opponents and deny freedom of speech and assembly, but their numbers – 
when placed against the world-wide figures of refugee flows – currently remain small” (Weiner 1996:23). 
Large-scale pogroms and massacres, other important producers of refugees, most often occur in situations 
of war, though not necessarily. As I argue that the dynamics behind large-scale massacres etc. in “peace-
ful” times are akin to those of war, i.e. perceived political enemies are eliminated by violent means, it can 
be justified to analyse involvement of these refugees in combat from the same perspective as that applied 
to war refugees. 
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A concurring hypothesis deserving equal consideration is that flight constitutes a breach 
with the order of war, as people become geographically dissociated with the core of that 
order. For instance, a prominent war economy analysis states that in the absence of hu-
manitarian aid flight represents a drain on the combatants’ resources (Rufin 1999:30). Put 
differently, refugees are one of the factors that contribute to ending wars.  
The first chapter of the present paper lays down an analytical framework. It establishes 
terms serving as tools in analysis and shows in an abstract manner how refugees integrate 
into an order of war, i.e. which home and host country dynamics create root causes, and 
how root causes can translate into combat capabilities. On the one hand, it is intended to 
guide future case studies concerned with the matter, while on the other hand, its abstract 
form shall help to explain in the most general way why refugees become actors in wars.  
Firstly, a theory of war and the methodology associated with it, the “grammar of war” (cf. 
Siegelberg 1994, Jung 1995), are briefly presented. These general reflections on the causal 
origin of war form the background of subsequent reflections on how war re-creates causes 
explaining its persistence. They are followed by considerations on what constitutes an or-
der of war. Following Jung’s methodology (Jung 1995) as further developed by Stuvøy 
(2002), I propose to analyse a societal order as a configuration of political, economic and 
symbolic modes of reproduction.  
I then present an abstract description of the societal order of refugees, i.e. their political, 
economic and symbolic reproduction, and thereby clarify how the terms established can be 
applied in an analysis of that order. The “grammar of war” explained before is a methodo-
logical tool allowing to structure causes of war. It inspired the model of the refugee order, 
as the elements it identifies as leading to war should re-appear in the refugee order as ele-
ments perpetuating war. In addition to preparing an analysis, the model establishes “refu-
gees” as a social category with political, economic and symbolic commonalities and 
thereby justifies generalisations about them. Summarising essentials of the refugee societal 
order, the chapter closes by presenting an abstract scheme of refugee armies.  
While chapter one aims at explaining the phenomenon in most general terms, chapter two 
presents empirical evidence. Its objective is to examine in detail two specific factors condi-
tioning the societal order of refugees and potentially accounting for the phenomenon of 
refugee-warriors, i.e. the host country and humanitarian aid. The chapter starts by defining 
militarised refugee populations and militarised refugee camps in order to come to terms 
with the object of analysis. Then, in what amounts to a preliminary examination, the em-
pirical relevance of the phenomenon is explored. That section seeks to investigate how 
widespread the problem is, i.e. how often refugees engage in what type of political vio-
lence and where the phenomenon is concentrated. The available statistics are as well em-
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ployed to support the reflections presented in chapter one. In essence, 2.1 serves to identify 
a cluster of particularly affected host countries.  
The second section seeks to link the phenomenon to a common characteristic of these host 
countries: weak state power and pronounced informalisation or personalisation of politics. 
It analyses informal links between refugee insurgents and host country forces in two nota-
ble cases of militarised refugee populations: the refugee crises in the Middle East and in 
the Great Lakes Region of Central Africa. These links and the interests behind them seem 
to be decisive in explaining why host country forces tolerate refugee insurgents.  
In the subsequent section, the role of humanitarian aid and humanitarian actors will be as-
sessed. Refugee-warriors stimulate so much interest primarily because of the link to hu-
manitarian aid, and that aspect therefore deserves further scrutiny. The section starts by 
presenting the historical evolution of the humanitarian system’s perception of the problem. 
I will then compare the contribution humanitarian aid made to war in two notable cases 
and present how humanitarian organisations assessed their role and responded to the prob-
lem. Another briefly presented case demonstrates recent changes in the self-assessment of 
humanitarian agencies and consequent changes in reactions. 
The approach established in chapter one not only allows to establish qualified hypotheses 
on the causes of the militarisation of refugee camps. It first and foremost constitutes a basis 
for the comparative study of refugees’ roles in wars. As an illustration of the framework 
and a test for its viability, a case study will be presented subsequently.  
In autumn 2000, heavy fighting erupted in the border region of Guinea, Liberia and Sierra 
Leone, primarily on the Guinean side. An alliance of Liberian government paramilitaries, 
Sierra Leonean Revolutionary United Front (RUF) rebels, and Guinean dissidents calling 
themselves the Union des Forces Démocratiques de Guinée (UFDG) had invaded Guinea 
from Sierra Leone and Liberia (cf. ICG 2002). The Liberian and Sierra Leonean elements 
seemed to be the dominant force in the alliance (ibid:4). The invaders were repelled in 
early 2001. At that time, Guinea had one of the world’s highest concentrations of refugees 
relative to its population.4 The wars in Liberia and Sierra Leone had produced massive 
population displacements during the 1990s. The refugee camps hosting Liberians had for 
about a decade been widely suspected of harbouring rebels hostile to the Liberian govern-
ment. During the confrontations, both Guinean civilians and security forces massively and 
systematically targeted refugees, in the peaceful capital as well as in the embattled border 
region. This short description indicates that the two dimensions the framework aims to 
analyse, i.e. cross-border violence and internal war involving refugees, seem to have been 
                                                 
4
 Only Jordan and Gaza/Westbank had higher concentrations of refugees, while that in Lebanon was roughly 
equal to that in Guinea. 
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present in the Guinean case. Yet Guinea has in the past conveniently been described as a 
place where large numbers of refugees took up strikingly harmonious relationships with 
the local population. Considering the massive violence, we are now tempted to assume that 
tensions did not arise all of a sudden, but had been building up for some time. These few 
features already suggest that the Guinean situation might constitute an instructive case 
study, as it allows examining peaceful coexistence, internal strife, and trans-border vio-
lence. Yet the case has so far attracted little scholarly attention, arguably due to the fact 
that the region’s wars have generally received little international attention until the end of 
the 1990s, and that Guinea’s regime pursued an extremely isolationist policy until 1984, 
which prevented the emergence of regional experts familiar with the country.  
Field research for this study was conducted from March to September 2002 in the capital 
Conakry, the Kissidougou region hosting Sierra Leonean refugees, and the N’zérékoré 
region hosting Liberian refugees. Methodically, research comprised three basic sets: press 
analysis, trend-line interviews, and semi-structured qualitative interviews aimed at collect-
ing further information the framework suggested to be relevant.  
Although local newspapers often publish little more than rumours they are important pri-
mary sources in that they allow to explore governmental rhetoric and to develop an under-
standing of how a certain situation is perceived within a given society. This is clearly the 
case where a vibrant and free press exists, but also applies, to a lesser extent, to regions 
where the press is state-controlled, as was the case in Guinea up to the second half of the 
1990s. Official declarations of policies often differ remarkably little from public opinion.5 
In societies with strong authoritarian structures such as the Guinean one, state propaganda 
is quite likely to influence the people’s opinion on a certain matter. Analysis of the private 
press suggested that public opinion concerning the refugees was indeed strongly influenced 
by the regime’s stance. The date of newspaper issues to be examined was chosen according 
to relevant events, such as international conferences concerned with the region’s wars etc.  
The trend line interviews follow a methodology drawn from Klingebiel et al. (2000). They 
aim at collecting perceptions of the situation, particularly with regard to when and why the 
quality of neighbourliness was considered to have improved or deteriorated. Results are 
prone to distortion, as the perception of a situation may change in retrospect. Press analysis 
was partly aimed at making up for that deficit. Essentially, the first two sets of the research 
work were intended to obtain a “superficial” understanding of the situation, i.e. of how the 
situation was perceived, while the latter aimed at gathering further information on underly-
ing structures and background data. Interviews were generally conducted in English and 
                                                 
5
 For instance, not only do the different Guinean opposition parties formulate essentially the same policies, 
but similar views are regularly expressed in presidential speeches as well.  
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French. Interlocutors were usually identified and approached through existing forms of 
organisation, for instance traditional structures at village level or more “modern” forms 
such as refugee women groups in the camps and NGOs etc. This approach resulted in a 
bias towards urban, educated interview partners. Nonetheless, as the methodology is quali-
tative rather than quantitative, and as it was possible to conduct several interviews with 
individuals of a rather traditional background, translation being provided by educated lo-
cals, this bias is likely to have resulted in rather negligible distortions. A relative bias in 
favour of educated interview partners can be further justified by the importance that popu-
lation segment has for armed warfare. Almost universally, sustained fighting is organised 
by educated elites (cf. Jung et al. 2003). Tensions on lower levels of society may lead to 
sporadic outbursts of violence, but are unlikely to transform into all-out war in the absence 
of elite organisation.  
Initially, some of the interviews were recorded, but this was quickly abandoned as it be-
came clear that interlocutors preferred talking without being recorded. Generally, finding 
interview partners was problematic. Within Guinea, the leading role assumed by the gov-
ernment during the attacks on refugees is well known, and there is little interest on the part 
of the authorities in any investigation concerned with the matter. Following pertinent 
guidelines on the protection of sources in sensitive situations, all interviews have been 
anonymised (cf. Bliss/Schönhuth 2002). As I could not establish contacts to the authorities 
that would have allowed me to be told anything but the official (published) version, I de-
cided to keep a distance from government officials. When contacting interview partners, 
the topic of the study was usually introduced as “the impact of the refugee influx on social 
relations” or “on the economy”. Research thus involved some degree of deception. In order 
not to compromise my research or people I was in contact with even further, I decided to 
minimise contact to UNHCR as well. UNHCR had declared from the beginning that it 
could not support any research on the background of the 2000/2001 fighting, and was in-
deed quite secretive regarding information considered sensitive.6 Other humanitarian or-
ganisations however were more willing to provide information and considerably facilitated 
contact to refugees in the camps.  
The case study begins with the origins of the regional crisis, i.e. with the war in Liberia, 
but its emphasis is clearly on Guinea. First, the background of the Liberian war is pre-
sented briefly. I will then show how and why refugee flows were produced, and how they 
relate to causes of conflict. The same procedure will afterwards be applied to the case of 
Sierra Leone. 
                                                 
6
 As turned out later, relations between UNHCR and the Guinean government were very strained because of 
the militarisation of the Kouankan refugee camp, negotiations were at a critical stage, and UNHCR was 
probably wary that information provided to outsiders could further undermine its position.  
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The analysis will then turn to Guinea. In order to develop a deeper understanding of the 
political situation within which the population movements took place, I will describe con-
cisely the country’s main relevant features. Subsequently, the sub-regional alliances and 
their connections with insurgent and refugee groups are presented, focussing on Guinea’s 
position. Thereby, Guinea’s attitude towards the militarisation of refugee camps is ex-
plained. The following section, directly concerned with the militarisation, will deal with 
the character of that phenomenon and particularly the way humanitarian organisations and 
the international community reacted to it. 
The second part on refugee-related tensions inside Guinea introduces the issue by giving a 
rather broad overview describing the dominant Guinean perceptions of refugees, of how 
refugees “behaved”, how they changed life in Guinea, and of how these perceptions 
changed over time. I will then proceed to analyse the impact the refugee influx had on the 
national political scene and on the economy in the following two sections. In particular, 
political and economic contradictions in Guinea relating to the refugee influx will be pre-
sented. Of course, in a society where political and economic power are hardly differenti-
ated, this distinction is rather analytical and in part artificial. Yet there were several eco-
nomic effects at the grass roots level which the state was relatively immune to. The analy-
sis of economic effects is structured along social strata for reasons of differing potentials 
for action. The following section reflects on the link between refuge and identity as it 
manifested itself in the region. It seeks to explore to what extent and why refugees ex-
pressed sectarian identities. 
Subsequently, instances of refugee-related violence in Guinea will be analysed in the light 
of the findings reached so far. A conclusion summarising why refugees in Guinea became 
involved in violence will complete the case study. 
The paper will close with a general conclusion on the reasons why refugees become in-
volved in armed warfare. The way in which war creates new causes of war should become 
apparent by using the “grammar of war”, yet the latter has so far been employed to explain 
the genesis of war in the first place. In this paper, it has guided the analysis of the societal 
order of refugees. As the method allows incorporating and structuring a maximum amount 
of information, it will be employed to systematically summarise the findings of this study. 
Finally, implications for the international community derived from these reflections will be 
presented.  
Having conceptualised the topic as outlined above, a vast amount of literature is potentially 
relevant. This includes theoretical considerations on wars and war economies, as well as 
the literature on the wars in the West-African sub-region and on Guinea in particular. An-
other area is the field of “refugee studies”, which has generated immense amounts of litera-
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ture, predominantly case studies, several of which are relevant as well. A third area is the 
humanitarian literature, often issued by human rights groups or humanitarian agencies. 
This latter category is usually rather descriptive in nature and strongly influenced by hu-
manitarian values and institutional interests, but relies on fairly well-functioning informa-
tion systems and often provides information not available from other sources.  
As far as the first complex is concerned, the “Hamburger Ansatz” so far is the most com-
prehensive theoretic approach to causes of war. Its perspective on the genesis of war pro-
vides a background to this analysis. As a supplement, war economy analyses will be incor-
porated. The literature on the wars in Liberia and Sierra Leone is extensive and allows for 
in depth-studies, while that on Guinea in general and on the refugee crisis in particular is 
rather limited, with a relatively high percentage being issued by human rights groups. In 
contrast, the potentially relevant “refugee studies” literature is too extensive for full re-
search, and it was only possible to take into account studies directly concerned with phe-
nomena of violence. Much of this literature is also “grey” and semi-public, and it can be 
assumed that some publications exist which were not accessible to me.  
Finally, the scope of analysis needs to be precisely confined and essential terms have to be 
defined. The primary interest of this paper is refugee involvement in war, war being de-
fined as continuous mass violence involving at least one state as an actor and at least two 
actors exhibiting some degree of military strategy (AKUF 2002:10). At some instances, it 
will however be necessary to reflect on less organised and therefore less continuous and 
strategic forms of mass violence, as causes of these may be similar to those of war and the 
violence may in fact be a prelude to or occur in a context of war. As this paper is con-
cerned with refugee armies, long-distance migrants to western countries are excluded from 
the analysis. These rarely organise into armed groups,7 although individual diaspora ele-
ments may assume important roles in contemporary wars. The study is thus confined to 
refugees displaced within Third World regions, and particularly to those displaced to a 
neighbouring state. The category of Third World states can be justified by a characteristic 
these states share, the simultaneous existence of traditional, personal and modern, abstract 
forms of Vergesellschaftung (cf. Siegelberg 1994:112f, Jung et al. 2003:10f). As will be 
demonstrated in 2.1, the phenomenon of refugee warriors is concentrated in Africa and the 
Middle East, regions which are characterised by comparatively strong personal structures. 
The paper thus focuses on these regions and is of particular relevance for these. Interna-
                                                 
7
 The US-supported “bay of pigs”-invasion of Cuban exiles and the Portuguese-led invasion of Paris-based 
exiles into Guinea’s capital in 1970 are notable exceptions. The alliances between these host states and 
foreign insurgents show similarities to the trans-border links analysed in 2.2. which I consider to be of 
great importance to the phenomenon of refugee-warriors. In fact, aligning with foreign, essentially infor-
mally organised actors was a key component of Western counterinsurgency strategies. 
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tional humanitarian law defines refugees as people who have left their country of origin out 
of a well-founded fear of persecution. Legally, refugees who take up arms in order to carry 
out subversive activities in their home countries should lose their refugee status, but in fact 
they rarely do. Clearly, a restriction of the term “refugee” to unarmed persons is not possi-
ble within the design of this study, and the term will therefore be employed in a more con-
ventional sense and designate those who have crossed an international border because of 
real threats to their physical integrity. Much of this paper focuses on the social characteris-
tics of refugees, and occasionally I will refer to internally displaced persons (IDP) as well, 
who share many of these characteristics, but the emphasis is on internationally displaced 
people. When designating the direction of that international displacement, the terms home 
state and sending state as well as the terms host state and receiving state are used inter-
changeably in this paper. 
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1 Refugees and Self-Sustaining Warfare 
Existing studies on the phenomenon of refugee-warriors have yielded first results, but are 
little systematic as they lack a theoretical underpinning. So far, approaches focussing on 
the reasons of flight or living conditions in the host country as “root causes” or on humani-
tarian assistance as fuelling war economies stand disparately side by side. Here, I argue 
that the phenomenon of refugees in wars can be analysed as a self-perpetuation of warfare. 
That is, refugees can be an integral part of a societal order of war. This societal order will 
be analysed by means of the Hamburger Ansatz, a theoretic approach primarily concerned 
with the dynamics leading to armed warfare (cf. Siegelberg 1994, Jung 1995, Schlichte 
1996), because it is the most elaborate and comprehensive theory on the causes of war. The 
associated methodology, the “grammar of war”, allows incorporating and structuring a 
maximum amount of information and should therefore enable integrating so far disparate 
approaches.  
In Hamburger perspective, a process of modernisation, i.e. the replacement of personal 
modes of Vergesellschaftung by abstract ones,8 is transforming traditional social settings 
and can be regarded as the most general cause of wars. This process of modernisation cre-
ates opportunities for some groups and threatens the social status of others. The balance of 
power within as well as between states is disturbed, as social orders become anachronistic, 
new actors can come into play, and, consequently, contradictions build up – contradictions 
which can make it seem rational for leaders to apply force, either in order to maintain the 
status quo, to overcome it, or to restore a status quo ante. The modernisation theoretical 
considerations provide the background to the following reflections rather than being the 
centrepiece, as I argue that war itself is the immediate cause of new contradictions which 
are at the heart of the continuation of warfare. I retain some of the theory’s terms to serve 
as tools in the analysis and one fundamental assumption derived from theoretical reflec-
tion: at the core of armed conflicts are objective contradictions. They are objective in the 
sense that they can be rationalised according to the modern (originally western) notion of 
opposed interests. These interests can be analytically separated into political, material, and 
                                                 
8
 The term personal relations as employed here includes face-to-face relations but is not restricted to them. It 
essentially designates a structuring principle characterized by social organization around persons or per-
sonified forces (e.g. gods and ghosts). “Wird […] von einem Strukturprinzip personaler Beziehungen ge-
sprochen, sind diese nicht mit sogenannten face-to-face relations, also direkten Interaktionsbeziehungen, 
gleichzusetzen [...]. Personale Beziehungen können, müssen aber keine persönlichen Beziehungen sein. 
Der personale Charakter traditionaler Gesellschaften geht weniger aus tatsächlichen persönlichen Kontak-
ten der in ihnen vergesellschafteten Menschen hervor, denn aus der Vergewisserung über die eigene Ge-
sellschaftlichkeit durch einen Panthenon von Personifikationen. [... Es sind, F.G.] Personenkonstellatio-
nen und nicht abstrakte Begriffe und Strukturen, welche die sozialen Machtverhältnisse traditionaler Ge-
sellschaften repräsentieren“ (Jung 1995:158). 
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ideal interests. When war has commenced, a societal system is established in which con-
tradictions are no longer processed peacefully. The concern of this paper is to examine 
how that system is sustained.  
Conventionally, Hamburger studies explaining the genesis of war analyse the transforma-
tion of contradictions into war using a four-stage model, the “grammar of war” (cf. Siegel-
berg 1994:167-193). It is intended to reconstruct logically how contradictions are proc-
essed when leading to war. Using the same model it should also be possible to observe the 
processes through which war sustains itself. Put differently, here it is argued that the ele-
ments that initially cause war are continuously re-created during war. As the methodology 
allows for integrating a maximum amount of information into one single framework (cf. 
Jung et al. 2003:10), it will be employed to finally structure the findings of this study in 
what is akin to a “grammar of self-sustaining war” focussing on refugees. Here, I will 
shortly outline the “grammar of war” as it is conventionally employed.  
On the first stage, “contradiction”, societal contrasts are assembled. Contradictions can 
analytically be separated into political, economic and symbolic/ideological differences. 
The second stage, “crisis”, designates the difference between objective (analytical) contra-
dictions and subjective reasons. Contradictions only become causal factors when realised 
and acted upon by actors. The paradigms, world views, systems of symbols etc. the rele-
vant actors use to interpret their situation and which enable them to perceive it as “critical” 
have to be identified.  As analysts, we have to understand the specific rationale specific 
actors base their actions on. Culturally distinct conceptions of good and evil as well as par-
ticular historical precedents which the actors perceive as analogous to the actual situation 
are important components when analysing the rationalisation of violence. The third stage, 
“conflict”, deals with the translation of perceptions into actions. Strictly speaking, it is a 
process of escalation. In our model, “conflict” means the mobilisation of combat capaci-
ties. This takes place on three different levels: the organisational, the economic, and the 
mental. Members have to be recruited into relatively stable forms of organisation. Eco-
nomic processes sustaining the organisation and its military capacities have to be organ-
ised. Mental conflict capacities are acquired by legitimising the killing of opponents. The 
creation of the perception that the opponent constituted a direct threat to livelihood and 
physical integrity is a typical way of acquiring mental combat capacities (cf. Rösel 1997). 
Developments at the “conflict” stage often make the difference between repeated but spo-
radic and weakly organised acts of violence and war. The fourth stage, “war”, is marked by 
the beginning of continuous mass violence involving at least two strategically proceeding 
organised actors, one of them being a state. War can resolve contradictions by overcoming 
anachronistic social orders and be a moment of progressive and necessary change. Often, 
however, it subsequently reshapes the causes that have led to its outbreak in the 
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first place, thus creating new causes perpetuating warfare. Then, paradoxically, war can 
become a relatively stable societal order.  
Central to the following argument is Elias’ notion of a societal order as the configuration 
of elementary functions every society has to assure, i.e. its political, economic and sym-
bolic reproduction (cf. Elias 1983, cf. Jung 1995:89-95). Political reproduction is defined 
as the control of violence, material reproduction as assuring economic subsistence, and 
symbolic reproduction as the provision of means of orientation (Orientierungsmittel) (Jung 
1995:91). A societal order of internal war is characterised by the existence of at least two 
systems of reproduction with a high degree of autonomy, i.e. the warring parties. These 
two systems, however, are not entirely separate but form a configuration (cf. Elias 
1991:139-146). They are related antagonistically, the link typically being constituted by 
competition for the same sources of revenue and the commonly claimed centre of political 
authority, the state. Concerning refugees, the order exhibits three tendencies: the exclusion 
from a home country system of reproduction, partial integration into and selective exclu-
sion from host country systems of reproduction, and partial integration into an alternative, 
insurgent order. Dynamics shaping the system include the processes in the home country 
producing refugees on the one hand, and processes in the host country reproducing a refu-
gee social entity and furthering its political and economic organisation. That point is fur-
ther elaborated in the following sections. 
Conventionally, in Hamburger studies, the society analysed is that within the borders of an 
internationally recognised state. Drawing from concepts so far employed to analyse the 
transformation of a peaceful society to a war society, Stuvøy (2002) adapted the associated 
terms to make sense of the order of an insurgent non-state entity. In the present context, the 
phenomena of refugee movements, refugee involvement in cross-border violence or in 
fighting in the host country suggest a focus on the trans-national character of societal links. 
The Hamburger Ansatz is open to such a perspective as it conceives society as world soci-
ety, i.e. states cannot be considered actors with clear-cut boundaries. Third World regions 
are characterised by the simultaneous existence of modern, bureaucratic and traditional, 
personal modes of government. The former constitute the state as an impersonal, distin-
guishable entity and allow for conceptualising international politics as relations between 
states. Yet these are often only weakly institutionalised in the developing world. Personal 
power relations regularly complement or overshadow bureaucratic administration as means 
of governance. Rather than being an impersonal body of domination, the state apparatus 
itself can be considered a resource competed for by various personalised political networks 
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(cf. Jackson 1990, Reno 1998), the dominant one constituting the regime.9 As for the ex-
tension and composition of these networks, national frontiers are of limited importance (cf. 
Reno 1998:10). Put differently, international political relations in the Third World to a 
substantial extent are personal international relations.10 This has obvious implications for 
the way in which refugees can become embroiled in politico-economic conflicts. When 
conceptualising the matter as one of trans-nationally organised politico-economic net-
works, cross-border violence and internal conflict in the host country involving refugees 
can be analysed within the same framework. 
That is, refugee-related violence must be analysed in the context of the (trans-national) 
societal environment it occurs in. I propose to employ terms derived from modernisation 
theory to analyse how refugees react in a given societal environment. As stated above, so-
cietal links can be distinguished using the distinction between modern and traditional 
modes of Vergesellschaftung. On the political level, the distinction corresponds to the 
idealtypical difference between legal-bureaucratic forms of administration and patrimonial 
forms of rule (cf. Weber 1976:124). Refugees will try to improve their social status in the 
host country. Upward social mobility in Third World countries often is closely connected 
to employment in the public sector. Under conditions of bureaucratic rule, employment is 
dependent on qualification (ibid:127). The staff is free from personal loyalty to the ruler, 
administers according to legal-rational principles (sachliche Amtspflicht) and receives 
regular salaries (ibid:126f). Under patrimonial conditions, integration into the administra-
tion is dependent on personal loyalty to the ruler, while the ruler has to confer reciprocal 
privileges to his staff (ibid:130-133). As the control of the use of force is considered to be 
the core of politics, stabilisation of military authority is a key aspect of rule, and the most 
important resource refugee-warriors can offer to rulers is violence, that aspect needs fur-
ther consideration. A key patrimonial strategy to consolidate military authority has histori-
cally been to rely on strangers (“Stammfremde” and “Religionsfremde”) because these are 
most likely to totally depend on the ruler and have few opportunities to establish relations 
with his rivals (Weber 1956:595-598).  
Economically, the distinction translates into that between market transactions and subsis-
tence reproduction (cf. Marx 1987:49-70). Idealtypically, refugees can integrate into host 
                                                 
9
 In this paper, the term is not employed in its classical sense, i.e. a military regime, a democratic one etc. 
Here, it is defined as the elite network governing a given country, yet it is broader than the term govern-
ment as the regime includes those military, economic or other elites integral to the organisation of state 
authority.   
10
 Bayart’s (1993) notion of a trans-national African hegemonic bloc deeply divided into factions competing 
for power and economic opportunities is an excellent attempt to put the phenomenon into theoretical per-
spective. As he demonstrates, the emergence of the hegemonic bloc is intrinsically linked to modernisa-
tion processes, yet, at least for the time being, it is primarily structured according to the per-
sonal/traditional principle. 
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country systems of economic reproduction by selling their labour or commodities (possibly 
acquired in the home country and thus constituting trans-border links), or enter into tradi-
tional mechanisms of land distribution which allow them to engage in subsistence farming.  
On the symbolical level, the distinction corresponds to that between amendable codified 
law as the basis of Wertrationalität and zweckrational defined interests on the one hand 
and a subjectively ontological Wertrationalität based on customary norms on the other (cf. 
Jung 1995:130-134+143-146). Codified law is based on the entity of the state, i.e. national 
law is exercised within a state territory and international law essentially regulates relations 
between states. Idealtypical modern in-groups expressing a common identity, no matter 
whether located within a state territory or stretching across boundaries, base that identity 
on common zweckrationale interests of the individuals constituting it. Concerning refu-
gees, this means they can integrate into host country groups by virtue of common individ-
ual interests. Traditional in-groups are subjectively based on custom and experienced as 
being naturally united through consanguinity, a common history and common fate (cf. 
Weber 1976:130, ibid. 2001:168). Typically, a belief in common descend constitutes the 
personal principle unifying the group. The notion of group rights and a group interest is 
closely connected to the notion of an organic community of common fate. Customary 
worldviews may stretch across international boundaries while not necessarily being ac-
cepted on the whole state territory. That is, refugees may integrate into host country com-
munities by virtue of a shared belief in a common fate and/or a common group interest. 
Host communities thus reinforced may regard refugees a resource strengthening the in-
group in domestic or local conflicts (cf. Harrell-Bond 1986:336). 
When it comes to explaining political alliances of host country forces with refugee actors I 
consider political interests in power accumulation, or, from a regime point of view secu-
rity, to be decisive.11 Yet, the three dimensions are closely interwoven. Political authority 
has to be ideologically legitimised and underpinned by economic resources. Same as rival-
ries for economic opportunities, the struggle for internal symbolic hegemony is directly 
linked to power struggles between elites, between clientelistic networks, between segments 
                                                 
11
 The notion of “security” may be useful to capture regime motivations for actions in the fields of both inter-
nal and external relations. Security can be conceptualised as military security, economic security and cul-
tural self-determination. Generally, in Third World states, security is primarily internal security. Given 
that state and regime are hardly differentiated in strongly personalised political settings, governments 
there tend to equate security with regime security (cf. Ayoob 1995:7-9). Military power is thus essentially 
a safeguard against internal rivals, the most important unit of economic accumulation is the regime rather 
than the national economy, and cultural threats take on the form of threats to a regime’s ideological basis. 
We can assume that regimes try to defend or maximise their control of military, economic and ideological 
power resources. This is obviously the case in domestic power struggles, yet these often have trans-
national repercussions. Analysis in chapter 2.2 suggests that in a Third World context, foreign regimes are 
primarily considered a threat because they are perceived as strengthening domestic rivals or as weakening 
the regime in place.  
  
 
17
of the population, and between states. As I will argue, refugee-warriors are most likely to 
become a security problem when the character of relations between host country forces and 
collective refugee actors approaches the informal, personal edge of the continuum, while 
strategic, zweckrationale interests in accumulation or preservation of acutely threatened 
power motivate establishing such relations. I will later demonstrate in detail how and why 
these links are established (see 2.2).  
In the following section I will explore how refugees are integrated into an order of war. By 
doing so, I will also show how refugees relate to causes of war. The presentation of the 
societal order is structured according to the three elementary functions which analytically 
structure the war system. The system of reproduction is not static but subject to 
transformations as captured in the “grammar of war”. The following description shall take 
account of that dynamic character by presenting the build-up of contradictions and the 
creation of armed refugee organisations as two interrelated but separate developments. 
1.1 Refugees and Political Reproduction 
In reference to Elias, the political is functionally defined, i.e. the control of the use of force 
is at the heart of politics (cf. Jung 1995:91). The entity within which the exercise of vio-
lence is subject to internal control is called unit of survival (Überlebenseinheit) (cf. Elias 
1983). Political contradictions can become manifest in a variety of ways. In the present 
case, one dimension is particularly important: the contradiction between those included in 
a unit of survival having significant control over the means of violence in a given territory, 
and those excluded. Historically, i.e. before the war, the contradiction did not necessarily 
exist, or its effects were mitigated. Those individuals and collective entities now excluded 
once enjoyed the protection of the state, nowadays the typical unit of survival.  
The outbreak of internal war can usually be traced back to contradictions based on differ-
ences concerning access to privatised public goods (patronage). Access is closely con-
nected to holding or being withheld posts in the government and the administration (cf. 
Schlichte 1998). In the course of the war contradictions between those included and those 
excluded are sharpened, as the most essential public good, security, is privatised, or at least 
the circle of people benefiting from generalised security is severely restricted (Reno 
2000:46f). Refugees typically have lost access to the provision of security, i.e. neither the 
state nor customary or new, war-typical institutions (warlord armies, protection rackets 
etc.) can or want to guarantee security to a degree deemed acceptable by the population. 
Most contemporary internal wars are characterised by high levels of violence against civil-
ians, creating a new contradiction between those relatively secure and those constantly 
threatened. That violence is often strategi- strategically employed by elites. Violence is 
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a decisive moment in societal reconfiguration and frequently serves identifiable interests. 
The depopulation of an area in an attempt to get rid of (often ethnically defined) groups 
perceived as sympathetic to the adversary indeed is a major cause of contemporary refugee 
movements. However, flight is not necessarily intended, and violence can be explained as 
politically instrumental in several ways. It destroys social structures which could be co-
opted by the enemy or could serve as a base for local resistance,12 and provokes civilians 
whose bases of economic and political reproduction was destroyed to seek the ruler’s per-
sonal favour in order to be granted security (Reno 2000:46f). Irrespective of the motives, 
generalised violence sharpens societal contradictions, i.e. it transforms into contradictions 
between those “elevated above the law” and those “falling below it” (Keen 2000:31), or 
more generally into those included and those excluded. Flight is then a turning point at 
which these distinctions find their geographical expression. 
The use of force does not remain as unstructured as a generalisation of violence implies. It 
tends to build clusters, or, put differently, people who have lost access to basic security 
will either die or will reorganise themselves in order to establish security.13  
We can distinguish three ways in which people try to re-establish security: by creating their 
own militias, by becoming affiliated with one of the warring parties, or by seeking the pro-
tection of a foreign state. These solutions are not mutually exclusive and may even coin-
cide. If the option of seeking the protection of a foreign state is not realised or comple-
mented by one of the other solutions, the contradiction finds an organisational expression 
and transforms into one between different actors – refugee warriors and their opponents – 
competing for control over people, territory, economic opportunities etc. The contradiction 
then translates into conflict between different clusters of authority.  
Internally displaced persons (IDP) share essential features with refugees yet have not de-
manded the protection of a foreign state. In order to re-establish security, IDP have to ei-
ther seek the protection of one of the existing warring parties or set up their own militias 
which most likely become party to the conflict. Warring parties may seek such an affilia-
tion because it allows them to control the civilian population and, in some cases, to exploit 
                                                 
12
 In internal wars, the difference between civilian and military structures is blurred. Civilian structures may 
serve as channels for communication, provide material resources and provide hiding places for combat-
ants. 
13
 In a study on political mobilisation of refugees in Central America taking into account political, economic 
and symbolic motives, Hammond identified the feeling of being threatened as the most important motiva-
tion for establishing political organisations (Hammond 1993). Similarly, the Sierra Leonena Kamajor mi-
litia which became a major actor in the country’s civil war first was established as a defence force of dis-
placed civilians (Muana 1997).   
  
 
19
IDP labour.14 Whether this option is viable is essentially a question of resources linking the 
civilian population to the main actors. These resources are partly symbolic in nature, i.e. 
when the population has effectively become divided into clearly demarcated blocks during 
the build-up and the course of war, IDP are likely to become affiliated with one of the war-
ring parties, this being the most cost-effective way to become secure.15 Yet these symbolic 
resources have to be complemented by material resources which the warring parties must 
mobilise. Freedom from direct violence is of little use when material conditions are equally 
life-threatening. Material resources supporting IDP are regularly provided by the interna-
tional community, while local actors exercise control on the spot. Governments, who can 
market resources such as state sovereignty not available to insurgents,16 have a relative 
advantage: control over IDP-camps largely is a government affair.17 In contrast, rebel 
groups tend to rely on refugee camps, which are supported to a greater extent by the inter-
national community and control over which is often not challenged by another actor, i.e. 
the host government.  
Refugees have demanded the protection of another state, an authority not necessarily di-
rectly involved in the conflict. Flight may constitute an exit option enabling people to be 
protected without having to resort to one of the parties in conflict or to constitute militia 
which become party to the conflict. The exit option allows re-establishing a livelihood in a 
new social setting. That is, flight may represent a breach with the order of war, effectively 
weakening its dynamics.  
Yet, upon arrival in the host country the contradiction between nationals and refugees is 
created. Although refugees might and often do become informally integrated, they are al-
most never formally considered legitimate inhabitants of the host country.18 By host gov-
                                                 
14
 Relations between armed actors and civilians do not need to be harmonious, but even slavery-like relations 
most often confer notable security. The situation in Sudan may be an example (cf. Stewart/Samman 
2001:175). 
15
 These symbolic resources can be understood as social capital, i.e. values that demand solidarity (cf. 
Hunout et al 2003). When people feel that they “belong to” an insurgent group for certain (e.g. ethnic) 
reasons, this constitutes social capital. State leaders may nevertheless feel that these people are part of the 
nation, which equally constitutes social capital.  
16
 On sovereignty as a resource cf. Reno 1998:18-24, 2000. 
17
 As humanitarian organisations increasingly delivered into rebel-held territories since the 1990s, that ten-
dency has become less pronounced. 
18
 This constitutes an important deviation from experiences in patrimonial Europe. Then, the civilian popula-
tion was probably even more than nowadays the main target of violence, but people fleeing were most of-
ten considered an asset by neighbouring rulers. Today, there is considerable evidence that in many re-
spects, Third World countries are under-populated. The debate on regional integration in order to com-
pensate for small domestic markets perfectly illustrates the point. Natural population growth has the dis-
advantage that children need considerable investment before they become productive. At current popula-
tion growth rates of 2 to 3 percent, investment per child almost automatically becomes too small for these 
to engage in modern, entrepreneurial economies successfully, while overall investment in children still 
represents a considerable constraint on adults’ ability to invest in economic activities. Apparently, growth 
through refugee immigration has some advantages compared to natural growth. Yet, in political econo-
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ernments and refugees alike, exile is considered a temporary condition, after which “nor-
mal” life in the home country will resume. Refugees are, however, subject to the host gov-
ernment. In their perspective, they find themselves at the bottom of the social ladder, the 
political side being only one aspect. Refugees often feel that the exclusive political struc-
ture of the home country is reproduced in the host country (cf. Malkki 1995:116-119). 
Governments are hardly inclined to spend their patronage on people politically marginal, 
and will instead try to profit from humanitarian resources and occasionally from refugee 
labour. Even where cultural links to the host population exist, rural refugees most often do 
not form an integral part of the local communities, which are usually organised on a village 
level. In order to integrate, refugees usually enter a hierarchical patron-client relationship 
with locals (cf. Harrell-Bond 1986:352-354).19 Even when integrated in such a way for 
decades (and in many instances for generations), refugees typically constitute a social 
category apart, situated at the end of the hierarchy structuring indigenous groupings. But 
even this status is threatened, as they are continually considered outsiders, and might face 
expulsion in case of intensifying political conflict. In essence, the refugee status represents 
a substantial demotion compared to habitual life as far as access to patronage, political 
authorities and participation in (local) decision-making are concerned. Refugees will try to 
improve their social position in the host country. The more social ascendancy is blocked, 
the more expectations remain centred on return to the home country and the resumption of 
habitual life.20 This often seems to depend on political change in the country of origin, 
change which is already pursued by violent means. Refugees may therefore consider sup-
porting one of the warring parties an appropriate response to their situation.  
So far, the analysis has focused on contradictions, i.e. the sharpening of an excluded-
included divide, and the partial integration into host country political reproduction tending 
to uphold that divide. Yet in order to translate into violent conflict, contradictions have to 
translate into organisational capacities. Typical refugee situations facilitate establishing 
and maintaining rebel organisations. The institution of the refugee camp itself is a major 
causal factor. Typically, traditional power holders lose authority in refugee situations, as 
the foundations of that authority are unravelled (cf. Harrell-Bond 1986:259). Camps usu-
                                                                                                                                                    
mies which largely centre on competition for patronage, additional people are rationally perceived a li-
ability. The contemporary challenges to integration are therefore totally different from those in times of 
patrimonial Europe. Rather than the humanitarian system (cf. Luttwak 1997) it is the nature of contempo-
rary Third World political economies which is the main hindrance to absorption of refugees into their host 
states’ societies. 
19
 That relationship is as much political as it is economic. The national patron binds the refugee, guarantees 
the refugee’s social integrity to the host community, and the relationship thus constitutes a means of con-
trol. At the same time, the patron is the vehicle allowing refugees to integrate into local mechanisms of 
land distribution. 
20
 The difference between Palestinians in Lebanon (cf. Nasrallah 1997) and in Jordan (cf. Viorst 1989) per-
fectly illustrates this point. 
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ally have their own local administration being run by refugees.21 Armed factions are often 
well represented or control this camp administration, or they assume informal positions of 
influence in camps. They do so because they are often the best-organised authority repre-
senting the refugee population, although threats of violence often compensate for a lack of 
legitimacy. The organisational capacities these groups demonstrate often make them the 
primary partners of humanitarian organisations for the distribution of supplies during the 
emergency phase. When the host government does not take action against the rebels, they 
acquire a position hard to challenge later on (cf. Jacobsen 2000). Humanitarian organisa-
tions are likely to give in to threats of violence, rather than to withdraw. Humanitarian re-
sources are often helpful in extending insurgents’ contacts and control far beyond the 
camps, as access to dispersed self-settling refugees is facilitated through humanitarian ef-
forts. Furthermore, refugee camps are an ideal environment for recruitment and mobilisa-
tion. As camps concentrate large numbers of people habitually living in rather small com-
munities dispersed over a wider territory, access to and communication with these people 
is drastically facilitated. In turn, refugees interested in recruitment find it much easier to 
contact the armed parties. Not least, secure rear bases which refugee camps can provide are 
important for sustaining a combatant organisation. 
In order for refugee camps to be a secure rear base enabling refugee insurgents to stabilise 
organisationally, the host country government has to tolerate the rebels’ activity (Adel-
mann 1998, Rufin 1999:20). Refugee camps further organisational capacities of insurgents, 
but camps are structures relatively easy to control for host governments (cf. Harrell-Bond 
1986:9, cf. Malkki 1995). In most cases, host governments could thus prevent refugee war-
rior organisations from being consolidated on their territory. Refugee-warriors will try to 
evolve from their vulnerable status and establish a sort of patron-client relationship. Rulers 
are valued patrons as they command important resources related to internationally recog-
nised sovereignty. Occasionally, host country dissidents may be more promising patrons. 
The nature of political, economic, ideological or ethnic trans-border links established be-
fore the refugee influx may make relations with the opposition more likely than relations 
with the government. Yet the government is usually stronger than its rivals. Links to op-
positional forces are likely to complicate refugee conditions, e.g. provoke restrictions on 
movement. Refugees who become a relevant threat to the established regime are likely to 
face expulsion. Links to opposition actors therefore tend to be unsustainable and are rare. 
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They are established whenever host state authorities allow for an independent refugee representation. Par-
ticularly in the Middle East this has not been the case. In these cases, informal refugee bodies often pro-
vide an interlocutor.  
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In case an opposition is strong enough to keep a regime in check, refugees may neverthe-
less be a valued resource for opposition forces trying to raise their profile.  
In order to be appreciated as clients, refugees have to offer benefits to patrons. The most 
important resource they can offer is violence. Regimes presiding over countries with an 
already strongly de-institutionalised security sector are most likely to integrate refugees 
into their security apparatus. Integrating refugees presents advantages over integrating na-
tionals, as their weak standing in the host country makes them depend on the ruler and they 
are unlikely to turn against him. Refugees may be integrated in order to police border ar-
eas, weaken a neighbour perceived as threatening, serve as a reserve force, or be directly 
employed against domestic dissidents (see 2.2).  
Despite the institution of the camp furthering the political organisation of refugees, in the 
absence of links to host country national or local elites, refugees remain weak actors. Al-
though multiple political, economic and symbolic contradictions may separate nationals 
and refugees, refugee situations rarely lead to armed confrontations between nationals and 
refugees (see 2.1) because the latter are too weak to engage in confrontations. Refugees 
will usually rather starve to death than acquire means of subsistence by force,22 and when 
hostilities take place it is usually in the form of weakly organised, sporadic clashes. Chang-
ing the situation in the home country by means of violence is a more realistic solution to 
refugees’ problems than confrontations with nationals. The possibility to maintain combat-
ant organisations largely depends on links with the host country government, yet these 
links make it unlikely that these fighting capacities are employed to combat local groups. 
Hostilities will occur on a greater scale only when links established with elites empower 
refugees to fight national groups. This is typically the case when refugee groups are em-
ployed to administer a peripheral region on behalf of a weak government.23 Generally, 
refugees need relations with host country forces in order to become strong enough to en-
gage in political confrontations against the home country as well as in the host country. 
As has been argued, refugees flee because of violence which either directly or indirectly, 
i.e. through the destruction of means of material reproduction, “created an actual or imag-
ined environment of complete physical insecurity” (Bariagaber 1995:219). That violence is 
partly politically and – as will be shown in the following section - economically instrumen-
tal to the perpetrators, and often the flight of its victims is intended. Yet flight of its adver-
saries not only relieves one party of political and economic threats to its position, but also 
sharpens societal contradictions, i.e. constitutes a geographically manifested included-
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 Harrell-Bond provides some accounts (cf. Harrell-Bond 1986:118f). 
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 The situations in the Pakistani Sindh province and in the Gambella region of Ethiopia, where the Sudan’s 
People Liberation Army (SPLA) had been employed to informally control the autochthon population, are 
examples.  
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excluded divide. This sharpening of contradictions furthers the cohesion of the fleeing 
party. Furthermore, the prospect of political and economical organisation abroad strength-
ens its organisational capacities. That is, flight also furthers the aims of the weaker, fleeing 
combatant organisation, and may be in its immediate interest. Hence, not all refugee flows 
can be attributed to actual violence against civilians. Where the advantages of exile, i.e. the 
fact that flight and particularly the concentration of people in refugee camps reinforce or-
ganisational capacities of insurgent groups, are recognised by elites, the latter may encour-
age or even organise the flight of their basis.  
Such flight typically takes place in an environment of real or imagined relative insecurity. 
Techniques used by armed actors to promote the emigration of their own social basis are 
generally less violent than those used against opponents. They consist of raising fear of the 
enemy, of promising security, and in some cases of direct pressure.24 Such an organised 
emigration seems to depend on several factors. Firstly, links between elites and their basis 
have to be relatively strong. Elites may feel some kind of responsibility for their basis, or at 
least feel that loss of civil support would diminish their strength. In turn, the civilian popu-
lation must retain some kind of confidence in its leaders and feel connected to them to fol-
low them into exile. Secondly, the fleeing armed group must be relatively weak or on the 
retreat in its home country. Its organisational network is in danger, and control of the popu-
lation will be lost, while eventually that population might become accustomed to alterna-
tive rulers. Thirdly, it can count on a sympathetic reception in a neighbouring country, as 
hiding in a familiar environment is still easier than challenging a foreign government de-
termined to control armed elements among the refugee population.  
1.2 Refugees and Material Reproduction 
The economy of Third World societies is characterised by the simultaneous existence of 
two qualitatively different modes of reproduction: subsistence production and market-
oriented commodity production. In most Third World states, the majority of the population 
lives in rural settings. Particularly in Africa and the Middle East, the rural population es-
sentially ensures material reproduction through subsistence agriculture and livestock farm-
ing, with only small portions of the produce being marketed. In Latin America and large 
parts of Asia, agriculture is comparatively more capitalised, land tenure is more concen-
trated and rural wage labour relations are consequently more pronounced, although subsis-
tence production is often still crucial. Even where subsistence production is dominant, the 
modern economy has had large impacts on rural material reproduction. Profits accruing to 
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 The flight of Palestinians during and after the war of 1948 and the flight of Rwandan Hutu in 1994 are 
illustrative cases.  
  
 
24
elites from world market transactions (and international development cooperation) are re-
distributed downwards through clientage networks, and have become an integral part of 
rural economic reproduction. 
Immediate pre-war and war situations are characterised by a cutback of patronage net-
works, motivated by elites’ interests in optimising the cost-benefit ratio of the network 
(Reno 1998:15-44). This process may take place on both an economic and a security level. 
The first dimension refers to a minimisation of cost, i.e. excluding less important elites 
from access to patronage and dissolving relatively expensive and unrewarding services 
such as education and health (cf. Reno 1998:22). The second one refers to the destruction 
of sources of revenue of little use to rulers in order to prevent resources from being used to 
mobilise resistance and in order to make civilians depend on the ruler’s patronage (cf. 
Reno 2000:47). Minimisation of costs implies a sharpening of intra-elite contradictions and 
is directly related to the outbreak of war. Frequently, it is elites excluded from patronage 
networks in the process of cost cutting who mobilise an armed opposition (Keen 2000:24). 
Yet, the most important sharpening of economic contradictions concerning the ordinary 
population is associated with the withdrawal of security. Once armed confrontations have 
begun, both sides will try to undermine the economic basis of the enemy and try to mobi-
lise additional revenue. Pillage is one of several possible means, but the monopolisation of 
trade connections through chasing away or assassinating rivals, the acquisition of land and 
territories by expulsing its inhabitants, and the recrudescence of slavery-like labour rela-
tions basically follow the same logic (cf. Keen 2000:29f). The ensuing economic transfor-
mations imply gains for a few and losses for the majority. Those who lose, lose a position 
in trade, access to revenue accumulation, state patronage and, at the bottom of the socio-
economic order, the land ensuring their subsistence. They will then populate refugee 
camps, try to become winners, try to change the economic order of war, or do all this at 
once. The point to be made here is that violence to a large extent is economically instru-
mental while sharpening societal contradictions, i.e. creating an excluded-included divide 
on the economic level similar to that on the political level. The resulting economic order 
inherently uproots civilians and incites them to either try to change that order (likely by 
violent means), to successfully integrate into it, thereby perpetuating the cycle of violence, 
and/or escape from it. 
As has been demonstrated, the circumstances under which flight occurs are inextricably 
linked to economic losses. Flight then implies further losses, as outward migration de-
mands the mobilisation of revenue. Armed groupings are likely to demand passage money 
on their way and, ultimately, exit money on the border. Upon arrival, an asset transfer to 
locals in the host country is characteristic for refugee situations (Duffield 1994). Often, 
refugees have to sell what is left of their belongings. Locals benefit, as they can ac-
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quire household items, agricultural tools and other goods much cheaper than they would be 
on the local market. Refugees are very often partly compensated later through humanitar-
ian programmes, but that compensation is restricted to the most basic items, e.g. essential 
agricultural tools. Essentially, a contradiction in the host country between those owning 
capital goods and those only able to sell their labour is created.  
Material reproduction in the receiving country is essentially achieved in four different 
ways: dependence on humanitarian rents, traditional agrarian subsistence production, mod-
ern agrarian wage labour, and (mostly urban) informal sector activities. Employment in the 
formal sector and criminality are additional but less central ways to ensure subsistence. 
Firstly, concerning humanitarian aid, despite many deficiencies the international humani-
tarian system represents a fairly effective and reliable source of support hardly imaginable 
only 50 years ago. There are essentially two types of refugee assistance: handouts of essen-
tial goods, and development assistance aimed at promoting self-sufficiency. If host country 
conditions are conducive to economic integration, handouts tend to be phased out rapidly 
and humanitarian organisations shift to development assistance (cf. UNHCR 2001a:1-
12).25 The discussion about humanitarian refugee aid in war economies has focussed on 
handouts, while other, entrepreneurial forms of economic reproduction have been grossly 
neglected, although these frequently seem to fund voluntary contributions to insurgents or 
may even be taxed by these.26  
Refugee income and particularly humanitarian resources may be acquired by insurgents by 
looting refugee camps and villages, but non-violent ways to appropriate handouts seem to 
be much more important. Handouts are distributed in various ways. Nowadays, NGOs de-
livering supplies to registered individuals or heads of families is the standard practice, but 
organisational structures of the refugees, be it customary ones or those established by rebel 
groups, are still employed for purposes of distribution. The latter way of distribution offers 
the best opportunities for a diversion of aid. Armed movements distributing humanitarian 
aid acquire positions as patrons. Aid then empowers these actors and confers to them a 
degree of legitimacy. Even in the best of cases, distribution through third parties on the 
basis of individual registration, these actors can still profit, either by registering combatants 
as refugees, through support by registered family members, or through taxation of civilian 
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 For instance, in some localities in Guinea food aid was phased out after less than a year after arrival. 
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 As the issue has been neglected so far, there is little firm evidence. The Palestinian case (cf. Viorst 1989), 
observations by Malkki (1995) and Harrell-Bond (1986:61) as well as the situation in Guinea-Bissau’s 
unassisted refugee villages inhabited by Senegalese indicate that refugee resources supporting insurgents 
are not necessarily derived from humanitarian aid. In the Senegalese case, the refugee villages were of 
great strategic importance to the rebels frequently retreating there. The insurgents seemed to be hosted 
and cared for by civilian relatives (Evans, pers. comm.), thus received resources, but occasionally recip-
rocated by providing doe meat and fruits acquired in Senegal to the villagers (Evans 2003:16). 
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refugees. Generally, refugee figures are estimated to be more or less grossly inflated, and 
comparatively mobile members of armed movements are able to apply several times for 
registration. Humanitarian organisations regularly try to start re-registration exercises. At 
times, these are obstructed by threats or actual violence by armed actors. As many civilian 
refugees profit from being registered several times as well, the ability to obstruct a re-
registration exercise confers legitimacy to these very actors. Yet, handouts typically consist 
of items of little value, and even in the case of grossly inflated figures, the overall value of 
diverted goods most likely is small (Shearer 2000). For humanitarian assistance to be mili-
tarily significant, armed movements have to control distribution at the highest stage, or 
they have to be organisationally strong enough to establish a comprehensive system of 
taxation of refugees.27 The latter is effectively a matter of the legitimacy of these rebel 
groups and their ability to coerce, the latter being strongly dependent on the attitude of the 
host state. If revenues are acquired by taxing refugees, it is of little importance whether 
refugees ensure their subsistence through handouts or economic activity: in both cases, the 
surplus that can accrue to combatants is rather small. In essence, humanitarian aid can and 
often does further the organisational capacities of insurgents. Yet, the mere fact that refu-
gees can enjoy security allowing them to stay alive and engage in economic activities may 
similarly sustain combatant organisations. 
Humanitarian aid to refugees is largely a rural affair,28 and generally the rural population in 
Third World countries is the poorest segment of these societies. The rent accruing to refu-
gees may cause jealousy and locals may demand that they be served equally (cf. Harrell-
Bond 1986:24, Klingebiel et al. 2000). In order to attract aid, locals may – often effectively 
- put pressure on refugees, e.g. prevent them from leaving the camps or rob them, possibly 
sparking clashes. Social distance between refugees and locals as well as the perception that 
the local population is negatively affected by the refugees’ presence increase the probabil-
ity of such attitudes.29 These situations require sensitive handling by humanitarian organi-
sations, yet we cannot consider them an expression of manifest societal contradictions, as 
ultimately the rent accruing to locals is dependent on the presence of the refugees and the 
former therefore have or develop an interest in the latter’s continued stay. However, as 
                                                 
27
 For example, Rwandan armed Hutu elements in Zaire taxed both humanitarian and other revenues (Reynt-
jens 1999:19). Fully self-sufficient refugees may be similarly be taxed (on the Burundian Hutu refugees 
in Tanzania cf. Malkki 1995:130). 
28
 For reasons of cost reduction, only few refugees falling into the designated category of “urban refugees” 
are entitled to UNHCR assistance in cities. The category includes only those refugees of urban back-
ground judged to be unable to integrate into rural life. As well, host governments frequently ban refugees 
from cities and confine them to camp areas. 
29
 Social distance can be defined as the absence of social capital, i.e. the absence of values demanding soli-
darity (cf. Hunout et al 2003).  
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humanitarian organisations often cannot transfer refugees to alternative sites, locals have 
considerable leverage. 
Secondly, most refugees engage in agriculture, either being self-sufficient or complement-
ing humanitarian assistance with their own produce. Refugees engaging in subsistence 
farming usually have to negotiate access to land with locals.30 Cultural similarities consid-
erably facilitate negotiations, but are not necessary and frequently not sufficient for being 
granted land. Frequently, locals’ material interests are furthered by temporarily allocating 
land to refugees. Humanitarian organisations regularly assume the position of an interme-
diary, offering the local population benefits in exchange for granting the refugees access to 
land. Alternatively or complementarily, locals may allocate undeveloped land to have it 
cleared by refugees and then retake it (cf. Harrell-Bond 1986:157f, Black/Sessay 1997). 
Locals generally maintain control over land resources. Refugees may resent locals’ atti-
tudes and the position they assume in relations with them, which regularly is an effective 
social demotion. Refugees are however unlikely to confront those they directly have to 
relate with because of interdependencies and their lack of conflict capacities. Instead, they 
might increase fighting capacities of local groups they are aligning with, thus becoming 
involved in and catalysing conflict between domestic actors (cf. Harrell-Bond 1986:336). 
In these cases, refugees typically are allocated undeveloped land claimed not only by their 
patrons but by neighbouring groups as well. As the community granting the land–rather 
than the refugees–thereby consolidates the land claim, this can exacerbate latent tensions. 
Concerning other interests of locals, a refugee influx regularly leads to an upsurge in de-
mand and consequently higher prices for essential goods. Two numerically important strata 
of the population - peasants and traders - profit. Rather than creating land pressure disad-
vantaging locals, the refugee presence can thus benefit peasant interests.  
Generally, rural integration, particularly into systems of subsistence production, is best 
possible where cultural similarities are pronounced. This is most likely the case in regions 
bordering the home country. At the same time, contact to rebel groups is particularly easy 
in these regions, and refugees often voluntarily supply shelter to armed groups retreating 
across the border. In other cases, guerrillas cross the border to plunder refugee villages. 
Consequently there is a dilemma: Where integration into the receiving country and its 
economy is most likely, the support of armed movements through refugee resources is also 
most likely.31 In order not to support a war economy it may be logical to relocate refugees 
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 As well, the state may allocate land, but this typically seems to be the case in remote, sparsely populated 
regions, were land conflicts are least likely to arise. As well, local authorities often mediate between refu-
gees and nationals, but tend to let the latter decide (cf. Harrell-Bond 1986:157f). 
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 The situations on the Senegalese-Guinean (Bissau) border (cf. Evans 2003) and in Guinea are examples.  
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into the interior of a receiving country, where they are more likely to relate uneasily to the 
local population and to depend on humanitarian handouts.  
Thirdly, refugees engage in agrarian wage labour.32 Capacities for the integration of 
strangers into traditional systems of land distribution are limited, particularly where land 
ownership is concentrated and agriculture is relatively capitalised, and flight creates what 
Marx called the “doppelt freien Arbeiter” and considered a precondition for capitalist eco-
nomic activity (Marx 1987:183+742). Refugees are typically free from traditional personal 
relations of dependency governing the use of their labour, and they are free from the means 
necessary to ensure their subsistence. Consequently, a refugee influx regularly leads to a 
sharp increase in rural wage labour relations. They are often employed by local small-scale 
farmers, but also by plantation holders. These rural wage labour relations tend to be infor-
mal, legal protection is precarious, traditional rules of behaviour are less binding where 
strangers are concerned, and degrees of exploitation tend to be high. The contradiction is 
thus a modern one between capital and labour, yet it tends to be mitigated because of inter-
dependency. The modern contradiction may combine with the traditional one, and both 
may be mutually reinforcing. Competition for jobs may cause hostility between national 
rural labourers and refugees. The competition may however be mitigated, as refugee de-
mand for goods often creates a demand for additional labour. 
The fourth way in which significant numbers of refugees try to ensure their subsistence is 
work in the urban, informal sector. Generally, this sector is in no way an island of free 
market forces but is strongly protected by informal means, e.g. ethnic relations and politi-
cal connections (Altmann 1991:10). If ethnic or other connections allow for it, refugees 
may be able to integrate into the sector, possibly increasing conflicts between domestic 
actors.33 Often, they have to confine themselves to a few niches and are likely to face po-
litical or other sanctions if they do not.34 Typically, the informal sector agents rivalling 
with refugees are those who have little (organised) power themselves. A lack of organisa-
tional capacities on both sides implies that rivalries will not transform into organised con-
flict. Refugees may have advantages in some sectors, e.g. they may bring with them re-
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 Refugees may as well engage in non-agrarian wage labour and these labour relations do have much in 
common with those described in this paragraph, but as most refugee camps are situated in rather remote, 
rural regions, agrarian labour dominates. Arrangements such as in Lebanon, where refugee camps were 
deliberately put up near cities in order to provide labour for factories (cf. Hudson 1997) seem to be an ex-
ception.  
33
 This seems to be the case with Pashtun drug trafficking networks operating in the Pakistani-Afghan border 
area (cf. Gantzel/Schwinghammer 1995:R210f). 
34
 For instance, Harrell-Bond (1986:339) attributed the growing tendency of confining refugees in Sudan to 
camps to the threat these posed to networks controlling the informal commercial sector. Similarly, com-
petition for the control of informal trade apparently constituted the background to the closure of Kenya’s 
coastal refugee camps and the relocation of refugees to the Dadaab and Kakuma areas (cf. Crisp 
2000:62f). 
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quired skills which are in short supply in the receiving country. Then they may be able to 
dominate some little competitive segments of the informal sector. A sector refugees typi-
cally are well positioned in is cross-border trade with the home country. Host country in-
terests very often have considerable difficulties to penetrate the home country war econ-
omy, and the connections refugees have can make them an attractive partner for nationals. 
Interests in trade may explain alliances between host country elites and refugee insurgents. 
That cross-border trade typically integrates into the war economy, as insurgents may di-
rectly conduct trade or tax activities of civilian refugees (cf. Harrell-Bond 1986:120). In 
essence, violence is unlikely to arise as a result of informal sector competition between 
nationals and refugees, as nationals have other, more effective means to promote their in-
terests.  
Fifthly, refugees may partake in economic reproduction in the formal sector of a host coun-
try. This is essentially a long-term development, as exceptionally few refugees will inte-
grate into the sector. The public sector, by far the most important employer for skilled la-
bour in most Third World countries, is often a vehicle for distributing patronage, and refu-
gees consequently have few chances to integrate. Humanitarian efforts considerably in-
crease the possibility for refugees, as compared to locals, to receive education. Where con-
ventional ways to realise self-sufficiency are blocked, for instance if refugees do not get 
sufficient access to land, humanitarian organisations may emphasise education as a way of 
becoming self-sufficient. Long-term refugee populations may become better educated on 
average than nationals,35 be consequently perceived as privileged and may face hostility. 
Even where refugees succeed to integrate, they may continue to seek employment in their 
home countries, particularly when in the host country opposition to foreigners being em-
ployed in the formal sector is pronounced and their status appears insecure.36 They may 
thus opt for supporting an armed return, reasoning that they would be rewarded with a pub-
lic sector position in their home country. 
Finally, crime as a way of reproduction is important because it is likely to become a focal 
point of resentment against refugees and most likely the immediate cause of clashes 
(Mehler 2000:38f). The humanitarian system generally does not perform too badly, and it 
is no exception that refugees are materially better off than the locals, and have better access 
to medical care and schooling. But it only provides for basic care, and refugee situations 
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 Rwandan refugees in Uganda and Palestinian refugees are examples. 
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 In contrast to refugees in Uganda, Palestinians in high-ranking positions in Middle Eastern host countries 
did not support armed groups because of their vulnerable status but rather because of a nationalist ideol-
ogy particularly pronounced among modern elites and strongly supported by the host countries. Yet, as 
will be shown later, the imposition of that ideology is closely connected to the societal transformations 
refugee existence represents, including the institution of refugee camps and education provided by hu-
manitarian organisations. 
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offer few perspectives for the people to improve their social status. Refugees usually dis-
pose of little material, social and cultural capital in exile,37 and consequently conventional 
ways to improve their situation are blocked or at least less open to them. This social ano-
mie typically coincides with a breakdown of mechanisms of social control.38 That break-
down is represented by the erosion of customary authority in refugee situations and a lack 
of norms prescribing how to relate to the new neighbours. Crime against locals is not nec-
essarily socially sanctioned within the refugee community. Crime may be adopted as a 
fairly accessible–and in situations of war fairly established and therefore obvious–means of 
improving ones economic situation. Yet, crime rarely leads to persistent violent conflict 
between locals and refugees, but rather to sporadic clashes in which locals prevail. Locals 
are usually better protected by security forces.39 Where the state fails to organise security, 
people organise it themselves. In regions where a monopoly on the use of force does not 
exist, locals have the same opportunities to acquire weapons as armed elements among the 
refugee population, and should the need arise a market for weapons will develop. Local 
militias usually have advantages over foreign ones. Being more familiar with the territory 
and the people, they are able to monitor activities in their territory. Where divisions be-
tween locals and refugees are pronounced, the refugees’ movements can often be effec-
tively controlled.40 In extreme cases, locals or state authorities may confine refugees to 
camps or even expel them. In contrast, crime can become endemic and may resemble low-
level conflict where local groups and refugee elements engage in crime together.41 Refu-
gees may have ethnic or other ties to locals, who in turn may have little common ground 
with other domestic groups. Refugees then can import crime, as they come from an envi-
ronment in which they have “learned” that it is often an effective way to fulfil aspirations 
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 Material capital means capital in the conventional sense, i.e. accumulated values. Here, social capital des-
ignates contacts that can be employed for economic purposes, while cultural capital means the know-how 
necessary to engage successfully in economic activities in a given socio-cultural environment. 
38
 The term social anomie as employed here designates a situation in which aspirations do not correspond 
with means necessary to fulfil aspirations (cf. Durkheim 1990, Merton 1979). 
39
 As in Sudan, for instance, authorities may react drastically and indiscriminately arrest large numbers of 
refugees (cf. Harrell-Bond 1986:62). Such arrests do not conform with Western standards of human 
rights, but are nevertheless often effective against crime. 
40
 The difference between the situation in the Dadaab- (see footnote below) and in the Kakuma-area of Kenya 
is most interesting. Although sharing the effective absence of state control with Dadaab, in contrast to the 
situation there, in Kakuma locals rarely fall victim to criminal acts by refugees, while refugees are fre-
quently robbed by locals or other refugees (Crisp 2000). The main difference between the two localities 
seems to be that the social distance between the Sudanese refugees and locals is considerable in Kakuma, 
while in Dadaab, refugees and locals of Somali ethnicity intermingle. 
41
 As is the case in the area of the Somali-populated Dadaab-camps in Kenya (cf. Crisp 2000) and–less dras-
tically–in the Kagera-region in Tanzania (cf. Klingebiel et al. 2000). 
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and in which a market for weapons has already been developed.42 These market connec-
tions can then be extended into the refugee-populated area.  
1.3 Refugees and Symbolic Reproduction 
As means of symbolic reproduction we designate those paradigms, world views, systems 
of thought etc. through which people analyse, interpret and experience their livelihoods (cf. 
Jung 1995:99f). These means of symbolic reproduction are collective and make possible a 
commonly shared understanding of a given situation. In conflicts, symbolic reproduction 
conventionally appears as ideology. Rather than causing conflicts, ideologies serve as a 
means to express contradictions situated in the other dimensions of societal reproduction 
(cf. Siegelberg 1994). That does not mean that symbolic reproduction is irrelevant. The 
difference in worldviews etc. may explain why sharp economic and political contradictions 
lead to war in one case but do not in the other. Finally, it is means of symbolic reproduc-
tion which actors use to interpret their situation and enable them to conclude that violence 
must or should be employed to change the status quo (or to oppose changes in it). Yet 
symbolic reproduction is not static. Although it is assumed to be changing rather slowly 
compared to the other two dimensions of societal reproduction, immediately before and 
during situations of armed conflict, changes (situated on the “conflict” stage of the gram-
mar of war) occur. It is particularly these changes as related to refugee situations which I 
intend to analyse here. 
Scholarly perceptions that conflicts are increasingly or overwhelmingly structured along 
ethnic lines (cf. Wimmer 1995:464) have given rise to the concept of “ethnic conflict” in 
the 1990s. As Münkler (2002:16) has observed, contemporary conflicts are, beside other 
concerns, motivated by a combination of ethno-cultural considerations and convictions 
commonly regarded as ideology. I propose not to consider the two as totally distinct, and 
suggest to focus on the interplay between the two dimensions. In some cases the analytical 
distinction may be useful, but here it is their common function of political mobilisation 
which is of interest.43 Ethnic ideologies are very often combined with a kind of class con-
sciousness centring on the perception that the in-group was economically and politically 
marginalized or was threatened to become so in the near future (cf. Wimmer 1995). 
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 As Cloward (1979) has pointed out, people from social environments where crime is ripe and is therefore 
easily “learned” are more likely to respond with crime to an anomic situation than others. 
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 Anderson (1993:20) strongly advocates to maintain that distinction. Yet he also recognised “daß sich seit 
dem Zeiten Weltkrieg jede erfolgreiche Revolution in nationalen Begriffen definiert“ (ibid:12). Symbols 
of the revolution have become national symbols and vice versa. 
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In studies on nationalism and ethnicity, Benedict Anderson’s concept of “imagined com-
munities” (1993), which for the first time presented a fully subjectivist theory of national-
ism, has become one of the most prominent approaches. Its strength is that it analyses the 
concept of nation as a symbolic order existing in the mind. These symbols may have their 
origins in past times, but may as well have been created more recently, i.e. during the era 
of nationalism. In phases of nationalist agitation, ancient sets of symbols are restructured 
and symbols are reinterpreted. Although an illusion of historical continuity is thus created 
by the nationalists, nations and other politicised “imagined communities” are relatively 
recent innovations not relying on historical continuity (on ethnic groups cf. Elwert 1989).  
In traditional settings, the in-group tends to be narrowly defined. Household, kinship, 
caste, and village are examples of institutions uniting people in the belief that they have a 
common identity. It was the destruction of these localised in-groups and the authority 
structures they where embedded in which largely accounted for the rise of nationalism in 
Europe (cf. Siegelberg 2000:25). Similarly, the rise of ethnicity in the Third World has 
been analysed as a result of colonially induced modernisation, particularly of the imposi-
tion of statehood, the extension of the monetarised economy and urbanisation (Elwert 
1989). In Anderson’s theory, the categories of social mobility (Anderson 1993:55-63) and 
mass communication (ibid:44-54) assume a key position. Social mobility is understood as 
both horizontal geographical mobility and vertical social mobility. Upward vertical social 
mobility dislodged individuals from their traditional communities and the structures of 
authority they were embedded in. It enabled people to question the customary order as 
much as it pushed them to search for new systems of symbols to base their lives on. 
Greater geographical mobility then brought these people together, let them experience new 
lifestyles, discover similarities, and develop the idea of a common fate and identity (cf. 
Anderson 1993:62-63+82). These ideas were communicated through newly emerging me-
dia of mass communication (ibid: 44-54) and found a receptive environment as the cus-
tomary order increasingly appeared anachronistic. Correspondingly, contemporary pro-
tagonists of ethnic ideologies and organizers of ethnic pressure groups emanate from the 
middle class (Wimmer 1995:470). It is particularly people who had access to modern edu-
cation and who occupy or occupied posts in the public sector (or the churches) that rede-
fine cultural symbols and mobilise on ethnic grounds.  
Forced migration directly causes the destruction of traditional communities. People habitu-
ally living in rather small communities are then propelled into refugee camps assembling 
thousands and often tens of thousands of individuals from different regions and social 
backgrounds. Many of them had to flee or were expelled because of their group identity, 
and contacts and communication in refugee camps makes them experience that they indeed 
do have a common fate. Flight and its cir- cumstances become symbols through which 
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the community is imagined. In the extreme, an ethnic identity which by and large was as-
cribed to them by others, i.e. “the enemy”, is appropriated as a valid self-identification.44 
Flight has the effect of levelling traditional stratifications: strongly differentiated people 
become refugees, have to deal with the same problems and tend to adopt similar strategies 
of survival, while the importance of the traditional social standing is diminished. Accord-
ingly, the vertical social mobility associated with flight is primarily downward social mo-
bility. It can nevertheless be as effective as upward mobility in creating a common identity. 
Refugees in general and particularly those confined to camps have diminished opportuni-
ties to adopt the conventionally employed techniques to improve their livelihoods. Even 
for the many self-sufficient refugees whose lives objectively do not differ much from what 
they could expect in their home countries, this loss of perspective is often felt as a social 
and economic degradation in itself. Economic living conditions thus help to explain the 
emergence or strengthening of an ethnic or class consciousness or a combination of the 
two.45 Under these circumstances, a “refugee” identity often symbolises a degree of up-
ward social mobility and becomes part of the wider group identity, particularly because 
international “refugee” protection turns the identity into a valuable resource. International 
protection offers a legal status in the host country and symbolises international recognition 
of the group’s plight (cf. Malkki 1995, Peteet 1997:36f).  
In order to spread, communal symbols have to be communicated to receptive masses. So-
cial levelling in refugee camps is not absolute, and modernised elites, the typical carriers of 
political ideologies, often formally or informally assume an outstanding position in 
camps.46 Most often, they are the ones who represent the refugees in the camp institutions 
and organise the part of refugee life left to these institutions. Camp leadership positions are 
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 The Burundian “Hutu” refugees in Tanzania who fled the massacres instigated by the regime since 1972 
indeed seemed to be strongly regionally oriented before they became refugees. “People from very differ-
ent regions of Burundi who had had little to do with each other prior to 1972 were thrown together in ex-
ile with a strong consciousness that they were there because of something they all had in common, their 
Hutuness” (Malkki 1995:102). “[T]he Hutu refugees in the camp located their identities within their dis-
placement extracting meaning and power from the interstitial social location they inhabited. Instead of 
losing their collective identity, this is where and how they made it” (ibid:16).  
45
 The camp refugees studied by Malkki maintained that “Hutu” is a synonym for “servant”. This notion 
which emerged in the camp equated the situation in Tanzania to that in Burundi. The refugees faced se-
vere restrictions on mobility, therefore had to continue to live on agriculture and were acutely aware of 
the fact that the export earning of the produce they had to sell to the state marketing boards, as well as the 
taxes they had to pay, were accruing to a political elite which seemed – despite rhetoric to the contrary - 
to have no intention to integrate them politically or socially (Malkki 1995:116-119).  
46
 In the camp studied by Malkki (1995) in 1985/86, the “Parti pour la libération du peuple Hutu” (PALIPE-
HUTU) had a very strong position although the camp had been economically self-sufficient for about ten 
years, was administered by the Tanzanian government, and the PALIPEHUTU faced repression from the 
Tanzanian authorities. The PALIPEHUTU’s armed wing “Forces nationales de libération” (FNL) is the 
second largest rebel group in the Burundian internal war which started in 1993. It is important to note that 
had the Tanzanian government maintained its stance against the PALIPEHUTU, the FNL could not have 
become an active military force. 
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instrumental in propagating ideologies, and when leadership positions are assumed by 
members of rebel groups, no matter whether belonging to a military or a civilian wing, the 
opportunities these positions offer to communicate with the refugee population will be 
used to further rebel aims. Ideological discourses confer legitimacy to armed groups and 
have direct implications for two interrelated dimensions power: power over the refugee 
community on the one hand, and consequent power to challenge the home country gov-
ernment on the other. The refugees’ group identity regularly includes the definition of the 
sending state as “home”, and the notion of a group interest unites civilians and combatants 
in the belief of having a common fate to be realised in the home country. The opportunity 
for political agitators to communicate with masses they could hardly have reached before 
strongly depends on the institution of the camp.47 Refugee self-help groups, distribution 
centres for dispersed refugees etc. may serve communication purposes as well, yet these 
institutions only provide limited occasions for agitation. 
Malkki’s (1995) comparison of urban, (illegally) self-settling refugees and those amassed 
in an isolated camp strongly suggests that social isolation and the blocking of upward so-
cial mobility are decisive in shaping an ethnic consciousness. Idiosyncratic discourses 
logically complement social isolation. Blocking upward social mobility prevents develop-
ments which enforce pragmatic identity management and which could ultimately lead to 
integration into the host society. As has been pointed out, the informal sector in Third 
World states is protected by and structured through informal relations often bound to eth-
nicity. Under these circumstances idiosyncratic discourses are a hindrance to economic 
improvement, and offer no realistic solution to typical refugee problems. If we can general-
ise from Malkki’s (1995) and Schrijvers’ (1999:324-329) findings, refugees try to over-
come obstacles imposed by identity-based informal structures through identity switching. 
Often refugees do have cultural similarities to people in the receiving country and they can 
pretend to belong to that national group. Both authors also observed the adoption of a new 
religion as a means to integrate socio-economically into the host society. In that process, 
the foreign identity may become less opportune and less frequently used, and may even be 
given up in the end.  
1.4 Implications for the Social Order of Refugee-Warriors 
In the three preceding sections, the societal order of refugees has been analysed as charac-
terised by three tendencies: the exclusion from a home country system of reproduction, 
                                                 
47
 Unsurprisingly, the PALIPEHUTU advocated that all refugees should be settled in camps, as the urban 
self-settlers (see below) overwhelmingly rejected their agitation. 
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partial integration into a host country system of reproduction tending to reproduce the in-
cluded-excluded divide, and partial reintegration into an alternative insurgent order. The 
latter partly compensates for exclusivist tendencies in the former two. In lieu of a prelimi-
nary conclusion, subsequently I shortly summarise how the alternative system of a refugee 
army is organised. 
Refugee insurgents, i.e. non-state actors, exercise political authority over refugee agglom-
erations, typically refugee camps. Political links to refugee villages may exist, but these are 
often weaker. These refugee agglomerations are typically extraterritorial, i.e. not situated 
within the territory that is fought for. This implies that the insurgents’ political authority is 
not or hardly subject to competition with the home state. If it is not challenged by the host 
state, it can unfold essentially unhindered. Authority is exercised informally and/or for-
mally through camp administrations, the latter option indicating a higher degree of legiti-
macy. Sources of legitimacy are the promise of furthering refugees’ interests in the host 
country, symbolic resources linking combatants and civilians, and patronage, i.e. providing 
social services or obstructing humanitarian efforts aimed at reducing the official refugee 
figure. Coercive capacities may and often do compensate for a lack of legitimacy. Refugee 
camps and villages sustain the organisation’s manpower by providing a reservoir for 
voluntary or forced recruitment. 
Economically, refugee-warriors are sustained by looting or directly diverting supplies, tax-
ing refugee income and supplies, and contributions from economically successful refugees. 
Revenues accruing from refugee supplies and subsistence income are typically small and 
will primarily be used to support the organisation’s staff, particularly its combatants. That 
is, humanitarian resources destined for the refugee masses are redistributed upwards. 
Refugee-warriors cultivating legitimacy by organising social services need contributions 
from wealthy refugees and/or alternative sources of income. A lack of humanitarian assis-
tance may increase pressure on insurgents to negotiate with civilian refugees in order to 
receive support.48 As unassisted refugee villages are prone to economic breakdown in case 
of looting and that would deprive rebels of strategically important rear bases, rebels might 
compensate civilian refugees for providing shelter and food to retreating fighters.  
Refugee-warriors achieve symbolic reproduction through a group identity linking the refu-
gee population and the combatants. This wider group identity is strengthened in refugee 
                                                 
48
 However, reciprocal relations between rebels and civilians on the Senegalese-Guinea-Bissauan border 
apparently are not only conditioned by a lack of humanitarian assistance, but perhaps more importantly 
by family links between combatants and civilians (Evans, pers. comm.). 
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situations, supporting the notion of a common fate of civilians and combatants. As the 
group identity includes definitions of “home”, it unites the two in the belief of furthering a 
common interest in a return under inclusive conditions in the home country.  
  
 
37
2 Host States, Humanitarian Assistance, and Refugees in Arms 
In chapter one, a comprehensive approach to the phenomenon of refugees in arms has been 
outlined. The chapter put strong emphasis on the creation of contradictions and presented 
in most general terms how these translate into the conflict-stage of the “grammar of war”, 
i.e. combat capabilities. The present chapter represents a deepening of that second com-
plex. It is intended to examine in detail the role of two important variables, the host coun-
try and humanitarian aid, for the creation of fighting capabilities. The importance of host 
country actors has been mentioned several times in chapter one, suggesting to further ex-
plore it. As the role of humanitarian assistance has the greatest implications for interna-
tional refugee policies and therefore is at the centre of the discussion about refugee-
warriors, it equally deserves closer scrutiny.  
Section 2.1 presents empirical data on whom refugees fight most frequently, i.e. against 
whom combat capabilities are mobilised, and where this is the case, i.e. which host coun-
tries are particularly vulnerable to refugee-warriors’ activities. In 2.1, frequent constella-
tions of actors and particularly affected countries are identified. It prepares section 2.2 
concerned with the mechanisms through which refugee insurgents can acquire combat ca-
pabilities. These mechanisms are investigated by a detailed analysis of two cases identified 
as being of outstanding importance. The analysis in section 2.2 centres on the concept of 
trans-national political networks outlined in 1.1, and shows why an integration of refugees 
into host country networks took place and how it affected domestic and cross-border secu-
rity. In 2.3, the issue of the impact of refugee assistance on wars is introduced by a brief 
reflection on how the issue has historically been perceived by humanitarian organisations. 
Subsequently, the impact humanitarian aid had in the two cases already investigated from a 
different perspective in the preceding section is analysed. These two cases are particularly 
instructive because of the varying impact of humanitarian aid.  
Before exploring the phenomenon of refugees in arms in further detail, it is useful to define 
what constitutes a militarised refugee population or a militarised refugee camp. Zolberg et 
al. define “refugee-warrior communities” as “not merely a passive group of dependent 
refugees, but […, ] highly conscious refugee communities with a political leadership struc-
ture and armed sections engaged in warfare for a political objective” (Zolberg et al. 
1989:275). The political structure linking civilians and combatants is decisive and the no-
tion of “refugee-warrior communities” also applies where military and civilian facilities 
are separated (ibid:276f). Lischer’s definition is similar, but stresses economic and social 
links less relevant to Zolberg et al.. “Militarization [of refugee populations, F.G.] describes 
non-civilian attributes of refugee-populated areas, including inflow of weapons, military 
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training and recruitment. Militarization also includes actions of refugees and/or exiles who 
engage in non-civilian activity outside the refugee camp, yet who depend on assistance 
from refugees or international organisations.49 Refugees or exiles who store arms and train 
outside the camps, yet return to the camp for food, medical assistance, and family visits, 
create a militarized refugee population. It follows that demilitarization entails the delinking 
of the refugee populated area from military actors and military activity and respect by all 
parties (i.e. refugees, receiving state government, and any external intervenors) for interna-
tional law relating to the protection of refugees” (Lischer 2000:3). According to these defi-
nitions, refugee camps are militarised where they host and supply militarised refugee popu-
lations, regardless whether the camp actually includes military facilities or not.50 It seems 
however appropriate to emphasise a factor only implicit in the above definitions. A few 
combatants visiting family members do not create militarised refugee populations; combat-
ants have to enter the refugee-populated area in question regularly and in proportions sug-
gesting that a presence in that area is part of the insurgents’ strategy.  
2.1 Refugees in Arms: Empirical Evidence 
This section is intended to gather data on refugee involvement in armed conflict. As schol-
ars concerned with cross-border incursions of refugee-warriors have reached diametrically 
opposed conclusions and little has been systematically explored so far,51 a comprehensive 
history of the phenomenon cannot be established at this stage. In contrast, concerning in-
volvement of refugee-warriors in fighting in the host country, comparatively reliable data 
covering an extended time period, i.e. 1945 to 1992, could be gathered.  
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 “The term exiles refers to people, including soldiers and war criminals, who left their country of origin but 
who do not qualify for refugee status. Exiles and refugees may live indistinguishably in camps, as they 
did in Zaire after the exodus from Rwanda” (Lischer 2000:Footnote 9). Because of the connection be-
tween exiles and refugees (apparent in the quotation), in this paper exiles have been included in the cate-
gory of refugees. 
50
 This contradicts UNHCR’s position according to which the problem can be solved through physical sepa-
ration of military and civilian structures (Zolberg et al. 1989:277). Zolberg et al. consider such a separa-
tion to have been the rule rather than the exception, but as the military and civilian facilities had strong 
political, economic and social links (ibid:276f), the civilian ones have to be regarded equally militarised.  
51
 For example, Shawcross claims that “in the eighties [the militarisation of refugee camps, F.G.] had been 
the exception […]. In the nineties, it became commonplace” (Shawcross 2000:378). In contrast, Rufin 
postulates a drastic reduction of “humanitarian sanctuaries” in the 1990s (Rufin 1999:26f). A third posi-
tion, that of continuity, is assumed by Barber (1997) and Luttwak (1999). All these claims are character-
ised by methodological flaws. Shawcross, primarily occupied with the situation in the 1990s, presents a 
rather superficial analysis of the situation in the previous decade. Rufin, Barber and Luttwak base their 
claim on too small and consequently questionable samples. Changes in a few high-profile refugee crises 
are strongly reflected in Rufin’s judgement. Barber and Luttwak, in turn, highlight continuity in a few 
high-profile crises, e.g. Palestine and the Great Lakes Region. 
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Gantzel/Schwinghammer (1995) delivered brief, systematic descriptions of all instances of 
political violence 1945 to 1992 that qualify as wars as defined above. They aim at identify-
ing the social bases of the warring parties, but as refugees conventionally have not been 
considered a distinct social basis in wars, refugee involvement in fighting in the home 
country is not fully reported in the publication. In contrast, direct foreign involvement in 
internal wars is highly conspicuous and generally regarded a significant aspect. Refugee 
involvement in fighting in the host country has thus mostly been reported in 
Gantzel/Schwinghammer (1995). In all, they have identified 142 cases of internal warfare, 
including combinations of internal and international war. Apparently, only in nine of these, 
refugees fought within the host polity. As most of the world’s states have received refugees 
during the period in question, the conventional wisdom that a refugee influx destabilises 
receiving countries seems rather unfounded, or, in the overwhelming majority of cases, the 
destabilisation appears to have been a minor one. 
In four of these cases, refugees fought for the host government: In Costa Rica’s war in 
1948, Nicaraguan exiles and government troops fought the Legion del Caribe, and in 
Uganda’s war in 1978-1979, Rwandan and Sudanese refugees fought together with the Idi 
Amin government against several rebel groups and Tanzania.52 In a later Ugandan war 
(1981-1992), Rwandan refugees supported the government of Yoweri Museveni, who had 
succeeded to conquer much of the country in 1986. In the war in Sierra Leone (1991-
2002), Liberian refugees organised in the rebel United Liberation Movement (ULIMO) 
supported the government in fighting the Revolutionary United Front, a force which had 
close ties to a Liberian guerilla rivalling the ULIMO. 
In four wars refugees fought against the host country government. In the Mulelist uprising 
in Zaire in 1963-1966, Rwandan Tutsi refugees aligned with the insurgents. In the Ugan-
dan war in 1978-1979, Rwandan Tutsi refugees fought not only for the government, but as 
well alongside Museveni’s rebel Front for National Salvation, as they did during the first 
phase of the war, when Museveni’s National Resistance Army fought against the Obote 
regime (1981-1986).53 The only case in which refugees were a largely independent, main 
actor challenging a government was the “Black September” war 1970-1971, pitting the 
Jordanian state against Palestinian resistance groups. 
In a further three cases, refugees’ position was somewhat ambiguous. In the Lebanese war 
(1975-1990), the Palestine Liberation Organisation (PLO) fought against the forces inter-
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 The Ugandan wars are the only ones frequently referred to in the literature on the subject in which the 
participation of foreign refugees in internal war was not mentioned or only mentioned in the description 
of another war, the one in Rwanda (1990-1994) in Gantzel/Schwinghammer (cf. 1995:R89). On Amin’s 
security apparatus cf. Harrell-Bond 1986:36f, Mamdani 2001:167f.  
53
 Gantzel/Schwinghammer (1995:R100) subdivided the war into two phases.  
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nationally recognised as government, but the term government is relative in a situation of 
acute state decay. In fact, Palestinians initially supported and received support from Sunni 
forces integrated into the country’s government prior to the war. As an opposition qualify 
leftist internal forces, with which the Palestinians were more closely allied. During the 
course of war, factionalism increased and the PLO became an independent actor fighting 
several Lebanese militias. Secondly, the Muhajir Quaumi Movement (MQM) active in 
Pakistan’s Sindh province is mainly made up of refugees and their descendents who fled 
contemporary India after the partition of the country in 1947. They became the majority in 
the Sindh and came to dominate the regional administration and economy. Since 1986, 
they have been fighting against “indigenous” Sindhi forces organised in the Jiye Sind Ma-
haz and against Pashtun networks made up of Pakistanis and Afghan refugees active in 
transport and drug trafficking. Intervention of the Pakistani state has pitted all these group-
ings against regular forces at times, although the Muhajirs were and to a lesser extent still 
are influential with the central government.54 Finally, Kuomintang-groups who fled China 
at the end of the 1940s are the core of some of the warlord armies operating in Burma’s 
war (ongoing since 1948), i.e. of the Shan United Army and the Thai Revolutionary Coun-
cil. These have been allied with the government at times and with rebels at others, but are 
essentially fighting for their own benefit and particularly for the control of areas of poppy 
production. 
Several of these refugee groups have not only engaged in fighting in the host country, but 
in cross-border attacks on the home country as well. In the cases of Sierra Leone, Jordan, 
Uganda (1981-1992) and Lebanon, both types occurred simultaneously. In the Costa Rican 
case, cross-border attacks followed shortly after refugees had been fighting for the gov-
ernment. It is not clear whether the Kuomintang-groups and the Zairian Tutsi supporting 
the Mulelists attacked their home countries as well, and the MQM is the only organisation 
which certainly not fought against the (former) home country. The two phenomena thus 
appear to significantly correlate.55 
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 It was due to particular circumstances that these refugees could acquire capacities allowing them to effec-
tively challenge local groups and even the central government. In the beginning, the Muhajir (”refugees”) 
were employed by the central government according to the patrimonial principle of using strangers for 
purposes of political control. Being Pakistani nationals and a relatively modernised segment of the popu-
lation, the Muhajir were able to independently secure their influential position and eventually became so 
strong that they represented a challenge to the central government (cf. Wilke 2000, cf. Wilke/Friederichs 
2003). 
55
 That correlation would be even more striking if we included the two most important cases of refugee in-
volvement in fighting in the host country that occurred after the publication of Gantzel/Schwinghammer 
(1995). Rwandan Hutu militias supporting Zaire’s president Mobutu in the mid-1990s as well attacked 
their home state. Similarly, the Liberians United for Reconciliation and Democracy in Guinea supported 
their host country government in the fighting in 2000/2001 and staged attacks on Liberia. 
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Generally, refugees rarely engage in war in the host country, while the same is not sure 
concerning attacks against the home state. The most elaborate quantitative study on refu-
gee involvement in political violence (Lischer 2000; 2001) allows gaining a deeper under-
standing of the phenomenon. In the context of this paper, refugee involvement in wars, 
either in the home or in the host country, is the main concern. Yet, because of a possible 
link of war to less intense and less persistent violence, non-war violence is briefly exam-
ined here, too. The link I have in mind is that root causes may be similar and the primary 
difference between the two may be that the latter lacks organisation.  
In Lischer’s analysis covering the time span 1987 to 1998, frequency, persistence, inten-
sity, and type of political violence are measured.56 Types of violence are  
1) “attacks between the sending state and the refugees”,  
2) “attacks between the receiving state and the refugees”,  
3) “Ethnic or factional violence among the refugees”,  
4) “Internal violence within the receiving state” due to refugees  
5) refugee-related “interstate war or unilateral intervention” (Lischer 2000:4).  
The fourth category reaches extremely low values and is statistically negligible. Although 
incidents of this type are likely to be underreported (ibid:15), these extremely low values 
seem to confirm my thesis laid down in chapter one of locals having other means than vio-
lence to impose their interests, while refugees are usually too weak to engage in violence 
against host country communities. The fifth category reaches low, but significant values 
(ibid.). Several of these cases represent an escalation of the low-scale interstate hostility 
which often stands at the outset of an integration of refugee combatants into a host state’s 
security sector, i.e. it is most likely to occur where refugee-warriors are employed to police 
a border area or weaken the sending state.  
Violence between refugees and the sending state is most common, followed by violence 
between refugees and the receiving state and factional violence among refugees (ibid:15). 
The first category exhibits the greatest intensity and persistence of violence, and was 
slightly increasing as a proportion of all violence in the second half of the 1990s (ibid.). 
Violence between refugees and the receiving state tends to occur in the form of small-scale 
and short-lived skirmishes and riots, often when refugees protest their conditions or in the 
context of refoulement (forcible repatriation) by the receiving state (ibid:16). Factional 
violence among refugees is usually localised and does not spread widely (ibid.). It seems to 
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 Frequency was measured as the number of refugees (i.e. the total case-load, not only those armed) involved 
in political violence. Persistence was measured as the number of years during which violence was re-
ported. Intensity was “measured by casualty figures and narrative descriptions” (Lischer 2000:4) of the 
incidents. 
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occur particularly where contradictions originating in the home country and entailed by the 
war divide the refugee population, i.e. rivalling warring parties have their respective social 
bases among different segments of the refugee population.  
Lischer’s data show considerable variations between different refugee situations. “In most 
years, over one hundred states host refugees, yet 95% of all violence usually takes place in 
fewer than fifteen states” (Lischer 2000:2). In total, among the 156 states hosting refugees, 
55 hosting refugees from 41 countries were affected at least during one year from 1987-
1998, while only ten host states reported violence for more than half of the twelve years 
studied (ibid:11). That figure indicates that violence involving refugees tends to be spo-
radic and the host state tends to rapidly (re-)impose control. It is a few states that deviate 
from the rule. “In persistence, as well as frequency, African states are over-represented, 
both as receiving states and refugee groups” (ibid:11). “Whereas African states accounted 
for 47% of affected receiving states in 1987, they accounted for 70% and 60% of the states 
impacted in 1997 and 1998, respectively” (ibid:2).57 Numbers of refugee groups and re-
ceiving states affected by violence have remained relatively constant, but there has been a 
slight increase in both categories since the mid-1990s (ibid:8+17). According to Lischer’s 
data, of the nine refugee groups involved in persistent and intense violence (ibid:13), six 
were involved in cross-border attacks on the home country government during the period 
1987 to 1998 (ibid:22-24). These were Palestinians (in Gaza/Westbank), Rwandans (in 
Zaire and Uganda), Afghans (in Pakistan), Sudanese (in Ethiopia and Uganda) and Liberi-
ans (in Guinea and Côte d’Ivoire).58 All of these refugee groups and most of the host states 
(i.e. except Uganda) were as well affected by other types of refugee-related violence,59 
indicating that there may be a causal link between the different types of violence. 
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 That trend cannot be explained by Africa’s disproportionate share of refugees (Lischer 2000:14). 
58
 As has been said above, Liberians in Sierra Leone engaged as well in cross-border attacks. More impor-
tantly, complementing Lischer’s data with other sources, eight of the nine groups seem to have engaged 
in cross-border violence, a figure that even more drastically underlines the importance of that type of vio-
lence relative to other types. The refugee populations which Lischer does not recognise as having been 
involved in cross-border attacks are Burmese (in Thailand and Bangladesh), Sierra Leoneans (in Guinea 
and Liberia), and Mozambicans (in Zambia and Zimbabwe). In the Burmese and probably in the Sierra 
Leonean case, refugees were involved in cross-border attacks against the home country government. Only 
in the Mozambican case Lischer’s judgement can be fully confirmed. Lischer lists Burmese refugees in 
Thailand as being subject to violence carried out by the Burmese military and Burma-based rebel groups 
on the one hand, and by Thai security forces on the other. In fact, Burmese guerrillas were allowed to op-
erate from Thailand for a long time, and the actual persistent violence the Thai military employs against 
refugees is a legacy of that period (cf. Adelmann 1998). Concerning the Sierra Leonean case, one camp in 
Liberia has been shelled by the Sierra Leone government. The Liberian government headed by Charles 
Taylor was closely connected to the RUF and supported cross-border activity, and it is likely that this 
camp served as an RUF-base.  
59
 Lischer does not list Uganda as involved in other types of violence, although Rwandan refugees supported 
the government in fighting Ugandan rebels. 
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From the above, we can draw a preliminary conclusion. While cross-border violence is the 
most intense and persistent type of violence, the bulk of incidents is concentrated in a few 
host countries, repeatedly involving the same refugee groups. At least since the end of the 
Cold War,60 this type of violence is concentrated in Africa, while Israel/Palestine and Af-
ghanistan/Pakistan are strongholds as well. Violence between refugees and the receiving 
state largely takes on the form of small-scale skirmishes. These skirmishes represent a mi-
nor destabilisation of receiving countries through refugee influx only, as the state most 
often easily prevails. There have been few incidents in which a refugee army challenges a 
host government, and mostly it has been in alliance with influential domestic groups. 
Refugees can also ally with host governments and thereby strengthen them. Furthermore, 
the different types of violence may be interrelated, but so far statistics remain inconclusive 
on that point. 
In addition to the question whether there is a link between the different types of violence 
and of what kind it is, further questions remain unanswered. Considering the small number 
of cases of profound militarisation of refugee populations, “[t]he real puzzle is why refugee 
situations […] so rarely lead to violence” (Lischer 2000:1). Furthermore, the regional con-
centration of the problem needs to be explained. Scholars largely agree that the host state 
has a decisive role in preventing or allowing cross-border attacks (ibid:18f, Adelmann 
1998, Rufin 1999:20). The question then is why receiving states are unwilling or incapa-
ble to prevent cross-border attacks. 
2.2 Host States, Refugees and Trans-national Political Networks 
 Except in a few cases,61 host states should be capable of blocking the movement of foreign 
irregulars and by constantly doing so demilitarise refugee camps. As cross-border activity 
is likely to lead to international tensions, host states can be expected to prevent irregulars 
operating from their territory. Host states can be expected to act even more decisively 
against armed actors posing a threat to the regime. Even weak states are strongest in their 
repressive capacities (Nuscheler 1995:338), and, from a security point of view, refugee 
camps do have the advantage that they allow for relatively close supervision (cf. Harrell-
Bond 1986:9, Malkki 1995). A host state which is determined to control refugee-warriors 
is likely to require all refugees to be camp residents. It may establish the camps at a “rea-
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 The first year evaluated in Lischer’s (2000) study is 1987, when Cold War patronage had already begun to 
decline as a result of a relaxation of tensions between East and West. As that patronage was the most im-
portant consequence of the Cold War for the Third World, we can consider Lischer’s study as covering a 
post-Cold War time span. 
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 Exceptions are states that have historically been extremely weak, i.e. where not even a semblance of con-
trol over the territory could be established, such as in Birma/Myanmar. 
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sonable distance”, i.e. some 50 km, from the border. Regularly occurring movement of 
armed forces over this distance is likely to be detected. Rebels are usually not strong 
enough to fight two armies, and have a particular disadvantage when fighting one that is 
familiar with a territory to which the irregulars are alien. Host states can and often do re-
strict the movement of refugees, in extreme cases sealing off entire refugee camps more or 
less temporarily. Host states may also resort to an expulsion of refugees they feel unable to 
control, as Tanzania did with Rwandan refugees.62 Surely, host states often cannot prevent 
every single incident, but they usually can prevent cross-border activities from occurring 
regularly. 
I argue that the answer to the questions raised above – the question of a link between the 
forms of violence and why particular host states fail to control refugee-warriors - lies 
within the personalisation or informalisation of the affected polities. Both Africa and the 
Middle East are regions characterised by a profound personalisation of politics. When cen-
tral authority is weak while competition for power and revenues is intense and little regu-
lated, refugees are most likely to become involved in host country political conflicts by 
aligning with one of its political networks. Rational interests in accumulation of power and 
material resources motivate these alliances. The networks competing for power are or be-
come trans-nationally organised. When refugee groupings become involved in power 
struggles in the host country, the political connections established in that process enable 
them to pursue their objectives concerning the home country, using bases in the receiving 
country. The problem of militarised refugee populations should therefore be analysed from 
a theoretical perspective of personal political trans-border networks as has been briefly 
presented in 1.1. In order to validate my claim, I will subsequently outline how the crises 
in Israel/Palestine and in the Great Lakes region, the most persistent and salient cases, 
would have to be analysed from that perspective. 
2.2.1 Palestinian Refugees and their Host States 
The war of the Palestine Liberation Organisation (PLO) and other Palestinian resistance 
groups against Israel began in 1968.63 The main external base of the PLO at that time was 
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 This option is relatively rarely realised, arguably due to international pressure. Yet, where regimes perceive 
their security to be at stake, they will ignore international criticism unless the international (humanitarian) 
community provides resources which make up for the security threat. 
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 Previously, a long period of consolidation of PLO authority, related to the emergence of Palestinian na-
tionalism, had taken place. This process occurred within a context of refugee existence. Initially, Palestin-
ian resistance was weak and organised around the traditional holders of authority, the heads of some no-
table families. These could maintain their authority for some time, but lost legitimacy in the context of 
urbanisation as the camps developed into cities (cf. Viorst 1989:24f). Two new social groups emerged. 
The first one is a refugee middle class, mainly made up of United Nations Relief and Works Agency 
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Jordan, from where it carried out cross-border raids and artillery attacks against Israel. Jor-
dan was opposed to the attacks for two reasons. Firstly, it feared retaliatory attacks from 
Israel, and secondly, King Hussein’s long-term strategy was the integration of the refugee 
population into his realm. The development of his sparsely populated desert kingdom and 
particularly of the Jordan valley largely depended on Palestinian labour, and the territorial 
claim to the West Bank would be considered illegitimate if Palestinians were not consid-
ered Jordanians. But Hussein, backed by “a small soldiery of backward bedouin” (Bailey 
1984:134) felt too weak to confront the Palestinians. Palestinians became amalgamated 
with internal forces in two areas of political competition in Jordan. In the first one, the 
lines were drawn between Palestinian and Bedouin patronage networks. A substantial pro-
portion of “indigenous” Jordanians were of Palestinian ethnicity.64 These were integrated 
into the administration and patronage system of the state, but viewed the Palestinian cause 
with sympathy. Palestinian military officers often colluded with the PLO (Bailey 1989:35-
42). In the second one, “conservative” social forces opposed “progressive” ones. In the 
wake of independence, ideologies of socialist-inspired Arab nationalism had thrived in the 
region, leading to the fall of several of the traditional leaders. The Jordanian opposition, 
some of the regime’s bureaucrats and the PLO subscribed to Arab nationalism, a threat 
against which Hussein had to defend his throne. The nationalists were backed by the lead-
ers of Egypt and Syria defending the ideological legitimacy of their rule. Egypt’s “Arab-
socialist” President Nasser had himself toppled a traditional ruler, while in Syria socialist 
Baath ideology had fulfilled a key role in stabilising political authority in an initially tu-
multuous post-colonial political situation. Egypt and Syria, fearing an unnecessary con-
frontation with Israel, prevented PLO-activity against Israel from their territory. Yet they 
endorsed it in Jordan which was the regional symbol for the persistence of traditional rule. 
Yet Egypt’s and Syria’s interference was hardly a matter of support for Arab nationalism 
per se. The channels for support were of a personal nature, with the Egyptian President 
backing Arafat and his Fatah, and Syria backing the leaders of smaller PLO factions to 
whom President Assad had personal links. 
                                                                                                                                                    
(UNRWA) employees and UNRWA-schooled elites active in business and administration of Arab coun-
tries. These owed their social status to their existence as Palestinian refugees and developed a nationalist 
ideology. The second was a proletarianised population, who were propelled into the labour market in of-
ten insecure jobs. These two strata combined in the resistance. The institution of the refugee camp en-
abled a close relationship. Social services in the camps organised by the PLO were a vehicle of communi-
cation between elites and the populace, as was the education system organised by UNRWA. UNRWA 
schools were considered to be the best in the Arab world, and the younger Palestinian population is al-
most universally literate (ibid. 54). The actual form of Palestinian resistance, inextricably linked to the 
war and its persistence, has to be analysed as being born out of the socio-economic transformations the 
camp population underwent. 
64
 No reliable statistics exist, and figures in the literature vary considerably. According to UNRWA calcula-
tions, some 50% of Jordanians were Palestinian, while refugees constituted about a third of the total 
population.  
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King Hussein’s rule 1968 to 1970 was characterised by careful balancing. Rejecting Arab 
nationalism outright would have meant to risk an alienation of the PLO and its internal 
supporters in top positions in the Jordanian military and the bureaucracy, thus strengthen-
ing the opposition and possibly leading to his overthrow. He opted for a “moderate hostil-
ity” (Bailey 1984:5) towards Israel. While rhetorically backing the PLO and Arab national-
ism, he tried to restrain their activities. This led to increasing confrontation with the PLO, 
particularly its Syrian-backed “radical” factions. When Hussein realised that legitimacy 
could not be gained through appeasement and the “radicals” started advocating regime 
change openly, he undertook to consolidate his authority over the military apparatus and 
sidelined pro-PLO officers. In September 1970, the Jordanian military started attacking 
PLO positions, and by July 1971, it had regained control over the country. Even a com-
paratively weak military like the Jordanian one was thus able to rapidly combat one of the 
world’s best-organised guerrillas. The PLO was expelled and fled to Lebanon. Jordan has 
since ceased to be a base for the PLO. Generous US-assistance allowed Hussein to extend 
his patronage system, while at the same time mise en valeur of Palestinian labour trans-
lated into exceptionally high GDP growth. The Palestinian population has become well 
integrated into Jordan. Even PLO representatives doubted that any of them would opt for 
repatriation if they were offered the opportunity (Viorst 1989:115).65 
Like Hussein, Lebanon’s mainstream political elite feared retaliation by Israel and was 
little inclined to let the Palestinian guerrilla operate from its territory. In order to prevent 
cross-border activity and in response to national businessmen interested in cheap labour, 
refugee camps had been established around Lebanon’s cities rather than in the border re-
gion (cf. Hudson 1997:250). Nonetheless, comparatively strong discrimination against Pal-
estinians in Lebanon had made its refugee population extremely receptive to the guerrilla 
appeal (Shiblak 1997:267), and the Fatah-militia (which later became the dominant PLO-
faction) launched its first-ever attack on Israel from Lebanon in January 1965. To appreci-
ate the significance of a subsequent shift in Lebanon’s internal balance of power, it is im-
portant to note that until 1968, the Lebanese military was largely successful in preventing 
further attacks (Hudson 1997:251). After the Arab-Israeli war of June 1967, Arab national-
ism witnessed an upsurge in Lebanon as it did in other countries of the region, and public 
opinion shifted in favour of the Palestinians and the PLO.66 Yet support to the Palestinians 
followed somewhat sectarian lines, a tendency which would increase later on. Particularly 
the Sunni and to a slightly lesser extent the Druze community supported the Palestinians, 
while support was least common among the Shiite and the Maronite Christian communities 
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 The situation may have changed somewhat during the last ten years.  
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 In a 1969 survey of public opinion, some 46% expressed “complete support” and another 40% “reserved 
support” for Palestinian guerrilla activities from Lebanon (Brynen 1990:208).  
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(Hudson 1997:247). Increasing support for the combatants from both Lebanese and Pales-
tinians and external pressure from Egypt and Syria put a strain on the military’s ability to 
suppress guerrilla activities. As the state got weaker, the PLO accumulated power. In 1969, 
armed confrontations between the guerrilla and the military erupted. The army surrounded 
the camps and the PLO took control within them (Brynen 1990:208). But due to political 
constraints, the military had to negotiate a settlement with the Palestinians and was forced 
to recognise the PLO as an interlocutor.  
The influx of guerrillas from Jordan in 1971 further strengthened the PLO while “the Pal-
estinian movement catalyzed the growth of Lebanese opposition forces” (Brynen 
1990:209). At the same time, conflict within the regime increased. In Lebanon’s political 
system, elites of the politically important groups of Maronites, Shiites, Sunnis and Druze 
were integrated. These operated their respective patronage systems. Transformations in 
Lebanon’s economy had undermined the socio-economic balance underlying the system, 
and rivalry between the groups became increasingly intense (cf. Jung 1995:213-221). Two 
areas of political competition partly converged in Lebanon, giving the PLO the opportunity 
to dock on to one side in the conflict. The first area was the conflict between the patronage 
networks. Lebanese Sunnis and Druze viewed the cause of the overwhelmingly Sunni Pal-
estinians with sympathy and advocated to give them free rein in their operations against 
Israel. The Palestinian struggle and its nationalist ideology represented a symbolic resource 
furthering the political interests of Lebanese Sunnis and Druze. In order to legitimise a 
change in the distribution of political power in their favour, they advocated the idea of a 
Muslim-Arab state, connoting pan-Arab ideas, while the Christian Maronites held on to the 
idea of the traditional Lebanese emirate (Jung 1995:217). The second area of conflict be-
tween “conservative” and “progressive” forces partly reflected the divide between the pa-
tronage networks. The emerging leftist opposition, united in the pan-Arab and socialist 
Lebanese National Movement (LNM) was particularly strong among Lebanese Sunnis. It 
aligned with the Palestinians, who provided them with protection against state repression 
(Brynen 1990:209). In turn, the LNM strengthened the PLO; in 1973, the Lebanese mili-
tary was forced to abandon its first offensive on PLO-positions since 1969, as a result of 
political lobbying by the LNM and neighbouring Arab states.  
Meanwhile, it became increasingly difficult for the Sunni elite to control its clientele. In 
the process of modernisation, they lost the unconditional loyalty of the Qabadayat, the mi-
litias which they had traditionally used to back their rule. The PLO stepped in to patronise 
several of these militias, many of whom were or became adherents of Arab nationalism 
(Jung 1995:221). Conservative politicians and their militias became increasingly apprehen-
sive of the Palestinian influence on Lebanon’s balance of power, and an attack by these on 
Palestinians in Beirut in April 1975 “pro- vided the spark that ignited the Lebanese 
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civil war” (Brynen 1990:209). Initially, fighting took place mainly between rightist militias 
and the LNM, while the PLO refrained from major involvement. This policy came to an 
end when the Christian militia attacked the refugee camps in east Beirut in January 1976. 
During the internal war, factionalism increased and the PLO lost most of its internal sup-
porters, but due to the collapse of state authority it could control parts of Lebanon and con-
tinue its attacks on Israel. The PLO had to leave Lebanon after the second Israeli invasion 
of Lebanon in 1982. While the PLO headquarter was transferred to Tunis, the centre of 
Palestinian guerrilla activity has since moved to Gaza and the West Bank. There, the PLO 
and more recently Hamas are still the “fish in the sea” of the civilian population. They thus 
have some space to manoeuvre, regardless whether Israel or the Palestinian Authority was 
in nominal control. 
2.2.2 Refugees and their Host States in the Great Lakes Region 
Apart from the Middle East, the refugee crisis in the Great Lakes region of Africa has be-
come the major point of reference in the discussion on militarised refugee populations. As 
in the Middle East, the region has a longstanding history of refugee-warriors. My analysis 
of events will therefore begin with the decolonisation period.  
In 1959, the monarchist rule of an ethnic Tutsi minority in Rwanda was toppled by the 
Parti du mouvement de l’émancipation Hutu (PARMEHUTU), an organisation assembling 
the ethnic Hutu subjects.67 In the process, several massacres of Tutsi occurred, and by the 
time of internationally recognised independence of Rwanda in 1962, between 40 and 70 
percent of the Tutsi population had fled the country (Reed 1996:481). In exile, monarchist 
Tutsi organised for a return to the status quo ante, and between 1961 and 1966, they car-
ried out at least ten raids into Rwanda (ibid.). Uganda appeared to have been insignificant 
as a base for these operations. The protestant Ugandan president Obote was quite reserved 
towards the catholic Tutsi, and actively turned against them in the late 1960s, suspecting 
them of supporting the catholic opposition Democratic Party (Meeren 1996:261). Tolerat-
ing their military organisation would thus have run counter to his political interests. Bu-
rundi was the main base for military incursions into Rwanda. Political power in Burundi 
was organised similarly to colonial Rwanda. The Tutsi monarchy had succeeded to main-
tain its hold on power, but faced strong Hutu opposition. Developments in Rwanda threat-
ened the legitimising ideology underlying the system, and Burundi was interested in a re-
turn to the status quo ante. A more important motivation for supporting the Rwandan guer-
rilla was that “Tutsi Rwandan refugees were largely welcomed […] as a reserve force 
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 Rwanda was still under colonial rule, but the Belgian colonial power exercised indirect rule over the popu-
lation, employing the structures of the Tutsi monarchy. 
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against Hutu insurrection” (Meeren 1996:263). They were considered reliable allies of the 
Burundian military because of their hardened stance against the Hutu (ibid.). In 1966, Tutsi 
military officers toppled the monarchy. For the new “republican” rulers, the overthrow of 
the Tutsi monarchy in Rwanda did not constitute a threat to the ideological basis of rule, 
while the Rwandan Tutsi forces in Burundi posed a threat because of their affiliation with 
the king. After an agreement on border security between the two states shortly after the 
coup, the monarchists were militarily defeated and ceased to be a security problem. 
Rwandans became politically important in Uganda during the rule of Idi Amin Dada 
(1971-1980). Compensating for his lack of legitimacy, Amin strengthened his security ap-
paratus by recruiting Sudanese and Rwandans. Attempts were made to integrate the refu-
gees by patronising the Tutsi King, Mwami Kigeri (Mamdani 2001:167). Yet the younger 
refugee generation, alienated from traditional structures and aspiring to belong to the mid-
dle class,68 could not be integrated in that way. As refugees were discriminated concerning 
employment in the formal sector, upward social mobility was largely blocked. In the mid-
1970s, the Ugandan intellectual and former state employee Yoweri Museveni recruited two 
refugee intellectuals, Fred Rugyema and Paul Kagame, into his rebel Front for National 
Salvation (FRONASA). The FRONASA was supported by Tanzania. Tanzanian president 
Julius Nyerere had been on good terms with the former Ugandan President Milton Obote, 
who, like Nyerere, symbolised a version of African socialism. The Idi Amin coup against 
Obote had been interpreted by Tanzania as an attempt by the former colonial power of both 
states, Great Britain, to undermine African socialism and re-establish British influence. 
“When FRONASA moved into Uganda behind Tanzanian forces in the Amin-war of 1979, 
Museveni began a mass recruitment that included Banyarwanda [Rwandan and Ugandan 
speakers of Kinyarwanda, Rwanda’s lingua franca, F.G.]” (Mamdani 2001:168). Follow-
ing the re-instatement of Obote in 1980, Museveni was initially appointed Minister of De-
fence, but he quickly broke with the president and returned to the bush, leading a new 
guerrilla war. Unrelenting repression by Obote against Ugandan and Rwandan Banyar-
wanda alike resulted in more of them joining Museveni’s National Resistance Army 
(NRA). Eventually in 1986, when the NRA took power, at least 3,000 of the 14,000 NRA-
soldiers were of Rwandan origin (Prunier 1993:125). By the time, self-identification of the 
refugees as Ugandans was strong, and Museveni promised to offer naturalisation to those 
who had been in the country for at least ten years. In the process of legitimacy consolida-
tion, Museveni came under increasing pressure from elites he had to (or chose to) co-
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 UNHCR had made a great effort to provide education to the refugee population, as rural integration had 
proved extremely difficult. In Ugandan society, the feeling that refugees were privileged over the national 
population became widespread, to an extent that education became considered the main criterion distin-
guishing Ugandan nationals speaking Kinyarwanda from the refugees (Mamdani 2001:165).  
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operate with. The prominent position Ugandans assumed in his government threatened to 
discredit his regime as foreign occupation. Gradually, Rwandans were removed from posi-
tions of influence, and at the same time were excluded from benefiting from land reform. 
Both the refugee elite, educated youths and the rural population segment were conse-
quently alienated from the regime. In 1987, the Rwandan Patriotic Front (RPF) was cre-
ated by the Rwandan soldiers in the NRA. In 1990, the RPF started invading Rwanda from 
Uganda. The invasion was actively supported by the Ugandan government, which regarded 
an “armed repatriation” as a relief from internal pressure (Mamdani 2001:183f).  
Facing defeat by the RPF, the Rwandan regime retreated to Zaire in 1994, taking with 
them about one million civilian Hutu. They arrived in North Kivu and South Kivu prov-
inces, both having a substantial population of Rwandan origin.  
In North Kivu, these were the Banyamasisi, mostly of Hutu ethnicity, while the Banya-
mulenge of South Kivu where Tutsi in the majority. Both groups’ identity was based on the 
Kinyarwanda-language and their region of residence, rather than on ethnicity (Mandani 
2001:235). The Banyamasisi constituted the majority of the population in some North Kivu 
localities, notably in Masisi, and had been in conflict with other local groups over access to 
land. All over Kivu, tensions had risen since the late 1980s in the context of democratisa-
tion, as the question who was to be considered a Congolese citizen and could therefore be 
attributed citizen rights was intensely discussed. In the process, the Banyamulenge and 
Banyamasisi communities were split along the Hutu-Tutsi divide. Zaire’s president 
Mobutu protected the land claims of the Banyamasisi, who had benefited greatly from the 
“Zairinisation” of arable land Mobutu had undertaken in the 1970s. Concurrently, the 
situation in South Kivu turned against the Banyamulenge, who increasingly had reason to 
fear being stripped of citizen rights. In the context of a divide-and-rule strategy by Mobutu, 
all Tutsi, including those from North Kivu came to be defined as Banyamulenge, and at the 
same time, a trans-regional Hutu identity became manifest. Since 1988, Mobutu and the 
allied Rwandan government materially supported the establishment of an organisation unit-
ing the Hutu in both provinces. In response, Tutsi elites undertook to organise the Tutsi-
population across Kivu. As the situation of the Tutsi deteriorated, several chose to join the 
RPF in their war in Rwanda. “By the middle of the 1990s, not only were Hutu and Tutsi 
organised across localities in Congo [Zaire, F.G.], but Hutu and Tutsi associations crossed 
state boundaries and began to function as regional networks” (Mamdani 2001:252). 
When the refugees arrived, their militia started supporting the Zairian Hutu against other 
local groups. These groups, led by local politicians, defied central authority, and posed a 
greater threat to Mobutu’s rule than the refugee irregulars (cf. Reno 1998:148-151). In fact, 
the latter were regarded a friendly force, while the RPF victory in Rwanda was considered 
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an extension of British-American influence in the region. Mobutu, who like the former 
Rwandan regime had historically been strongly supported by France, had to fear that ex-
tension. “With the large numbers of people of Rwandan ancestry who had ethnic ties to the 
RPF, the RPF victory in Rwanda posed a threat of weakening the hold of Mobutu and his 
associates over Kivu. Mobutu thus instigated violence among refugees, the local popula-
tion, and potential separatist politicians in Kivu, as he had done earlier” (Reno 1998:164). 
The Hutu militias were instrumental in a presidential divide-and-rule strategy aimed at 
“disrupting opponents’ attempts to organise rather than trying to control them directly” 
(Reno 1998:149). Some of the local politicians allied with the Rwandans in their struggle 
against local rivals, as did Mobutu in his struggle to remain the sovereign of Zaire. Addi-
tionally, the Rwandan Hutu in Zaire were backed by Burundian Hutu refugee-warriors 
from the internal war there which started in 1993. The alliance between Mobutu and the 
Hutu extremists seems to have been a fairly constant one (Reno 1998:147-181), although 
Mobutu often changed sides, inciting the different groups at different times to seek presi-
dential favours. He thereby temporarily created the impression of having given up support-
ing the refugee irregulars,69 but on the whole not only aided the Hutu extremists in acquir-
ing arms (USCR 1996:74), but allegedly paid for these arms as well (Reno 1998:186). Big 
Men rivalling Mobutu worked towards an expulsion of the refugees, but failed to prevail. 
As a consequence of their important position in Mobutu’s strategy, the Hutu militias could 
continuously carry out cross-border incursions into Rwanda and–less intensely–into Bu-
rundi.  
In 1996, the new Rwandan regime invaded Zaire in alliance with local groups, particularly 
the Banyamulenge. It closed down the refugee camps and triggered the return of 600,000 
to 700,000 refugees, while at least 200,000, including a considerable number of Hutu ex-
tremists, fled further into Zaire (USCR 1998:62). Zairian rebels and the Rwandan army 
continued to pursue them, massacring an unknown number of civilians and extremists in 
the process (Emizet 2000:163,70 cf. Reyntjens 1999:100-120). Hutu extremists have con-
tinued to attack Rwanda since and the immediate aftermath of the invasion witnessed an 
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 We should not exaggerate the importance of a short-lived action of Mobutu’s Division Speciale Presiden-
tielle (DSP) against the Hutu militia (cf. Reyntjens 1999:18), as the DSP always maintained close links to 
the Hutu militias (Reno 1998:165). In various accounts of the events, one sentence seems to be repeated 
in different versions over and over again: “In August [1996, F.G.], Rwandan and Zairian officials reiter-
ated their earlier agreements that camps should close one by one to facilitate rapid, organized repatriation. 
Zaire again pledged to […] disarm soldiers and militia based in the camps. Zairian officials again did not 
fulfill the agreement” (USCR 1997:105). For a detailed account of the many twists and turns in the con-
figuration of political alliances cf. Reyntjens 1999.  
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 Emizet alleges that some 230,000 Rwandan Hutu were massacred, yet the figure remains questionable. Of 
the 200,000 Rwandans remaining in Zaire according to official estimates, 185,000 were repatriated later 
on according to UNHCR (Flüchtlinge 1998:8). 
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upsurge in fighting in Rwanda as the rebels had fewer opportunities to retreat into safe 
territory, but they have been severely weakened and Rwanda has greatly stabilised.  
The rebel alliance initially supported by Rwanda overthrew the Mobutu-regime in 1997. 
Subsequently, the alliance split and relations with Rwanda turned hostile. The Hutu ex-
tremists became supported by the new regime as part of a strategy similar to that of 
Mobutu, i.e. disrupting opponents’ attempts to organise. In a context of advanced state 
decay, they have become a largely autonomous actor. Some 8,000 to 20,000 armed Hutu 
extremists still exercise some degree of control over parts of Kivu and terrorise the local 
population (cf. FAZ 16.07.2005). 
As the analysis of these two refugee situations has shown, in weakly integrated polities 
which are internally structured by rivalling personal networks rather than impersonal bu-
reaucracies, refugees can become a domestic and trans-border security problem by aligning 
with host country forces. In the two cases analysed, refugees repeatedly furthered interests 
of host country groups in two dimensions of societal reproduction, i.e. refugees were in-
strumental for groups trying to establish symbolic and politico-military hegemony.71 Two 
mechanisms serving to establish alliances between refugees and host country groups can be 
distinguished.  
Firstly, strategic interests of host country groups and refugees largely explain the alliances. 
In the Great Lakes region, refugee-warriors were integrated in classical patrimonial fash-
ion, i.e. rulers relied militarily (partly) on outsiders because these are most likely to depend 
on their patron. Where not only military but symbolic hegemony was an objective of the 
ruler, rather than being total strangers or Stammfremde (Weber, see 1.1.), the refugees usu-
ally belonged to the in-group which was the power base of the ruler. The (perceived) pri-
mary challenge to the ruler in these cases seemed to be other in-groups, with whom the 
refugees were unlikely to establish relations. Relations between host country insurgents 
and refugee-warriors, i.e. between the LNM and the PLO as well as between the NRA and 
Rwandans, shared the characteristics of a strategic alliance and mutual protection with the 
patrimonial mode. In the Great Lakes region, the hierarchy in relations between refugees 
and rulers or opposition groups tended to privilege indigenous forces, i.e. the refugees were 
essentially a means of these forces to achieve or maintain political control in the host coun-
try. LNM-PLO relations lacked such a hierarchy, and in PLO-Qabadayat relations, that 
hierarchy was even inversed, i.e. the refugee elites temporarily became patrons of domestic 
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 If economic factors played a role, these could hardly be captured. In the cases analysed, the refugees’ alli-
ances with local groups generally appeared not to be conditioned by economic incentives for the latter. 
Particularly in the Great Lakes region, the refugees tended to constitute a drain on revenue of host country 
patrons. Where economic motives played a salient role, i.e. in PLO-Qabadayat relations, the refugees be-
came patrons of domestic groups. 
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groups. This was due to particular circumstances, i.e. a relatively weak opposition aligning 
with an exceptionally strong refugee army receiving much international support and thus 
able to mobilise revenue inaccessible to the domestic actors.  
Secondly, in contrast, particularly in the Middle East and partly in the Great Lakes region, 
refugees integrated by virtue of being considered to belong to national (i.e. Arab), ethnic or 
religious groups stretching across boundaries. That kind of integration is not dependent on 
strategic considerations, but rather based on a belief in a common culture and destiny. This 
type of integration facilitates diffusion into the host society, which in turn mitigates con-
tradictions and reduces conflict risks. Yet, when communal lines overlap with lines of po-
litical conflict, refugees are likely to become involved in power disputes. Local groups 
associated with the refugees will consider the increase in their numerical strength a power 
resource, and rivalling groups are likely to be apprehensive of the refugees and mobilise 
against them. Communal links stretching across boundaries facilitate alliances between 
nationals and refugees, yet these alliances will increase potentials of conflict only when 
complemented by strategic interests. 
The link between different types of refugee-related violence appears to be a common 
causal origin, i.e. domestic groups enable refugees to acquire combat capabilities. These 
combat capabilities are most likely to be employed against the home state, as refugees fre-
quently constitute a mere reserve force not employed in domestic fighting, and one of the 
considerations rulers take into account when tolerating cross-border attacks is the threat to 
symbolic hegemony represented by neighbouring states.72 Combat capabilities thus ac-
quired may be employed in various ways in the host country depending on specific constel-
lations of interests, which may be the reason why that link is hard to prove inductively by 
establishing statistics, while a deductive approach as employed here seems to be more 
promising.  
2.3 The International Humanitarian Community and Militarised Refugee Camps 
The scope of this section is restricted to the role of the UN’s humanitarian agencies in 
strengthening refugee-warriors.73 In order to capture the international political dynamics 
within which the humanitarian system and its response to the problem developed, a brief 
                                                 
72
 For instance, the fall of Obote threatened Tanzanian President Nyerere’s symbolic base of power, as it 
seemed to undermine African socialism and national independence. Similarly, the fall of the Hutu-regime 
in Rwanda symbolised the relegation of rulers of the Francophonie to the benefit of Anglo-Saxon sup-
ported ones.  
73
 Incorporating NGOs in the analysis would unnecessarily increase the complexity of the matter. The restric-
tion to UN agencies can be justified by the important co-ordinating role these agencies assume and by the 
fact that they frequently are the major source of revenues for NGOs charged with implementing relief.  
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historical overview introduces the matter. Subsequently, two cases of humanitarian assis-
tance under conditions of militarised refugee populations are analysed. That analysis is 
structured into three parts: the importance of humanitarian aid to the insurgents relative to 
other sources of revenue, the humanitarian organisations’ self-assessment of their impact 
on the conflict and their attitude towards the militarisation of refugees, and a closing as-
sessment of the respective role of humanitarian aid and humanitarian actors in the conflict. 
The cases of Rwandan refugee-warriors in Zaire and Palestinians have been chosen be-
cause these represent two of the most important points of reference in the discussion, while 
the impact humanitarian aid actually had on the creation or maintenance of material com-
bat capacities differed strongly. The Rwandan case further is particularly relevant because 
it entailed a significant change in the self-assessment of the United Nations High Commis-
sioner for Refugees (UNHCR), the main UN body organising refugee assistance.  
The problem that humanitarian assistance could further combat capabilities of refugees had 
been recognised early on. It was a major issue in diplomatic quarrels between the West and 
the Soviet Union when solutions to the European refugee crisis were discussed in the af-
termath of World War II. The diplomatic dispute resulted in Paragraph 2 of the UNHCR 
statute stating that “the work of the High Commissioner shall be of an entirely non-
political character; it shall be humanitarian and social” (Sugino 1998).  
 When UNHCR was finally established as of 1 January 1951, its mandate was to ensure the 
protection of refugees. Furthermore, it was charged with finding durable solutions to refu-
gee crises, which were summed up as repatriation, reintegration (in the host country) and 
(third country) resettlement. Protection was defined as legal protection while the provision 
of physical security remained a responsibility of the host state (cf. Crisp 2000:612). In fact, 
“the main focus of the international humanitarian response has been to emphasize physical 
(biological) assistance [i.e. provision of food and medical supplies, F.G.] at the expense of 
physical protection and human rights” (Jacobsen 1999:9). The provision of material assis-
tance legitimated a humanitarian presence and met few political obstacles. Finally humani-
tarian institutional interests built up around the provision of supplies. 
UNHCR became active in the Third World’s refugee crises in a context of intense Cold 
War rivalry after the mandate confining its activities to Europe had been amended in 1967. 
In the three decades to follow, humanitarian organisations came to regard militarised refu-
gee populations as something normal (Jacobsen 2000:4). During the 1960s, in most inter-
nal wars leftist and anti-colonial groups fought pro-Western governments (Rufin 1999:23). 
Host governments were often unwilling to disarm anti-colonial fighters among the refu-
gees, and humanitarian organisations arranged the delivery of supplies with the combat-
ants. As the practices aroused little international criticism, the problem developed some-
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what unnoticed. During the 1970s, the patterns of war changed, and in the 1980s, internal 
wars were mainly fought between governments supported by the Soviets and rebels sup-
ported by the West (Rufin 1999:23). The importance of refugee aid for insurgents in-
creased in significance when the West chose to employ humanitarian aid to influence the 
outcome of power struggles in the Third World.74 Western states exerted considerable in-
fluence on UNHCR’s operations. The US have consistently been the most important donor, 
and Western states financed most of UNHCR’s budget (Zolberg et al. 1989:272).  
During the Cold War, the concept of proxy wars dominated intellectual discourse on the 
causes of war. Instead of recognising their activities as a mechanism through which East-
West tensions translated into fighting capabilities for Third World actors, humanitarian 
organisations considered their contribution to the system as insignificant. Cold War patrons 
did not need the humanitarian organisations in order to support their clients, and they 
would have acted as they did even in the absence of humanitarian agencies, it was argued. 
Being “political” was equated with pronouncing criticism on the policies that caused refu-
gee movements, while providing humanitarian aid, even where substantial amounts were 
diverted to combatants, was considered “non-political” (Sugino 1998:47). The humanitar-
ian organisations’ self-assessment as non-political and uninvolved in the dynamics of war 
must be explained with the build-up of humanitarian institutional interests. Humanitarian 
organisations in the field had little power to change the situation, and ultimately only had 
the option to withdraw or to stay. As they were not accountable to the refugees’ home 
country, they chose to stay.  
During the 1990s, two contradictory tendencies emerged. On the one hand, the notions of 
“impartiality” and “neutrality” were introduced and increasingly emphasised. On the other, 
the new concept of a “right to relief” (Waal 1997:198), to be imposed through military 
“humanitarian interventions” was advocated (ibid:179, cf. Mundo 1992, cf. Kumin 1995). 
This shift in humanitarian policy was marked by Sadako Ogata assuming office as the UN 
High Commissioner for Refugees in early 1991. Ogata’s vision was to increase effective-
ness and reach of humanitarian efforts of UNHCR. On the one hand, her decisive stance 
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 As Zolberg et al. state, particularly before the 1980s, the US defined a refugee primarily “as someone who 
was escaping a communist regime” (Zolberg et al. 1989:275). The most important points of reference for 
the deliberate use of humanitarian aid to support Western clients are the situation on the Thai-Cambodian 
border (cf. Robinson 2000, Reynell 1989) and on the Pakistani-Afghan border (cf. Martin 2000:74). 
“Humanitarian” Cold War aid surely had a great impact on the Afghan and Cambodian conflicts, but 
Cold War dynamics cannot be held solely responsible for the problem. Regional and institutional humani-
tarian dynamics were always of great importance, and the wider international community (including non-
Western states) influenced humanitarian policy outcomes. For example, the Palestinians continuously re-
ceived humanitarian support (largely funded by Western states (Hudson 1997:249)), although Israel was 
the main Western client in the region. Similarly, refugees and refugee-warriors in Southern Africa were 
continuously supported (cf. Zolberg et al. 1989:273+276), although South Africa presented itself as a 
staunchly anti-communist country.  
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has resulted in greatly increased access to humanitarian resources for people in need. It 
was her who established the precedent of UNHCR becoming involved in humanitarian 
assistance to IDPs (cf. Urquhart 2005). On the other hand, the policy shift resulted in an 
increased emphasis on physical “biological” assistance and increased vulnerability to abuse 
of humanitarian resources.  
UNHCR became involved in a military intervention for the first time in Yugoslavia in 
early 1992. Inevitably, the two contradictory concepts clashed as UNHCR became part of 
the international community’s strategy against the Yugoslavian government (cf. 
Cunliffe/Pugh 1997). However, this signified little change in the character of relations be-
tween humanitarian organisations and national combatants. UNHCR had to negotiate de-
liveries with national forces exercising power on the spot that received or diverted sup-
plies. Most refugee populations were not militarised, but where they were, the international 
forces did not separate civilians from combatants (cf. Lischer 1999).75 The Yugoslavian 
experience is important primarily because it seemed to establish a “right to relief” imposed 
through international interventions and not dependent on the use of humanitarian resources 
for civilian purposes only. This provided UNHCR with a precedent employed to blame the 
international community for not having honoured its “obligations” when not intervening in 
Zaire in the mid-1990s. After severe criticism in the aftermath of the crisis in Zaire, part of 
which threatened the very legitimacy of humanitarian aid in general (Macrae 1998), 
UNHCR officially maintained its position concerning a “right to relief”, and continued to 
advocate military humanitarian interventions were conditions are not conducive. It held on 
to the necessity to strike deals with irregulars in order to deliver supplies, and has not pre-
sented further guidelines on how to deal with combatants’ presence in camps in case the 
host state is not willing to disarm refugees.76 
Internally, however, UNHCR seems to have moved towards considering withdrawal a vi-
able option. Starting in December 1996, shortly after the Zairian experience, UNHCR 
withdrew completely from a refugee site for the first time on the grounds that “the humani-
tarian and non-political nature of the camp had been compromised” (USCR 1998:145). 
The refugee site in question was the Atrush camp in northern Iraq, which hosted some 
15,000 refugees and was controlled by the Turkish rebel group Partiya Karkeren Kurdi-
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 Refugee camps were not militarised because segments of the former regular army of Yugoslavia con-
fronted each other in the war. These segments conscripted all males capable of fighting into their forces, 
and the distinction between soldiers and civilians was more pronounced than in most internal wars. As an 
exception to the rule, camps of a breakaway Bosnian faction and of Kosovars were militarised (Lischer 
1999). 
76
 UNHCR’s manual for emergencies (UNHCR 2001a) does not discuss to what extent and under what cir-
cumstances such deals can be justified, but urged to avoid the impression that the UN recognised the ir-
regulars.  
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stan (PKK). As in Zaire, there was no state able or willing to separate combatants from 
civilians, and the camp posed an evident threat to both the home state’s and local (Northern 
Iraqi) security. Two months before the withdrawal, fighting had restarted involving Iraqi 
Kurdish rebels and the Turkish military on the one side and the PKK on the other.77  
That withdrawal has remained an exception, and UNHCR has since tried to strike a bal-
ance between the imperatives of providing relief and avoiding abuse of relief for purposes 
of combat. Analysis of the impact of refugee assistance on combat capabilities is therefore 
still relevant. The following two sections analyse the role of refugee assistance and the 
UN’s humanitarian organisations in two cases of heavily militarised refugee populations: 
the refugee crises in the Middle East and the one in the Great Lakes Region of Central Af-
rica.  
2.3.1 Humanitarian Assistance to Palestinian Refugees 
The most long-standing refugee crisis in which humanitarian aid was continuously pro-
vided is the crisis in the Middle East. The United Nations Relief and Works Agency (UN-
RWA) was established as of 1 January 1950 by the UN General Assembly as a special 
body solely occupied with Palestinian refugees and mandated “to carry out direct relief and 
works programmes in collaboration with local governments” 
(http://www.un.org/unrwa/overview/qa.html:16.03.04). UNRWA is neither charged with 
refugee protection nor with the search for durable solutions. Solutions were defined by the 
UN General Assembly and restricted to the options of repatriation or compensation 
(UNGA Res. 194 (III) (1949)).  
UNRWA’s activities essentially consisted of the development of camp infrastructures and 
educational facilities, the provision of items of basic necessity and support towards self-
sufficiency. UNRWA traditionally put strong emphasis on the provision of education in 
order to enable Palestinians to make a living. The Palestinian guerilla and most Arab host 
governments rejected “development” activities aimed at achieving self-sufficiency, as they 
feared that these would lead to an integration of the refugees and consequently to a solu-
tion of the crisis not involving Israeli concessions (Viorst 1989:36f). Notwithstanding the 
guerrilla’s rejection of “development”, Palestinians developed coping mechanisms and 
effectively integrated economically and, where conditions were conducive, socially into 
their new environment.78 Living standards in most camps rose considerably above those in 
                                                 
77
 On the situation in northern Iraq cf. USCR 1998:145. 
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 In Jordan, development efforts could be supported by UNRWA with silent approval from King Hussein, 
who however publicly maintained that he did not intend to deprive the PLO of its constituency by inte-
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traditional Palestine.79 UNRWA operated the best schools in the Arab world, and Palestini-
ans became the possibly best and most universally educated population in the region 
(ibid:54).80 Being forced to adopt austerity measures because the mostly Western donors 
reduced their financial contributions, UNRWA terminated the general distribution of sup-
plies in 1982 and restricted it to a few hardship cases. In 2004, 5.7 percent of registered 
refugees still received direct supplies (http://www.un. 
org/unrwa/overview/p05.html:16.03.04). Since the first intifada began in 1987, UNRWA 
has redirected resources to the health sector, where wounded Palestinians were treated. It 
further assumed an observing role, forcing Israel’s soldiers to exercise restraint upon their 
missions in the camps, and mediated between the two sides (Viorst 1989:20-24).81 
Generally, the position the PLO assumed in the camps was an informal one. Neither Israel 
nor Arab host states were inclined to allow a political-administrative organisation of the 
camp population. UNRWA, whose staff is mostly made up of Palestinians,82 and Palestin-
ian NGOs were the main channels through which the PLO could communicate informally 
with the civilian population. Particularly in Syria and Egypt, PLO factions were clients of 
the respective regimes employed to administer the camps informally on behalf of the gov-
ernments. In the weaker Jordanian and Lebanese states, PLO factions temporarily con-
trolled the camps independently from the governments. The PLO profited from UNRWA 
through supplies its combatants received as refugees, through wages its members em-
ployed by the agency earned, and through usage of facilities such as schools for their pur-
poses.83 The PLO could further strengthen its legitimacy by demonstrating an ability to 
obstruct registration exercises aimed at reducing the inflated numbers of refugees. It had, 
however, no direct role in providing supplies, and diversions do not seem to have been an 
important issue.84 The PLO taxed refugees in some camps, but a substantial part of the 
                                                                                                                                                    
grating them. More recently, UNRWA has strengthened the development component in the whole of its 
area of operation, primarily through micro-credit schemes, although the PLO still resents these activities. 
79
 Conditions were worst in Gaza and Lebanon. In Gaza living standards rose only slowly and slightly (Viorst 
1989:42), as was probably the case in Lebanon as well (cf. ibid:67f). 
80
 Educational levels of Palestinians dropped during the 1990s (Hudson 1997:239). 
81
 These activities were supported by the UN Secretary General. A resolution on the issue was vetoed by the 
US because of a passage relating to other aspects. As the monitoring activities were not criticised, UN-
RWA continued them (Viorst 1989:15). 
82
 In contrast, the leadership of UNRWA is exclusively made up of Western expatriates. 
83
 In at least one case were this became known, UNRWA reacted effectively against the abuse of its facility 
by closing the school and only reopening it upon assurances that these activities would be stopped. More-
over, Israel has ordered the schools in the Occupied Territories to be closed for extended periods, either as 
a punitive measure or to prevent them from providing points of assembly (Viorst 1989:15f).  
84
 The time of the Lebanese internal war may be an exception, but little information is available on the extent 
of diversions. During that war, UNRWA negotiated the delivery of supplies with the different warring 
factions, who apparently received part of the supplies in return. Humanitarian aid was used for supplying 
combatants and humanitarian installations were partly used militarily, but other sources of income were 
far more important to the guerilla (cf. Virost 1989:67). 
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refugees’ income was generated outside the humanitarian economy, often in Israel. Rather 
than profiting from resources destined for refugees, the PLO spent considerable sums on 
the refugees. In its quest for legitimacy, the PLO invested in the provision of social ser-
vices. At times the PLO had an enormous budget possibly larger than that of the state of 
Lebanon (Hudson 1997:254). These revenues accrued from sympathetic Arab governments 
and the Palestinian diaspora which, due to their education, occupied high-ranking positions 
in the administrations of Arab states. Humanitarian aid may have become more important 
to the PLO since it lost many of its Arab supporters and diaspora Palestinians got expelled 
from Kuwait and Saudi-Arabia because of the PLO’s pro-Saddam position in the early 
1990s. It however still disposes of alternative sources of income, and its weakness seems to 
have led to a change in tactics (and increased willingness to compromise), rather than a 
breakdown of the resistance. 
Relations between UNRWA and the stakeholders–the PLO, the host governments, and 
donors–were uneasy at times: the PLO and Arab states criticised the agency for not supply-
ing enough assistance and for its development activities, while Israel blamed it with sup-
porting the Palestinian resistance. Western donors, in turn, urged UNRWA to put greater 
emphasis on achieving self-sufficiency (cf. Zolberg et al. 1989:273).85 Yet precisely be-
cause it had to cooperate with Israel and depended on Western donors, UNRWA was 
highly conscious about the political implications of its work already at a time when the 
connection between humanitarian aid and war rarely bothered humanitarian organisations 
(cf. Viorst 1989:9f). UNRWA officials were more inclined than humanitarian organisa-
tions in other parts of the world to admit that their activities had political implications 
(ibid.), but actively sought to remain impartial, which was defined as being acceptable to 
all the stakeholders. The definition did neither entail turning a blind eye to Israeli human 
rights violations nor to Palestinian abuses of humanitarian resources. Balancing between 
different imperatives–delivering supplies, developing infrastructures, promoting self-
sufficiency, and monitoring the human rights situation–UNRWA considered its activities 
as furthering stability.  
That perspective seems to be more convincing than the position that UNRWA prolonged 
conflict. The yardstick by which UNRWA’s impact can be measured is that it remained 
acceptable to all the stakeholders, as all of these estimated that UNRWA was more benefi-
cial than detrimental to their interests (Viorst 1989:12). UNRWA strongly invested in the 
development of infrastructure such as water supply, sewerage systems, electricity etc., i.e. 
                                                 
85
 Arguably, achieving self-sufficiency and thus relieving Israel from pressure was a major reason for West-
ern donors to support UNRWA (Zolberg et al. 1989:273). UNRWA supported self-sufficiency were it 
could, but as these projects are dependent on the participation of the refugees, they were a minor aspect of 
UNRWA’s activities. 
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activities that would otherwise have to be carried out by the host states. Concerning Israel, 
that would have meant a drain on resources, probably to the detriment of military expendi-
tures. Israel frequently criticised UNRWA and regularly succeeded to remove officials it 
estimated to be too critical of Israels’s policies (Viorst 1989:16), but never realised its 
threats of expelling the agency although it could have done so (Viorst 1989:44f). After all, 
UNRWA did not pose an obstacle to Israel’s military activity. Israel was free to take mili-
tary action against the camps or to put camps under curfew where it could (i.e. particularly 
in the Occupied Territories), which it often did. Israel also, certainly not forgetting its stra-
tegic objectives, regularly allowed supplies to be delivered after a period of curfew.  
Clearly, the Palestinian-Israeli conflict has its roots in the unique circumstances of state 
building in Israel. Humanitarian assistance had an impact on dynamics of the conflict, but 
on the whole appears as a minor factor. Rather than humanitarian aid funding combat ca-
pabilities, the institution of the camp and UNRWA’s educational system seem to have had 
the clearest impact on the conflict. These entailed the emergence of an educated refugee 
middle class, decisive for the emergence of Palestinian nationalism and the imposition of 
the PLO as the representative of the Palestinians. Although the resistance was strength-
ened, it is debatable whether the form it took actually prolonged the war. During the first 
decades of Israel’s coming into existence, its government had continuously complained 
that Palestinian resistance was too divided to present an interlocutor in peace negotiations. 
Difficult to measure but probably important to maintaining the Palestinians’ moral was the 
psychological impact of UNRWA’s presence, which was equated with international recog-
nition of and support for the Palestinians’ cause - which it at least partly was (cf. Viorst 
1989:33+38). After all, UNRWA was politically established by actors feeling that the Pal-
estinians should receive some kind of compensation and international support (ibid.). That 
means as well that UNRWA’s presence was politically motivated, and its activities, though 
essentially humanitarian, cannot be separated from the international community’s political 
response to the Middle Eastern conflict. Consequently, UNRWA could not have with-
drawn even if its leadership had ever intended to do so, as it had a clear mandate from the 
UN General Assembly. More importantly, the Palestinian resistance would have had the 
international political support crucial to its strength even in the absence of humanitarian 
aid. Considering that most refugees became self-supporting by themselves, and integrated 
where conditions were conducive as they were in Jordan, the accusation that UNRWA pre-
vented a solution to the conflict by rewarding a refusal to integrate with high living stan-
dards (Luttwak 1999:42) is unfounded. Taking into account the situation in Lebanon and in 
the Occupied Territories, it is naïve to assume that in the absence of UNRWA, Palestinians 
would have simply “integrated” and ceased to exist as a group or several groups with 
vested interests in political change in Israel.  
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Considering the importance of host country political dynamics presented in 2.2 and the 
minor impact humanitarian aid had on the PLO’s combat capabilities, the Middle Eastern 
case is ill-suited for developing a critique of humanitarian aid. The situation in Zairian 
Kivu subsequently analysed is different in that respect.  
2.3.2 Humanitarian Refugee Assistance in Kivu (Zaire/DR Congo) 
The mass exodus of 800,000 to 1.2 million Hutu refugees into Zaire commenced in July 
1994. Among these were about 50,000 to 65,000 armed extremists (Emizet 2000:165) and 
some 70,000 to 85,000 civilians who had participated in the genocide (Waal 1997:211). 
Assuming that many of the “refugees” were essentially motivated to go into exile by a de-
sire to follow family members trying to evade charges of genocide, a substantial proportion 
of the camps’ population and probably the majority would not have legally qualified for 
refugee status (cf. statement of the UN-envoy to Rwanda, quoted in Boutroue 1998:Annex 
Chronology). During the next months, the extremist former Rwandan government asserted 
their control over the camps, and by the end of the year they had established a tight grip on 
them. Humanitarian aid greatly contributed to the stabilisation of the extremists’ organisa-
tion, thus increasing their fighting power and allowing them to control the refugee popula-
tion. Large amounts of supplies were diverted or robbed, and the extremists levelled an 
additional tax of 15 percent on the rations the refugees received (Waal 1997:205). The 
other resources they disposed of were military hardware and assets taken with them when 
they fled, properties looted from Zairians, and support from Zairian president Mobutu. As 
time went by, refugees and combatants increasingly engaged in trade of natural resources 
acquired in the surrounding jungle, such as doe meat and charcoal. It is likely that the Hutu 
forces would have stepped up plundering the local population in the absence of humanitar-
ian aid, as they have done since the termination of refugee assistance. The revenues thus 
gained would have allowed the extremists to continue their struggle on a lower scale, but 
not to control the civilian population. This control is important as it conferred a degree of 
legitimacy to the extremists, increased their weight in negotiations with international agen-
cies, and the camp population provided human shields.  
The camps presented a clear security threat on several fronts. Immediately upon their arri-
val in Kivu, the extremists continued the genocide, now targeting Zairian Tutsi. Addition-
ally, in an attempt to create an ethnically pure “Hutuland” around Masisi (North Kivu), 
they fought other local militias and occasionally regular military units commanded by local 
elites. Thirdly, they increasingly staged incursions into Rwanda. Fourthly, they established 
links with Burundian rebels, and the camps became an important rear base as well as a 
centre for the procurement of weapons for these rebels. Fifthly, the extremists intimidated 
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refugees who were willing to return and robbed, threatened and killed humanitarian per-
sonnel.86 
Humanitarian interests worked as a filter through which the problem was communicated to 
the outside world. There is an abundance of assertions that the extremists’ influence “has 
created unusual security problems for refugees and relief agencies”, exemplified by 
UNHCR’s statement that “intimidation and harassment of refugees wishing to repatriate is 
the main security concern in the camps” (USCR 1996:74). Nonetheless, UNHCR was 
aware of the wider security implications and these were intensely discussed internally 
(Boutroue 1998:28). Divisions within UNHCR evolved around the question whether a 
rapid and massive or a gradual repatriation over several years should be aimed at. Propo-
nents of the first option, particularly UNHCR Goma (North Kivu), stressed Zairian and 
regional stability, while those opting for the latter were motivated either by a concern for 
Rwandan stability, by mistrust over the evolution of the Rwandan polity, i.e. a fear of Hutu 
being massacred (Boutroue 1998), or by humanitarian interests in providing relief (Waal 
1997).  
The position that UNHCR’s assistance to the refugees promoted Rwandan stability by not 
forcing the extremists back into their country of origin (cf. Boutroue 1998:28) as well as 
the fear for the safety of returnees was partly conditioned by Rwanda’s intransigent stance. 
Rwanda continuously declared that it wanted the refugees back but did little to promote 
voluntary return, prompting suspicion whether it was indeed interested in their repatria-
tion.87 The confusion was largely caused by conflicting views within the Rwandan regime 
on how to react to the threat of the Kivu camps (Boutroue 1998:17). Clearly, the Rwandan 
regime was not so much interested in a return of se refugees per se, but in a solution to the 
                                                 
86
 In the fighting involving Zairian Tutsi and the other militia in Kivu, 6,000 to 40,000 people died between 
1993 and 1996 (USCR 1997:105). During the first half of 1996 alone, the extremists staged 98 incursions 
into Rwanda (ibid:84). Some 4.000 people died in the camps due to violence, including acts of banditry 
(ibid:104). 1994 to 1996, 28 UNHCR staff were killed, died or went missing (Flüchtlinge 1998:31), sev-
eral of them when the Rwandan army invaded in 1996. Additionally, a high number of NGO employees 
was killed.  
87
 Rwanda did not allow spontaneous returnees in, but only those arriving in UNHCR convoys. Border entry 
points and facilities established to receive returnees were considered inadequate for massive return but the 
Rwandan government refused to increase capacities. Furthermore, the government cooperated only reluc-
tantly and partially in information campaigns aimed at educating refugees about conditions in Rwanda 
and in organising cross-border visits. Only in September 1995, Rwanda gave assurances to UNHCR of 
unhindered access to returnees. These attitudes can partly be explained by security interests and a–well 
founded–mistrust of the international community. In fact, return was much easier for refugees in UNHCR 
convoys, while the procedures involved allowed for better screening of the refugees. The Rwandan au-
thorities were probably right in their assessment that refugees returning on their own did so to evade 
screening. It can be further be argued that Rwanda was completely justified in forbidding cross-border 
visits, as those sent into Rwanda to check the situation there were hand-picked by the extremists (Adel-
mann 1998). It appears that in contrast to UNHCR, the Rwandan government had realised that voluntary 
return was an unlikely option, and did little to realise it.  
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threat the Hutu extremists posed. This order of priorities caused concern within UNHCR 
for the safety of returnees. UNHCR Rwanda, the division in closest contact with the 
Rwandan authorities, estimated that the first priority for the government was return from 
Burundi, followed by return from Tanzania, while return from Zaire ranked least. It argued 
against repatriation because of a concern for Rwandan stability (ibid:28). It seems that the 
Rwandan regime as a whole came to consider the Kivu camps an intolerable threat to secu-
rity in late 1995 only, and from then on definitely preferred a return of the refugees to their 
presence in Kivu.  
Due to conflicting interpretations of the crisis, UNHCR failed to establish a coherent pol-
icy on repatriation (Boutroue 1998). Nevertheless, UNHCR has fairly consistently advo-
cated voluntary repatriation and organised the first return convoy in August 1994. A con-
cern for regional stability accounts for that policy. “In other circumstances, UNHCR would 
not have encouraged a return movement” (Boutroue 1998:27) as the human rights situation 
in Rwanda was considered unsatisfying. Officials however decided that it was not intoler-
able.88 Several initiatives have been taken to encourage voluntary repatriation. 
UNHCR argued that the main hindrance to repatriation were intimidation and extremist 
propaganda. It thereby legitimised its adherence to the concept of voluntary repatriation, 
although it was clear that a substantial portion of the refugees was not prepared to return 
under an RPF government.89 UNHCR regularly called on the Zairian government to sepa-
rate combatants from civilians, but with little effect. Prime Minister Kengo, a political rival 
of President Mobutu, was considered co-operative, but Mobutu remained the head of the 
armed forces. UNHCR started calling for an international military intervention in October 
1994 with the objective of increasing security for humanitarian personnel. The call has 
been regularly repeated since, but with little response from the international community. 
UNHCR was totally aware that no international force with a robust mandate would be de-
ployed, but unrealistically hoped that an intervention force would undermine the extrem-
ists’ position (Boutroue 1998:58). In fact, the only thing an intervention would have 
brought about was security for humanitarian personnel, thus furthering their institutional 
interests in providing relief, which can be regarded the ultimate reason for the prominence 
of the idea.90 Clearly, UNHCR could not have carried out a separation of combatants and 
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 Those who returned did not suffer systematic, state-sponsored violence. “Tens of thousands of uprooted 
Hutu returned to their homes (in 1995, F.G.) without any serious incident. Authorities screened returnees 
and reportedly detained about 2 percent of them on suspicion of genocide or other crimes” (USCR 
1996:61). 
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 The UN envoy to Rwanda stated that “even if 30 or 40 percent of the refugees came back, that would be a 
big success […] the remainder won’t come back anyway because they would face charges in Rwanda for 
the genocide” (quoted in Boutroue 1998:Annex Chronology).  
90
 Boutroue does not specify how humanitarian organisations thought an international force with an obvi-
ously restricted mandate could bring about stability. Shortly after the Somali experience, it was at best na-
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civilians on its own. UNHCR staff who attempted to expel a known génocidaire from a 
camp in Tanzania in 1994 were rescued by the Tanzanian police in the very last minute. It 
is no surprise that the possibility to exclude extremists from refugee status was discussed in 
late 1996 only. As a measure within their capacity UNHCR hired, i.e. paid and equipped, 
1,500 Zairian elite troops in 1995 to police the Kivu camps. The elite troops were under the 
command of President Mobutu and openly colluded with the extremists. Crime became 
less endemic, humanitarian personnel became less threatened, and relief could be distrib-
uted in a more rational manner, but the position of the extremists remained essentially un-
challenged.  
In addition to searching for security back up, UNHCR took further initiatives to promote 
repatriation. The organisation tried to create economic incentives for return by urging the 
government to close the camps and forbid refugees to engage in economic activities, but 
again with little effect.91 At great risk to their lives, UNHCR and NGO staff distributed 
leaflets condemning the extremists’ power and providing information on the situation in-
side Rwanda. Yet given the militias’ influence, these measures could have little effect. 
Nonetheless, a few hundred people repatriated daily from the end of 1994, with numbers 
going up to 1,600 a day as the December 1995 deadline for a repatriation pronounced by 
the Prime Minister (see below) approached (Boutroue 1998). For most of the time, 
UNHCR refrained from advocating a relocation of camps close to the border because it 
believed this would send a wrong signal to the refugees, rendering their presence perma-
nent. A relocation away from the border was further considered as not promoting cross-
border security and as further endangering stability in Kivu. The extremists could move 
freely in Zaire and could thus reach the border from localities far inside Kivu.  
In a marked shift indicating the divisions within UNHCR and the resulting inconsistency, 
the agency started to promote relocation deeper into Zaire and integration for a quarter to a 
third of the refugees in February 1996. This was prompted by the assumptions that return 
was not feasible for many refugees and that local integration would lead to the refugees 
developing civilian structures (Boutroue 1998). As the situation in Kivu and Burundi dete-
                                                                                                                                                    
ïve to assume that the international community was prepared to fight a war–and this is what separating 
combatants from civilians would have meant–against at least 50,000 combatants in a jungle environment. 
The call for an intervention can thus be considered a pretext for continuing humanitarian activities and 
putting the blame for its abuse on the international community. If realised, proposals the international 
community made, such as the one from the US that an international “force would work with the extremist 
for their mutual humanitarian interests” (Waal 1997:209), would only have perpetuated the problem 
(ibid., USCR 1997:107). As the intervention would only have protected humanitarian activities and as the 
relevant members of the UN Security Council had made clear that a force would be withdrawn should it 
become involved in major fighting, an international presence would not even have promoted stability in-
side Kivu. 
91
 It is intriguing to note that UNHCR pressed for such action to be taken, while phasing out food assistance 
was not seriously considered. 
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riorated, i.e. centrifugal rather than integrative tendencies prevailed, that perspective was 
unlikely to materialise.92 In fact, the right to voluntary return took priority over the princi-
ple of not supplying–in this case genocidal–irregular forces. 
Important segments of UNHCR, particularly UNHCR Goma, advocated a more aggressive 
approach to repatriation, which however did not become official policy. When Prime Min-
ister Kengo wa Dondo expelled some 15,000 refugees in August 1995 in an attempt to 
weaken Mobutu, this was welcomed by many UNHCR staff as a liberation rather than a 
forced return.93 High-ranking UNHCR officials internally stated that “forceful return was 
the only option” and that “UNHCR should step back and close its eyes while it happened 
and then assist once the refugees had returned” (Boutroue 1998:66). Their position how-
ever did not become UNHCR policy. Officially, UNHCR vigorously denounced the expul-
sion. When Kengo subsequently announced that all camps would be closed by 31 Decem-
ber 1995 UNHCR unconventionally did not protest against the deadline which they re-
garded as encouraging voluntary return. Yet UNHCR did not feel obliged to respect it nei-
ther. The deadline was lifted by Mobutu in late November 1995. Breaking new ground, the 
director of UNHCR’s Division of Internal Protection (DIP), a unit traditionally promoting 
voluntary return, introduced the notion of an “imposed return” in February 1996 (ibid:31). 
The idea gained acceptance later in the year, but did not become official policy. Equally in 
early 1996, the idea of cutting supplies was discussed. It was dismissed because many re-
garded it too drastic a measure, and because it was argued that it would trigger a destabilis-
ing movement into the Masisi “Hutuland” rather than a return to Rwanda (ibid:31f), an 
argument which is debatable.94 Taking global UNHCR policy into account, a withdrawal 
from Kivu and an early termination of supplies would have jeopardised High Commis-
sioner Ogata’s project of increasing scope and reach of UNHCR’s humanitarian efforts. 
Although Medecins Sans Frontieres (MSF) and the International Rescue Committee 
(IRC),95 two of the most experienced NGOs, left Zaire in 1995 in protest over the extrem-
ists’ control of the camps, UNHCR did not seriously consider withdrawing or cutting sup-
plies for most of the time. In public statements it justified that decision with the argument 
that the refugees were in such a dire condition that relief had to be provided and that vast 
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 Ironically, the deterioration of the security situation was one of the factors pushing UNHCR to change its 
policy and promote integration. 
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 The expulsion was halted a few days later on the order of Mobutu. 
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 Most likely, the armed extremists would indeed have remained in Kivu and terrorised the local non-Hutu 
population, as they do nowadays. Yet the resources gained through plunder would not have enabled them 
to maintain control over the civilian refugee population. Faced with the choice between starvation in Ma-
sisi and relief in Rwanda, most civilians would probably have chosen to return. The problem constituted 
by the militias would thus have been rendered easier to control. Yet the situation would most likely not 
have turned for the better, as their was no strong political actor determined to control the Hutu militias. 
95
 MSF France already withdrew in November 1994. 
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numbers of civilians would not have survived without it (cf. Wilkinson 1998:9f).96 This 
argument was at least deceptive. Conditions were indeed dire during the first months of the 
refugee influx, and death rates were relatively high. After a cholera epidemic had been 
contained in September 1994, conditions improved markedly. The refugees were cared for 
quite well by African standards, and probably from early 1995 on most would have sur-
vived for about a month without assistance, time enough to repatriate by foot (Waal 
1997:206f). UNHCR took into consideration a withdrawal after Rwanda invaded in No-
vember 1996,97 when in the ensuing chaos, humanitarian supplies were abused to attract 
and massacre those dispersed, but eventually decided to stay (Wilkinson 1998:12). This 
move can be regarded as justified. The Rwandan offensive had apparently largely suc-
ceeded in weakening the extremists’ control over the civilian population. Many could be 
repatriated out of the camps established by the extremists upon their withdrawal further 
into Zaire. It is very likely that many of the 185,000 people repatriated during the fighting 
would have been massacred if the humanitarian organisations had withdrawn.98  
It is remarkable that senior UNHCR officials advocated extremely unconventional meas-
ures when faced with the exceptional situation in Zaire–i.e. an especially complicated secu-
rity situation involving three states and several local armed actors, including a particularly 
strong and well organised refugee army–and that regional security considerations influ-
enced the response. Yet processes of institutional learning were slow and on the whole, 
UNHCR responded with rather traditional concepts, for instance by insisting that return be 
voluntary and by lobbying for an international intervention which it knew would neither 
prevent the security situation in Kivu from deteriorating further nor overcome the power of 
the extremists. UNHCR’s priorities were providing relief to the refugees and getting secu-
rity allowing to provide relief. There was a tendency for UNHCR to interpret events in a 
way which would allow them to continue business as usual, i.e. by regarding their activi-
ties as actually promoting stability in Rwanda and partly as well in Kivu.  
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 As has been stated above, a political consideration, i.e. the assumption that UNHCR’s activities promoted 
regional and Rwandan stability, influenced that decision. Much of the criticism of UNHCR is due to the 
failure to communicate which considerations determined its policy. 
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 Humanitarian organisations seemed to be surprised by this development, as is exemplified by USCR’s 
statement that the “repatriation occurred under circumstances virtually no one had foreseen” (USCR 
1997:105). However, the development clearly had been predictable, as the situation in Kivu deteriorated 
almost steadily, and Rwanda had declared its intention to intervene if the situation did not improve at lat-
est in February 1996. Reyntjens confirms that the Rwandan intervention was foreseeable (Reyntjens 
1999:51-53). However, humanitarian organisations were equally surprised about the good condition the 
returnees were in upon their arrival in Rwanda (Waal 1997:210, cf. URSC 1998). 
98
 The invasion was motivated by a desire to destroy the refugee camps rather than a desire to repatriate the 
refugees (Boutroue 1998:77). The events in late 1996/early 1997 indeed indicate that the Rwandan re-
gime, once able to fight the extremists directly, was little inclined to let the refugees return. The forces at-
tacked from the east, forcing the refugees deeper into Zaire. It was only when local militias blocked them 
from proceeding further that the refugees turned the other way. 
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In retrospective, UNHCR would have done better had it adopted a more aggressive ap-
proach towards repatriation early on, which would have included the early termination of 
the distribution of supplies. It could have done so on the grounds that that Rwanda was 
safe for return, that many of the Kivu camp population were not refugees in the legal sense 
but exiles trying to evade charges of genocide, that these exiles were the principal reason 
for which refugees did not repatriate, and that the large-scale diversion of humanitarian 
supplies strengthened these actors. Concerning safety in Rwanda, contradicting assess-
ments of UNHCR officials of the time proved wrong. Contrary to what UNHCR Rwanda 
expected (cf. Boutroue 1998:28), there was no “bloodshed” when 600,000 to 700,000 refu-
gees returned following the invasion of the RPA into Kivu. The authorities at the border 
were indeed overwhelmed, but ordered the refugees to register in their home locality in-
stead of blocking their return. A further 185,000 refugees could be repatriated by air by 
UNHCR during the fighting, again without major incidents. There is however a dilemma: 
Humanitarian assistance had the greatest impact on the extremists’ capacities during the 
early stages of the refugee crises, as it facilitated their reorganisation. At that time, many 
civilian refugees were in a dire condition, a cholera epidemic ravaged, and a termination of 
supplies would have resulted in civilian deaths on a large scale. Such a decision would 
have severely compromised UNHCR and neither could nor should be expected. UNHCR 
could however have adopted a strategy prioritising repatriation after the epidemic had been 
contained in September 1994. Less than three months after the crises had begun, the termi-
nation of supplies might still have had a significant impact on the extremists’ attempts to 
consolidate their organisation. As time went by, humanitarian assistance became less cen-
tral to the extremists, and it is in doubt whether a withdrawal of humanitarian organisations 
would still have had a significant impact on the situation. 
Yet UNHCR missed other opportunities to end the–in itself intolerable–situation of supply-
ing camps controlled by a genocidal force that attacked their home country as well as 
groups in the host country. The latest point in time when UNHCR should have decided to 
withdraw from Kivu would have been towards the end of 1995. Then, there could be little 
doubt that the Rwandan regime indeed preferred a return of the refugees to their presence 
in Kivu, and prospects for the security for the refugees as well as for stability were more 
promising in Rwanda than in Kivu. UNHCR had received assurances of unhindered access 
to the returnees and it could thus reasonably expect to be able to monitor their human 
rights situation. UNHCR assistance in Rwanda but not in Kivu would have been an incen-
tive for return. Kengo’s December 1995 deadline would have provided an opportunity for 
the organised phasing out of relief in Kivu, increasing incentives for return.  
Notwithstanding, it is in doubt whether a withdrawal at that point in time would have 
changed the situation in Kivu. The situation as it was in 2005–8,000 to 20,000 armed 
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Hutu extremists controlling parts of Kivu–is closely related to the situation of acute state 
decay catalysed by the Rwandan invasion of 1996. Yet given the political dynamics behind 
the crises–particularly the strategy of President Mobutu–it is likely that the situation today 
would not be too different had humanitarian organisations withdrawn earlier. The extrem-
ists would have resisted return at all costs. Finally, the Rwandan invasion seems to have 
done more to reduce the extremists’ strength than a withdrawal of humanitarian organisa-
tions could have. Before the invasion, the figure of armed Hutu forces stood between 
50,000 and 65,000 (Emizet 2000:165). The threat these forces posed would quite likely 
have provoked a Rwandan invasion even if the civilian refugees had been repatriated. 
Notwithstanding, amid subsequent strong criticism of UNHCR, the organisation has 
changed its policy. “The recent refugee crises have led UNHCR to major rethinking of the 
concept of repatriation” and “withdrawal or non-involvement from the start are [now, F.G.] 
options” (Boutroue 1998:82f).  
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3 Case Study: Refugee Migration in West Africa: Liberia, Sierra 
Leone, and Guinea 
Since the 1990s, Liberia and Sierra Leone have been the scene of protracted conflict and 
the centre of sub-regional instability. The wars in Liberia and Sierra Leone, characterised 
by many observers as being among the most brutal ones in recent history (cf. AI 2001:1) 
have produced large population movements. In Sierra Leone alone, more than half of its 
4.5 million strong population have either sought refuge or have been internally displaced 
(Cholet 2003:105). Up to the late 1990s, the wars had been largely ignored by the interna-
tional community, but they witnessed substantial sub-regional involvement. War refugees 
came to play a crucial role in this trans-national political context. The following case study 
examines the role refugees played in trans-border violence and internal strife in Guinea. It 
seeks an answer to the question why refugees became involved in violence. While the fo-
cus will be on the situation in Guinea, the background the countries of origin provided will 
be analysed in line with the framework presented in chapter one. 
3.1 Country of Origin: Liberia 
3.1.1 Background of the War 
The origins of the war in Liberia can be traced back to the social distortions created by the 
antagonism between the ruling elite of Liberians of American descent and indigenous 
groups (cf. Schlichte 1992). For almost 160 years, Americo-Liberians and their assimilated 
allies dominated political, social, and economic life. A military coup by Sergeant Samuel 
K. Doe on 12 April 1980 brought an indigenous Liberian to the heights of political power 
for the first time. The overthrow was largely welcomed by the population, but support soon 
faded as Doe started to concentrate power within his own ethnic group, the Krahn. These 
made up some five percent of the country’s population (Schlichte 1992:85). “Progressive” 
Americo-Liberians and non-Krahn-figures from the indigenous population, notably ethnic 
Mano and Gio,99 who initially backed the overthrow of the former regime were increas-
ingly replaced or simply killed. Political competition became intense, and as the Liberian 
elites rivalling for power based their claims on ethnic followings, the political landscape 
and the military got thoroughly ethnicised during the 1980s. 
                                                 
99
 The Gio are as well referred to as “Dan”. In order to avoid confusion I will exclusively use the more fre-
quently applied term Gio. 
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The alienation of “progressive” elements and non-Krahn natives was more important to 
subsequent developments than the displacement of the ancien regime. The “progressives” 
had been instrumental in weakening the last Americo-Liberian President William Tolbert. 
One of them was Charles Taylor, son of an Americo-Liberian and a native Gola woman 
and chairman of the Union of Liberian Students in the Americas (ULAA). After his studies, 
Taylor became director of the General Services Agency, a government procurement body. 
He was a protégé of Corporal (later General) Thomas Quiwonkpa, a Gio from Nimba 
County and commander of the Armed Forces of Liberia (AFL). Taylor fled to the US in 
1984 to avoid prosecution for embezzlement but (after escaping from prison while await-
ing extradition) rejoined Quiwonkpa in Côte d’Ivoire.100 Quiwonpa had left Liberia in 
1983 amid a power struggle with Doe and subsequent attempts by the latter to oust him 
from his position. Several other Nimba County-based political figures joined them in exile, 
notably representatives of the Gio and Mano ethnic groups. 
Doe’s Krahn-clique privileged elites from the Mandingo ethnic group. The latter’s exten-
sive trade connections in the region as well as their politically weak status as a minority of 
Muslim immigrants made them an attractive ally (Reno 1998:92). Many of the Liberian 
Mandingo are descendants of migrant traders who had established themselves in the Forest 
Region of Guinea before proceeding to contemporary Liberia. These Forest Mandingo de-
veloped a certain autonomy and separate ethnic identity from those in the Mandingo heart-
land in Upper Guinea. They are divided into several sub-groups, of which the Konia or 
Konianké, with a stronghold in the Macenta and Beyla provinces of Guinea, are particu-
larly important in the context of this paper. During Sekou Touré’s rule of terror 1958-1984 
that caused about one third of the population to flee Guinea, the emigration of Guinean 
Mandingos–mostly from the Konianké sub-group–to Liberia increased. They mingled with 
the Mandingo already present there, reinforcing and strengthening the informal ties of the 
Liberian Mandingo to the Konianké (and Guinean officials (Reno 1998:92)). The Man-
dingo refugees in Guinea are frequently considered Guinean returnees, even though many 
do not consider themselves Guineans. In Liberia and to a lesser extent in Guinea’s Forest 
Region, tensions were latent between the Mandingo traders and the “indigenous” groups 
(cf. Richards 1995:154f).101 The traditional agrarian community is characterised by a pro-
found attachment to the soil and an economic mode of production that is based on recip-
rocity and the conservation of the social entity. By contrast, the idealtypical merchant is 
                                                 
100
 The corruption charges have to be seen as an opportunity to get rid of expensive clients rather than an 
attempt to strengthen accountability. Anyway, if extradited, Taylor would have been „more likely to have 
met an untimely end than stand a fair trial“ (Richards 1995:165). 
101
 Relations between the groups in Sierra Leone were not trouble-free either, but tensions did not escalate. 
Richards explains the difference with a comparatively advanced diffusion of Mandingo values into Sierra 
Leonean society (Richards 1995:155f). 
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characterised by a high degree of mobility and the quest for profit. In traditional societies, 
the merchant is almost universally regarded with contempt (cf. Jung 1995:138), and cleav-
ages between agrarian and trading communities are widespread in modernising societies.  
Rigged elections in 1985 confirmed Samuel Doe as President, but sealed the hostility of 
non-Krahn peoples towards the regime. Particularly the peoples of Nimba County consid-
ered Jackson F. Doe, a Gio and ally of Quiwonkpa, to be the true winner of the elections. 
On 12 November 1985, Thomas Quiwonkpa staged an attempted coup–some call it an in-
vasion from Sierra Leone–backed by Gio and Mano elements in the increasingly Krahn-
dominated AFL. Its failure resulted in the execution of Quiwonkpa and undiscriminating 
campaigns of repression by the AFL against the suspected supporters of the coup plotters, 
i.e. Mano and Gio in Monrovia and the civilian population of Nimba. Between 600 and 
1,500 people are said to have died in the massacres. Heavy repression continued the fol-
lowing years (Schlichte 1992:105). Gio and Mano, soldiers as well as civilians, fled for 
Côte d’Ivoire. It was mainly among these that Charles Taylor, supported by Côte d’Ivoire, 
Libya and Burkina Faso, recruited his roughly 150 combatants. On 24 December 1989 his 
National Patriotic Front of Liberia (NPFL) invaded Nimba County from Côte d’Ivoire.  
3.1.2  Refugees, Interests and Strategies in the Liberian Civil War 
Following the invasion, Samuel Doe declared that “he would transform Nimba County into 
an empty land, where even ants would not live” (Damme 1999:37). Relentless campaigns 
by his army against civilians in Nimba County sent waves of refugees to Côte d’Ivoire and 
Guinea and quickly filled the ranks of Taylor’s forces with new recruits (Ruiz 1992:5).102 
The NPFL advanced rapidly and occupied Buchanan, Liberia’s second biggest town, in 
late May 1990. In the beginning of July, it entered the suburbs of the capital, but was pre-
vented from conquering it by a sub-regional military intervention.  
This sub-regional intervention and its motivations are of utmost importance to an under-
standing of the configuration of interests and actors conditioning opportunities for refugee-
warriors. Burkina Faso, Côte d’Ivoire, Libya and France supported the NPFL rebellion. 
The support of Côte d’Ivoire is most often explained by personal animosities. A step-
daughter of its President Houphouët-Boigny was married to Adolphus B. Tolbert, the son 
of the former Liberian President. Tolbert junior was killed by order of Samuel Doe. 
Around 1985, a foster sister of Tolbert’s widow became the wife of Blaise Compaoré, then 
the second most important political figure of Burkina Faso and its President after a palace 
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 By late March 1990, some 97,000 people, mostly Mano and Gio, had fled to Guinea and similar numbers 
had left for Côte d’Ivoire (Damme 1999:38). 
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coup in 1987. However, in traditional social settings in general and in African politics in 
particular, personal relations are inseparable from economic and political relations, and the 
former often serve to stabilise the latter (cf. Jung 1995:134-147).  
The longstanding rivalry between French and Anglo-Saxon spheres of influence goes a 
long way in explaining the alliances. A Taylor leadership would almost certainly have redi-
rected trade flows towards Côte d’Ivoire and Burkina Faso. This would have meant a rela-
tive increase in French influence in the region. Côte d’Ivoire had always maintained its 
close ties with its former colonial power and Burkina Faso had re-established them after 
Compaoré’s coup. Indeed, the two countries rapidly profited from their alliance with Tay-
lor, as “French and Ivoirian-based Lebanese commercial interests have been important in 
supplying the NPFL (and perhaps the RUF also) with credit and access to equipment, in 
return for business concessions in minerals and tropical forest products” (Richards 
1995:143). Furthermore, Compaoré was deeply involved in arms-against-diamonds deals 
with the NPFL. For Libya, the desire to extend its influence into sub-Saharan Africa, espe-
cially to a country that symbolised American influence in Africa like no other, played a 
crucial role in strategic considerations. 
Generally, the Economic Community of West African States’ (ECOWAS) “language of 
economic integration reflected an underlying concern for regional and regime security” 
(Clapham 1994:77). These concerns culminated in a military intervention by the ECOWAS 
Cease Fire Monitoring Group (ECOMOG) in the Liberian war (ibid.). The driving force 
behind the ECOMOG intervention was Nigeria, which has no common border with Libe-
ria. The reason for its engagement was connected to the long-standing rivalry with Côte 
d’Ivoire for hegemonic status in the sub-region, but the decisive factor were interests in 
regime sovereignty. Côte d’Ivoire and France had supported the Biafra-secessionists in 
Nigeria’s civil war 1967-1970. This experience had broadened the parameters of Nigeria’s 
definition of national security. It would have established a precedent deemed unacceptable 
if Taylor came into power with the support of mercenaries from neighbouring states and 
the complicity of France (Inegbedion 1994:222-225/ Körner 1996:100-104+112f/ ICG 
2002:2). Similar calculations account for the engagement of the other ECOMOG-
supporting states (see below), among whom Guinea temporarily was the second most im-
portant contributor.103  
On 24 August 1990 the first 5,000 ECOMOG troops, 500 of which were Guinean, were 
deployed to Monrovia. Until 1996, Taylor exercised kind of control about some 60 to 80 
per cent of the country, called “Taylorland” by outside observers and “Greater Liberia” by 
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Taylor (Montclos 1999). The ECOMOG, together with the AFL and several irregulars,104 
secured Monrovia and its environs. The NPFL initially enjoyed considerable support and 
indeed remained the most representative of the armed factions. Notwithstanding, it en-
gaged in gross human rights abuses. One of its principal targets were ethnic Krahn, who 
were targeted to revenge the atrocities of the AFL and as a strategy to build support among 
other ethnic groups alienated by Doe. Krahn civilians and soldiers of the disintegrating 
AFL fled massively, primarily to Sierra Leone. The other principal target of the NPFL was 
the Mandingo community. On the one hand, violence against rural traders aimed at profit-
ing from the latent peasant-trader tensions. On the other hand, violence against Mandingo 
was an important moment in the reorganisation of the war economy of “Taylorland”. The 
anti-trader violence largely was directed against “a rather different stratum of Mandingo 
trading interests in the sub-region - namely large-scale traders from the Senegal and Upper 
Niger basins”, referred to as Maranka in Sierra Leone (Richards 1995:156). “Allegedly, 
Maranka interests control[ed] an important share of the unofficial diamond trade from Si-
erra Leone. Although firm evidence is in short supply, it is estimated that diamonds ac-
count for about a third of all Sierra Leone’s GDP [...]. The [17 major, F.G.] unofficial 
dealers are presumed to handle the greater part of the 30-40 per cent of Sierra Leone’s 
diamond wealth that is smuggled each year, much of it […] through Monrovia. [...] Sup-
posedly, much of this wealth found its way through networks linking Monrovia, Conakry 
and Dakar to Europe and the Middle East” (ibid.).  
“Areas under Taylor’s control were […] a domain organized through selective access to 
rights to profit rather than by rule over a specific territory. NPFL attacks on Liberian Man-
dingo [... represented an, F.G.] ambitious attempt to replace a vulnerable minority group 
and foreign traders as intermediaries and directly conduct commerce for the benefit of 
NPFL fighters” (Reno 1998:98). By late 1990, trade in several Lofa County towns was 
directly controlled by the NPFL (ibid:97). Generally, in Taylorland, “[t]he few travellers 
who could move freely were Gio and Mano people, overwhelmingly supporters of the 
NPFL, who soon acquired control of local trade” (Ellis 1999:89). As a consequence of 
Taylor’s “warlord politics” (Reno 1998), many Mandingo fled, most of them to Guinea. 
The reasons for their flight were the loss of physical security and the expropriation of their 
basis of material reproduction. 
Generally, the major reason for flight was the destruction of the rural and urban economy 
as a result of looting and other forms of violence carried out by all of the armed factions. 
The substantial insertion of the Liberian war economy into the world market, centred on 
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 The main irregular armed actors were the NPFL, the Independent National Patriotic Front of Liberia 
(INPFL), the two United Liberation Movement (ULIMO) factions, the Liberian Peace Council (LPC) and 
the Lofa Defence Force (LDF). 
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externally financed log and diamond production in enclaves, obliterated the warring fac-
tions from the need to build consensus in exchange for resources (Reno 1998:38f). Addi-
tionally, destroying local self-help capacities forced people to depend on the faction lead-
ers’ patronage. These phenomena and the associated incentives for undiscriminating vio-
lence against civilians (Reno 2000:55) have been comparatively more accentuated in Sierra 
Leone. This is important for explaining the difference in the insurgents’ respective social 
basis. In Liberia, looting was relatively focused and tended to be directed against the imag-
ined enemy, i.e. certain ethnic groups. “Taylor was shrewd enough to seek the support of 
clan chiefs and other local leaders where possible, so that daily life continued with some 
degree of normality in much of his territory after the disruption caused by the first months 
of the war” (Ellis 1999:91). Members of a potentially hostile ethnic group could be looted 
with impunity. This mode of looting further exacerbated ethnic cleavages and uprooted 
large numbers of people, increasing the number of potential recruits for Taylor’s oppo-
nents. The support Taylor was able to mobilise up to his resignation in August 2003 espe-
cially in Bong and Nimba Counties (ICG 2002:21) indicates that it was possible to keep 
looting relatively targeted. This seems surprising as most fighters were not paid and conse-
quently highly undisciplined. Yet Taylor’s control over access to arms, his charismatic 
qualities and an effective surveillance system allowed him to somewhat effectively control 
his troops.  
3.1.3 Host Country: Sierra Leone 
In the beginning of the war, most Liberian refugees fled for Guinea and Côte d’Ivoire. This 
pattern changed as the NPFL forces approached Monrovia in late May 1990. Already in 
mid June, 20,000 refugees had arrived in Sierra Leone, and by September their number had 
increased to more than 125,000 (Ruiz 1992:22). These refugees mostly came from outside 
the heartland of Taylor’s rebellion, i.e. they belonged to groups perceived as hostile to the 
NPFL. Many had been subject to abuses by the NPFL and the disintegrating AFL. A sub-
stantial number of the refugees were former AFL soldiers fearing revenge upon their im-
minent defeat.  
On 23 March 1991, the Revolutionary United Front (RUF), a Sierra Leonean rebel force 
supported by Taylor and reinforced by NPFL-combatants, entered Sierra Leone from Libe-
ria. Contacts between Taylor and RUF-leaders dated back to pre-war times, at least to mid-
1989 (Abdullah 1997:67). Taylor’s backing of the invasion into Sierra Leone was moti-
vated by security concerns and economic interests. Extending “political control across in-
ternational boundaries by co-opting and further politicizing cross-border networks” (Reno 
1998:114) was intended to sabotage the Sierra Leonean contribution to ECOMOG. Sec-
  
 
75
ondly, the alliance increased Taylor’s control of cross-border trade. Already before the 
invasion “NPFL fighters and Sierra Leonean [had, F.G.] collaborated in […] clandestine 
trade, which deprived the Sierra Leonean government of revenue and armed the NPFL. But 
the involvement of [government, F.G.] officials in the trade blocked NPFL designs to gain 
direct access to Sierra Leone’s wealth” (Reno 1998:123).  
The invasion seemed to confirm the Sierra Leonean government’s perception of the refu-
gee influx as a major threat to social, economic, and, most important, political stability 
(Ruiz 1992:22). The Sierra Leonean border town of Zimmi, where about 65,000 Liberian 
refugees had put up a camp, served as a base for the RUF rebels (Wiedensohler 1992:159). 
This prompted allegations that the NPFL had infiltrated the camp.105 The invasion sparked 
some anti-Liberian resentment in Sierra Leone, and many refugees accused of smuggling 
weapons or otherwise supporting the invasion were arrested and often manhandled (ibid.). 
On the other hand, the Sierra Leonean government found useful allies in certain refugee 
groups.  
Since May 1991, Roosevelt Johnson, Minister for Rural Development under Doe, had re-
cruited refugees in Sierra Leone, predominantly Krahn from the former AFL, and founded 
the United Liberation Movement (ULIMO). The Guinea-based Mandingo Movement for 
the Redemption of Liberian Moslems (MRLM) headed by Al Hadji Kromah, a former Min-
ister of Information, joined the ULIMO soon after. The ULIMO was thus essentially com-
posed of beneficiaries of the ancien regime, who had lost their power and status due to the 
war in Liberia. The extension of the war into Sierra Leone by a group close to Taylor 
threatened to render their already volatile situation even more precarious. From the mo-
ment of its creation, the ULIMO fought together with the Republic of Sierra Leone Mili-
tary Forces (RSLMF) against the RUF. They were supported by bilaterally deployed con-
tingents from Nigeria and Guinea. The ULIMO became a major ally of ECOMOG. Power 
struggles between the two ULIMO wings led to a split in a Sierra Leone-based Krahn fac-
tion, the ULIMO-J under Roosevelt Johnson, and a Guinea-based Mandingo faction, the 
ULIMO-K of Al Hadji Kromah in 1994. The divide had actually been present before, and 
both factions had considerable organisational autonomy. When Liberia transcended into 
war again after a semblance of peace between 1996 and 2000, lines of conflict followed 
those previously established. The Liberians United for Reconciliation and Democracy 
(LURD) were founded in February 2000 and had their organisational roots in the ULIMO 
factions (ICG 2002). In early 2003, the Krahn-faction split from the LURD and became 
subsequently known as Movement for Democracy in Liberia (MODEL). 
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 The Waterloo camp close to Freetown had also been suspected by several refugees interviewed during the 
research to have been infiltrated. 
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3.2 Country of Origin: Sierra Leone 
3.2.1 Background of the War 
Compared to Liberia, where war had been preceded by a decade of ethnicisation of politics 
and the military resulting in rather clearly demarcated boundaries between political interest 
groups, the outbreak of the war in Sierra Leone occurred in a less structured environment 
of political competition. This is important to an understanding of the specific social bases 
of the warring factions. In Liberia, ten years of increased ethnic agitation had marked 
group boundaries and structured the lines of conflict. In military-governed Sierra Leone the 
ethnicisation of politics was less advanced. The military had deteriorated rather than be-
come ethnicised, as politicians relied on loosely organised gangs for repression. “The rapid 
rate of regime turn-over [... then F.G.] made it difficult for some of the ethnic interests that 
were already building up around state leaders to consolidate their grip on power” (Bangura 
1997:145).  
The RUF had its origins in early left-wing student movements that had become closely 
related to youths of a stratum of society often referred to as “lumpen proletariat”: marginal-
ised and semi-literate individuals of urban and rural background, socialised within a semi-
criminal and often violent environment. An increasing informalisation in the allocation of 
state revenues and a corresponding retrenchment of the state from the provision of public 
services during the 1980s entailed the growth of this population segment. Student represen-
tatives had been instrumental in establishing contacts with Libya, organising military train-
ing and creating the RUF, but quickly lost control over the movement. The “insurgency 
force from Liberia was composed of three distinct groups: those who had acquired military 
training in Libya – predominantly urban lumpens – and had seen action with the NPFL as 
combatants; a second group of Sierra Leoneans, resident in Liberia, mostly lumpens; and a 
third group of hard core NPFL fighters from Liberia, on loan to the RUF” (Abdullah 
1997:68). In 1992, the military leader Foday Sankoh, who belonged to the “lumpen” seg-
ment of the RUF recruited by the students,106 took control and ordered the execution of the 
remaining two students in the RUF leadership (Abdullah 1997).107 The war and the way in 
which violence was perpetrated then reproduced the uprising’s own social basis. 
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 Foday Sankoh had been an army Corporal who had been jailed and retired for alleged involvement in a 
coup attempt in 1970. He then worked as a photographer and later became associated with a student 
movement, but was himself said to have had a rather troubled educational history (Abdullah 1997). 
107
 The social composition of the RUF is still a point of considerable debate. Richards (1996) has argued that 
“excluded intellectuals” were an important segment within the RUF even after Sankoh took control. He 
has been strongly criticised by the Sierra Leonean intellectuals cited above. 
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3.2.2 Strategies, Tactics of Warfare and Re-production of a Social Basis 
In the beginning, the RUF tried to present the struggle as an uprising of the Mende ethnic 
group, hoping for a similar overreaction like that of Doe in Liberia to fill up its ranks 
(Richards 1995:139). Although there was much confusion on the part of the government 
about how to interpret the rebellion, this strategy finally failed. Instead of ordering the ex-
pected repression, panicking representatives of the administration and the RSLMF simply 
left Mende-areas, leaving them to the RUF and exposing the local population to their 
abuses (ibid:149).  
The first targets of the RUF were government representatives, mostly subaltern employees 
of the administration in rural areas as well as “traditional” authorities. Yet the RUF strat-
egy went beyond destroying the organisational structures of the incumbent regime, aiming 
instead at destroying any form of conventional social cohesion.108 Looting was systemati-
cally accompanied by murders, rapes, abductions, mutilations and the burning down of 
fields and villages. Atrocities were generally carried out without regard for ethnic or reli-
gious affiliations (HRW 1998:12). Most victims were subsistence farmers, miners and 
small merchants (ibid:13). Nevertheless, a focus on men of voting and fighting age could 
be observed, as they were to be discouraged from supporting to the government. The vast 
majority of victims were men between sixteen and forty five (ibid.). The destruction of 
existing social structures and means of economic reproduction served several purposes. 
Firstly, the uprooting made new recruits available, particularly from among those who 
could not return to their villages because they had been forced to commit atrocities against 
their communities. Secondly, IDP flows into government-held territory were systemati-
cally created to put a strain on the government’s resources. Thirdly, local structures could 
no longer be controlled by the government or serve as a basis for local resistance, and 
fourthly, the regime’s economic base was undermined as taxes could no longer be col-
lected and government soldiers had fewer opportunities to loot.  
The RUF’s conduct was mirrored by the regular army. Particularly from 1991 to 1995, 
government troops seemed more occupied with looting than with fighting the insurgents 
(Keen 2000:29). Often, it could not even be established whether it had been the army or the 
rebels who were responsible for an attack. The army thus contributed to the atomisation of 
social structures. The social basis for the continuation of warfare created by both sides was 
a “lumpenised” population, disintegrated from their communities. Often, youths joined one 
of the parties for individual reasons, i.e. economic gain or revenge against those suspected 
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 Abdullah (1997) holds that the attitude towards civilians was subject to discussion within the RUF leader-
ship early on, and that the violence was actively encouraged by Foday Sankoh. Massive human rights 
abuses thus appear to have been part of a deliberate strategy. 
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of being responsible for the killing of their relatives. The rudimentary cohesion of the 
combatant organisations, illustrated by instances of cooperation between the army and the 
rebels for purposes of looting (and in the military coup 1997), is directly related to the pre-
ponderance of individual motives on the side of their fighters (cf. Keen 2000). 
 This assessment has to be qualified for one armed party which assumed outstanding im-
portance later on, the Kamajor. When the RUF established “control” over the Mende-areas, 
many fled their abuses into IDP-camps in government-held territory. These camps came 
under attack by the RUF (and probably the army as well). The Kamajor militia was estab-
lished by the IDP in order to re-establish security. It was comparatively homogeneous, 
reinforcing its cohesion by drawing on ethnic symbols of the Mende, and had substantial 
support from the displaced civilians. Faced with an unreliable army, President Kabbah 
equipped them with modern weapons after his election victory in 1996. The Kamajor be-
came an elite paramilitary unit and the main military supporter of the President (cf. Muana 
1997).  
Concerning the net effect of refugee movements on the Sierra Leonean war economy, the 
flight of civilians constituted a loss of potential rebel resources that could not be substi-
tuted with refugee aid. The RUF was reported to have tried to recruit refugee in the Kat-
kama camp (Milner 2005:150), but never succeeded to exert meaningful influence in the 
refugee camps in Guinea. Several refugees interviewed by the author told that they fled to 
avoid forced conscription or forced mining. Undisciplined looting, including that of min-
ers, and subsequent flight diminished the rebels’ economic base. The importance of slave 
labour to the RUF economy probably indicated the losses brought about by flight,109 as 
slavery generally is associated with a scarcity of available labour (Marx 1987:792-802). 
Slave labour is a relatively unproductive form of exploitation. The pool of working slaves 
regularly empties and has to be refilled. Faced with a scarcity of human resources, RUF 
attacks on and abductions from refugee camps in Guinea increased in 1999 
(http:\\www.hrw.org/press/1999/may/guinea530.htm:03.01.02). In the late 1990s, the RUF 
increasingly called on refugees to return. Many of those who returned were later forced to 
mine (AI 2001:26f). Apart from a need for manpower, the prospect of profiting from hu-
manitarian aid is likely to have accounted for the RUF-attempts to bring people back into 
its territory, indicating how little they could profit from humanitarian aid in Guinea. Like-
wise after the peace accord of 1999, control over people in RUF territory would have 
strengthened the position of the RUF in any subsequent negotiations, which was avoided 
by enabling civilians to stay abroad.  
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 In interviews, several refugees referred to slavery as an important or the dominant mode of production. Cf. 
also UN 1998 and AI 2001:25. 
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The failure of the RUF to establish itself in the refugee camps can be explained by a lack 
of rebel legitimacy on the one hand, and the attitude of the Guinean state on the other. The 
RUF enjoyed little legitimacy, as refugees overwhelmingly blamed their plight on the re-
bels. While entering the rebel force offered some individual gain, the RUF was not consid-
ered to be expressing any civilian interests. The absence of any ethnic or religious ideology 
connecting rebels and civilians contributed to that perception. At the same time, Guinea’s 
aggressive attitude towards the RUF increased the “transaction costs” of a diversion of 
humanitarian aid. “Unlike the situation in Liberia [...], infiltration of the camps by 
AFRC/RUF members is not known to have happened to a large extent.110 Suspected 
AFRC/RUF members have reportedly turned up in small numbers, and have been identi-
fied by the refugees and handed over to the Guinean authorities” (HRW 1998:29). In the 
context of the invasion in 2000, the Guinean authorities ordered the Massakoundou camp, 
four kilometres away from the important town of Kissidougou, to be closed. It suspected 
that the camp hosting mostly Sierra Leonean refugees had been infiltrated by the RUF 
(Milner 2005:155). There is little evidence that this was indeed the case, yet the camp un-
derstandably was a cause of concern to the authorities. During the fighting, the RUF had 
taken the nearby town of Yende and had been advancing on Kissidougou. Given precarious 
governmental control over the area, the camp was indeed a potential hiding place for RUF 
rebels.  
3.3 Host Country: Republic of Guinea 
3.3.1 General Background 
Guinea was the first French colony in Africa to gain independence in 1958. It was the sole 
colony that refused to join the “Communauté Française”. The postcolonial foreign policy 
of its first President Ahmed Sékou Touré was isolationist and the defence of independence 
was central to the ideological legitimisation of one of the most repressive regimes Africa 
ever witnessed. Sékou Touré, an ethnic Mandingo,111 established a totalitarian system built 
on his personal control of every aspect of economic and political life. Undiscriminating 
campaigns against potential opponents, at times directed against the Peul ethnic group as a 
whole, were a regular feature of political life (cf. Condé 1972, cf. Kaké 1987). About two 
million Guineans, roughly one third of the population, fled the country during Touré’s rule. 
                                                 
110
 The Armed Forces Revolutionary Council (AFRC) was a short-lived military government of Sierra Leone 
that had conducted a military coup in collaboration with the RUF in 1997. 
111
 The ethnic group is called Malinké in Guinea. In order to avoid confusion, I will continue to employ the 
Anglo-Liberian term Mandingo. 
  
 
80
In colonial times an important exporter of agricultural produce, the country’s economy was 
restructured around the mining sector, especially bauxite. Although blessed with abundant 
natural and mineral resources making it a potential middle income country (Devey 1997), 
at the end of Touré’s presidency the economy was devastated and agricultural production 
in the formal sector had virtually ceased. The combination of extreme repression and pov-
erty earned Guinea the reputation of Africa’s Albania. After Touré’s death in 1984, Colo-
nel (later General) Lansana Conté seized power in a coup. He opened up the country to the 
outside world and privatised the economy. Due to donor pressure, the political system was 
partly democratised in the early 1990s, but elections held so far were neither free nor fair 
and repression is ongoing. An increase in international development assistance (reflected in 
a sharp rise in foreign debt) and increasing possibilities for self-enrichment of the elite 
stimulated some economic growth in the Conté era,112 yet three times Guinea came last in 
the World Bank’s Human Development Index (HDI) chart in the 1990s. The political econ-
omy of contemporary Guinea is characterised by the use of political power to secure eco-
nomic opportunities for the President, his family and some cronies. Economic reproduction 
of the elite is based on the exploitation of the country’s natural and mineral resources, 
(monopolised) import of consumer goods and involvement in illicit international trade in 
diamonds and weapons.113 
The influx of refugees beginning in late 1989 coincided with an accelerated process of so-
cial change incurred by the altered political parameters. Refugees entered a socio-
economic environment less developed than that of their home countries. Compared to Li-
beria and Sierra Leone, Guinea was virtually virgin territory concerning the provision of 
social and material infrastructures and the market economy. Politically, the influx took 
place in the context of a highly personalised and de-institutionalised state structure. At the 
height of the refugee crisis in late 1998, official statistics showed 739,318 refugees in 
Guinea (RdG 1999:7), roughly ten percent of the population, making it one of the countries 
with the highest proportion of refugees among its population worldwide.114 Although 
UNHCR statistics are known to have been grossly inflated and real figures were probably 
closer to half or even a third of that, in some districts close to the border the population 
effectively doubled, tripled or even quadrupled. In Guinean public opinion, the effects of 
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 In Guinean Francs, annual GDP growth averaged 4 to 5 percent. In US Dollars, GDP growth was close to 
or below population growth (author’s calculations, based on Hemstedt 1991-1998, Wegemund 1999, EIU 
figures).  
113
 “A mid-level functionary in the agriculture ministry, who worked in conjunction with European arms 
dealers, was responsible for issuing 80 per cent of the documentation for illicit arms fuelling West Af-
rica's regional war in the 1990's. Could this have taken place without the involvement, or at least the com-
plicity of Guinea's security forces? Almost certainly not. At least one source has pointed to a former sen-
ior figure in the ministry of defence” (ICG 2005:16). 
114
 Only Jordan and Gaza/Westbank had a higher proportion of refugees among their populations, while in 
Lebanon, the proportion was roughly equal to that of Guinea.  
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broader changes in the political economy are frequently confused with those of the refugee 
influx. In the following sections, the entry of refugees into given international, national and 
local relations and conflict-related aspects of this will be examined in more detail.  
3.3.2 Guinea, Regional Relations, and the Refugees 
Traditionally, Guinea regarded interference from colonial powers and particularly from 
France a major threat to regime security. France and Guinea had cut relations after inde-
pendence and only loosely re-established them after 1977. In many ways, Guinea contin-
ued to define national security as the containment of French influence (cf. ICG 2002:11), 
and has privileged relations to the US. A Portuguese-lead invasion by diaspora dissidents 
of Conakry in 1970, which almost succeeded to replace the regime, seemed to confirm the 
perception of a neo-colonialist threat.115 The event constitutes an important point of refer-
ence in the thinking of the political elite and is condemned across party lines. The preven-
tion of regime change engineered by (former) colonial powers in the region is regarded as 
a move with direct relevance for Guinean (regime) sovereignty. The uprising in Liberia 
lead by Charles Taylor was considered a French attempt to increase France’s influence in 
the region, and was probably taken as an indication for the existence of a French plan to 
gain full control over the Mount Nimba iron ore project.  
Eight weeks before the war started, Guinea’s President Lansana Conté had signed an 
agreement with Liberia for the joint exploitation of the Mount Nimba iron ore deposits 
located on both sides of the border. The iron ore should be transported by train to the Libe-
rian town of Buchanan, from where it would be exported overseas. Taylor’s invasion sud-
denly rendered these plans obsolete, and in the long run threatened to relinquish control 
over the Liberian share of the project to a France-Taylor alliance.116 However, after it be-
came clear that Doe could not be kept in power, a quick victory of Taylor would have 
served the economic interests of Guinea, as this would have allowed the exploitation of the 
ore. If the Mount Nimba project played a role in Guinea’s decision (as is often supposed 
(Körner 1996:166-168)) its political rather than its economic implications would have been 
crucial.  
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 The invasion was motivated by the Guinean support for the anti-colonial rebels in Guinea-Bissau. 
116
 The French public Bureau des Recherches Géologiques et Minières (BRGM) had taken over organising 
the project. It was represented in the Nimba International Mining Company (NIMCO) consortium, whose 
other stakeholders were the African Mining Company of Liberia (AMCL), the Liberian Mining Company 
(LIMINCO) and the Guinean Société Mifergui-Nimba. The AMCL was controlled by Americo-Liberian 
interests close to Taylor, while the LIMINCO majority share was state-held, i.e. under control of the Doe 
regime (Körner 1996:167). A victory of Taylor would have meant that he – and by extension France - had 
dominated the project.  
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An economic interest in influencing developments in Liberia, however, was created be-
cause of Taylor’s destruction of Mandingo trading networks and his links with Côte 
d’Ivoire, which undermined Guinea’s position in regional trade. Guinea was widely as-
sumed to be an important transit country for goods smuggled into and from Liberia and 
Sierra Leone (cf. Richards 1995). Guinea’s primary interest concerning its southern 
neighbours therefore was to prevent Charles Taylor and in extension Foday Sankoh from 
acceding to power. Any faction or government opposed to the NPFL and the RUF was 
consequently supported. 
When the ECOMOG troops intervened in Liberia, the United Liberation Movement 
(ULIMO) became their most important irregular partner. The Guinean army was affiliated 
particularly with its Mandingo faction lead by Al Hadji Kromah. In order to explain that 
alliance, a brief reflection on Guinean political history is necessary. 
The ethnic Soussou Lansana Conté inherited a security system from Sékou Touré that was 
strongly de-institutionalised. The army was in bad shape and deprived of weapons, while 
several special paramilitary units and “civilian” militias assumed security functions. This 
had alienated the military from the regime, and after his coup d’état Conté undertook to 
strengthen the army to establish a support base. However, he found the army to be unreli-
able. A first coup attempt allegedly instigated by the Touré family in 1985 resulted from 
power struggles in the transition period rather than from widespread discontent within the 
army. It was nevertheless important because of its consequences for the national political 
landscape and its regional implications. The coup was interpreted as a Mandingo attempt to 
return to the status quo ante. It was followed by a government-instigated pogrom against 
Mandingo civilians and a purge against Mandingo in the army. This alienated the Man-
dingo from the government.117 Many Mandingo soldiers fled to Liberia, where they estab-
lished links with the interest groups that later created the ULIMO. Conté became increas-
ingly suspicious of his army.118 The threat it posed was countered by returning to old pat-
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 President Conté delivered a public speech to his supporters, famous for his appraisal “Wo fata“ (“You 
have well done“ in Soussou), after scores of Mandingo civilians had been killed, their property looted and 
their businesses destroyed. Conté resorted to patronising Mandingo elites in the 1990s and has overcome 
much Mandingo resentment, but some mutual mistrust remains.  
118
 A speech by Conté delivered to his officers in 2000 clearly expresses his apprehension of the army and 
deserves to be quoted in length. “Je ne veux pas me mettre à citer tout ce que vous avez fait de 1958 
jusqu’à nos jours. Car chacun de nous le connaît. [...] Dieu m’a donné la chance avec vous de diriger un 
pays. [...] Ce que vous êtes déjà, c’est pas petit. [...] Quand il [un soldat F.G.] l’est [un officier F.G.], il 
faut qu’il défende d’abord son rang d’officier qui n’est pas à négliger dans tous les Etats, il faut que vous 
vous respectiez. [...] Ce qu’Il [Dieu F.G.] ne te donne pas, tu ne pourras jamais l’avoir. En cherchant trop 
à l’avoir, Il te fait perdre même ce que tu as. Qu’est-ce que tu as de plus cher dans le monde, c’est la vie. 
Si tu cherches trop loin, c’est la vie là que tu perds“ (Le Républicain 10.01.2000).  
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terns of fragmenting the security sector, relying on special units,119 civilian militias and the 
ULIMO or LURD respectively. A second coup attempt in 1996 indicated discontent and 
serious splits within the army (Docking 1999). Following the coup attempt, a substantial 
number of soldiers fled to Liberia, where they allegedly allied with Taylor. 
Faced with a discontent army, politicised ethnicity, and armed dissidents in neighbouring 
countries, Conté had to neutralise several threats. Firstly, the Guinean Mandingo dissidents 
in the ULIMO-K had to be prevented from taking into consideration an armed return to 
Guinea. Secondly, an alliance of Mandingo opposition forces with the ULIMO-K had to be 
discouraged.120 Thirdly, safeguards against an alliance between dissatisfied elements in the 
army and the dissidents that had fled in 1996 had to be established (ICG 2002:4). Since the 
early days of the war in Liberia, rumours of a possible invasion of those elements sup-
ported by Taylor circulated. Fourthly, the exposure of regular soldiers to high-risk situa-
tions had to be minimised, as the interventions in neighbouring states constituted a main 
reason for their dissatisfaction (Docking 1999:2). Conté responded to these threats in ac-
cordance with his general approach to regime stability: co-optation (cf. Barry 2000) sup-
ported by divide-and-rule tactics and fragmentation of the security sector. Aligning with 
the ULIMO-K effectively neutralised the threat the Mandingo opposition posed in exile 
and at home. The ULIMO-K depended on the President’s goodwill and was therefore 
unlikely to turn against him.121 Furthermore, the ULIMO-K could serve as a spearhead in 
operations against the NPFL and patrol borders, thus freeing the Guinean army from dan-
gerous and arduous tasks. ULIMO-K/LURD fighters could be expected to defend the 
President in case of a cross-border invasion or an internal coup (as the ULIMO-J later did 
in Sierra Leone), as their political (and physical) survival depended on Conté. In this re-
spect, the LURD did not disappoint the government. “The over 500 LURD fighters in 
Guinea played a key role in repulsing the Taylor-backed forces” (ICG 2002:5) that invaded 
                                                 
119
 Particularly the 1,600 men-strong Presidential Guard, almost exclusively made up of members of the 
President’s ethnic group, the Soussou. 
120
 There was a clear and present danger that political competition in Guinea could turn (more) violent and 
that refugees would become involved in fighting. In 1991, probably several hundred Mandingo died in ri-
ots and massacres related to communal elections in N’zérékoré prefecture close to the Liberian border 
(Interviews in Conakry 17.04.02 and 08.06.02, cf. Hemstedt 1992). The Mandingo community perceived 
the violence as state-sponsored. The government strongly warned that “under no circumstances should a 
refugee become involved in the internal political affairs of Guinea” (quoted from Ruiz 1992:21).  
121
 Nevertheless, the alliance was not always an easy one. In 1993, allegedly, 500 members and supporters of 
ULIMO-K were arrested by the Guinean army (Hemstedt 1994:107). Several smaller arrests were re-
ported in the following years as well, allegedly for looting. During the fighting 2000/2001 there were con-
frontations of Volontaires (a youth militia created by the government when the war started) and regular 
soldiers with LURD forces in Guéckédou in February 2001. The destruction of Guéckédou is widely be-
lieved to have been caused by an army attempt to dislodge the LURD rebels. According to the official 
version, an attack by Union des Forces Démocratiques Guinéennes (UFDG)-rebels, the Guinean element 
in the invasion, caused the destruction. It seems that a Volontaires attempt to prevent the unpaid LURD 
from looting sparked the fighting. 
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in September 2000. Indeed, it was mainly LURD combatants and the freshly recruited “Vo-
lontaires”-youth militia who fought at the front while the Guinean army provided helicop-
ter and artillery support (ibid.). 
Interests in regime security, rather than economic interests appear to have been the decisive 
factor for Guinea’s alliance with Liberian irregulars. It is subject to discussion whether 
Guinea profited economically from its military engagement, including support to the 
ULIMO-K, or whether this represented additional costs only.122 The Guinean military and 
their rebel allies were deeply involved in cross-border trade in the Forest Region (cf. Gro-
vogui 1996:33). However, the war economy of the ULIMO was considered relatively dis-
organised and of little profit (Montclos 1999:234f). Support to the LURD after the invasion 
in 2000/2001 seems to have been essentially politically motivated. The LURD’s economy 
was even weaker than the ULIMO’s. The leadership had banned diamond mining, fearing 
it could split the movement (ICG 2002:7). Reno’s (2002) analysis of the Liberian war 
economy suggests that the LURD could not have mobilised the resources to overthrow 
Taylor on their own. Consequently, Guinean support to the rebels appears to have been a 
costly rather than an immediately rewarding affair. As well, the LURD’s choice of leader–
Sékou Dammateh Conneh–suggests that the organisation financially depended on Guinea. 
His wife, Ayesha Conneh, was the top spiritual adviser to Conté, and assistance to the 
LURD was channelled through her business network (ICG 2002:10).123 This is not to say 
that economic motives were irrelevant for the support of the ULIMO and LURD. The Gui-
nean support to the rebels cannot be considered separate from attempts to preserve a re-
gional economic network involving Liberian and Sierra Leonean elites. Guinea had a spe-
cial interest in preventing Sierra Leonean elites involved in diamond smuggling form being 
replaced.124 In this case, the force trying to replace them was supported by the prime en-
emy of the LURD, the NPFL and the Taylor government respectively. 
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 The Guinean government claimed to have had additional military expenses of 81.61 billion Guinean 
Francs from 1990 to 1998, or 9.06777 billion per year as a consequence of its regional engagement (RdG 
1999:25). The total amount roughly equals 90,247,000 US dollars (Author’s calculations, foreign ex-
change rates which form the basis of these calculations are from Hemstedt 1991-1998 and Wegemund 
1999). The calculations put forward by the government are highly questionable. If we accept the figure, it 
means that Guinea must have realised profits between 14 and 7 million US dollars annually (depending 
on the exchange rate) from its regional engagement, which is possible but in no way certain. 
123
 Ayesha Conneh was a small-scale market woman when she foretold the coup attempt of 1996. After-
wards, she became the top advisor of Conté and an important business woman. Her husband had never 
been involved in politics before he was made chairman of the LURD military leadership (ICG 2002:10).  
124
 “Guinean export of diamonds has [...] been way above production: 533,000 carats in 1997, while domestic 
production was estimated at 205,000 carats. The difference was [...] believed to have emanated from Si-
erra Leone” (Davies 2000:360f). Direct contacts between Sierra Leonean government officials and Gui-
nean authorities as well as the Guinean contingent in Sierra Leone seem to have been the most important 
channels for diamond trade.   
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The military alliance with the ULIMO-K was complemented by patronising the Forest 
Mandingo on the one hand and the refugees on the other. A political divide between the 
Konia, the main Forest Mandingo sub-group with the closest relations to Liberian Man-
dingo, and the Upper Guinea Mandingo was furthered through patronage politics. The 
Konia ethnic sub-group is represented in the political party Alliance National du Progrès 
(ANP) rather than in the Mandingo Rassemblement du Peuple Guinéen (RPG). ANP-
representatives are almost exclusively Konia.125 The ANP constitutes a “parti satellite”, i.e. 
it is integrated into the regime’s patronage network and supports the President.126 The op-
position neither seems to have tried to establish relations with the refugees nor with the 
ULIMO,127 and it is unlikely that it would have succeeded if it had. Referring to African 
hospitality, the government had welcomed the refugees. Local authorities frequently inter-
vened informally in disputes with locals in favour of the refugees. Guinean humanitarian 
personnel overwhelmingly regarded the refugees as supporters of the President, and refu-
gees by and large seemed to have appreciated the regime.  
The situation changed drastically following the invasion from Liberia and Sierra Leone in 
September 2000. Along the Guinean border with Sierra Leone and Liberia, a series of 
seemingly coordinated attacks had occurred (Milner 2005:148). The Forest Region, at its 
nearest point some 600 kilometres away from the capital, was a major field of combat. 
There, the objective of the attackers appeared to be destroying the LURD rear bases and 
exploit the region’s resources. Yet, the towns of Forecariah and Kindia, both located at 
some 100 kilometres from the capital, were as well targets of major RUF offensives. The 
offensive on Kindia most likely had Conakry as its final target (ICG 2002:4), and Conté 
had reason to believe that RUF-combatants posing as refugees had already infiltrated the 
capital. The government then initiated a pogrom against the refugees.128 Refugees fled the 
capital or sheltered by the thousands in front of the Sierra Leonean embassy. Thus assem-
bled they could easily be controlled. 
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 Interview with a political analyst and journalist in Conakry, 08.06.02 
126
 The official results of the blatantly rigged legislative elections of June 2002 were: 85 seats to Conté’s PUP 
(Parti de l’Unité et du Progrès), 20 seats to the Peul-dominated opposition UPR (Union du Progrès et du 
Renouveau), 3 seats to the opposition UPG (Union pour le Progrès en Guinée), which has its constituency 
among the minorities of the Forest Region, 3 seats went to the “satellite” PDG-RDA (Parti Démocratique 
de la Guinée-Rassemblement Démocratique Africain, formerly Sékou Touré’s united party), 1 seat to the 
“satellite” PUD (Parti de l’Unité et du Développement), and 2 seats for the ANP, which seems a lot given 
that the party represents an absolute minority that is numerically strong in two Forest localities only. The 
RPG boycotted the elections.  
127
 None of the interviews I conducted with opposition politicians suggested that they had considered the 
refugees useful supporters. 
128
 McGovern (2002) considered the need to have a common enemy and a scapegoat for Guinea’s crisis as 
the main motives for which the government targeted the refugees. I attribute much higher importance to a 
perceived security threat. It was well known to President Conté that in an earlier attack on the Sierra 
Leonean capital, RUF infiltrators had opened a second front in the city when their forces attacked the out-
skirts.  
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3.3.3 Refugee Camps, the Humanitarian System and the International Community  
Prior to September 2000, roughly 20 per cent of the refugees in Guinea lived in designated 
camps, some 25 percent in refugee villages, and the rest lived in refugee quarters of Gui-
nean villages or cohabitated with locals in villages and towns (Damme 1999:49-52). All in 
all, there were an estimated 2,000 to 3,000 camps or refugee villages harbouring refu-
gees.129 This settlement pattern led to logistical problems concerning the registration proc-
ess, the distribution of assistance, and the control of the refugee population. Refugee fig-
ures were grossly inflated, and although humanitarian organisations controlled distribution 
and gave rations directly to heads of families, combatants may have profited from the sup-
plies. Before 2001, most refugee settlements in Guinea were less than 50 km away from 
the border. 
The ULIMO-K/LURD was the only rebel force in Guinea to which refugee settlements 
were strategically important. Yet, Kamajor forces were occasionally present in camps of 
Sierra Leonean refugees, particularly in the Massakoundou camp near Kissidougou 
(Milner 2005:147). Sierra Leonean government troops and Kamajor once retreated in large 
numbers into Guinean refugee camps. UNHCR created a separate facility, the Kaloko 
camp, where these forces were concentrated.130 There they could regroup and re-enter Si-
erra Leone, but this was a minor event in the war. Occasionally, NPFL (Suma 2001:7) and 
RUF fighters were sheltered by and reposed with refugee relatives in Guinea,131 but the 
literature and field research suggested that rear bases in Guinea were neither secure nor 
important for these forces. A large-scale infiltration of refugee camps by armed factions 
hostile to the Guinean government never occurred. The invaders who attacked Guinea in 
2000 entered from Liberia and Sierra Leone, but did not operate out of the refugee camps. 
Nevertheless, several reports indicate that the invading forces were guided by people 
known to the local population as refugees. 
The ULIMO-K of Al Hadji Kromah is alleged to have recruited among urban refugees in 
N’zérékoré town, rather than in the camps (Milner 2005:173, footnote 5). Yet, the refugee 
camp of Daro (12,000 inhabitants) south of Macenta was reported to have been an impor-
tant ULIMO-K rear base.132 Militarily of far greater importance was Macenta town, where 
the regional headquarter of the Guinean army was located. In these very facilities, the 
ULIMO-K and later the LURD established their military headquarters. Two quarters of 
Macenta, Mohamed V and Patrice Lumumba, were considered ULIMO-K/LURD terri-
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 Interview with humanitarian aid worker, 15.06.02 
130
 Interview in Conakry 11.06.02. 
131
 Interview in Conakry, 08.04.02 
132
 Interview with senior humanitarian staff in Conakry, 04.06.02 
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tory.133 The protected forest reserves, like Ziama close to Macenta and Daro, were widely 
suspected to serve as training grounds. Alternatively, the Guinean government had estab-
lished a training centre for the ULIMO-K in a military base in Kankan in Upper Guinea, 
some 200 km air distance away from the border.134 During the fighting in 2000/2001, most 
refugee camps were destroyed.135 In February 2001, UNHCR undertook the biggest ever 
relocation of refugees to places further away from the border. Liberian refugees were trans-
ferred to the Kouankan and Kola camps,136 administered from N’zérékoré, while Sierra 
Leonean refugees were relocated to the more westerly Albadariah sub-prefecture, adminis-
tered from Kissidougou. Most of the refugees from Daro were relocated to Kouankan 
(21,000 inhabitants in June 2002), some 50 km air distance away from the border. Depend-
ing on the quality of the vehicle, the distance between Kouankan and the Liberian border 
can be covered in two to four hours. Of the internationally assisted refugee camps, 
Kouankan became the most important LURD base, but the bulk of combatants was with 
the Guinean military in Macenta. Only a few rebels stayed with their families in Kola, al-
though the camp was located at a mere 35 km air distance from the border.137 Many refu-
gees were still self-settled in small villages in the Forest Region, and some of these were 
alleged to haven given refuge to the insurgents as well. Since the relocation, only refugees 
registered in the official camps received assistance. 
The most important military function of the refugee camps was to provide a reservoir for 
forcible and voluntary recruitment.138 When the LURD was founded in early 2000, its 
Guinean wing recruited mainly among the refugees and particularly among those who had 
been with the ULIMO before.139 Combatants sheltered in the camps and received assis-
                                                 
133
 A quarter of N’zérékoré was as well reported to host a considerable number of LURD combatants. Yet 
their presence their was in no way comparable to that in Macenta. The local prefect of N’zérékoré was re-
portedly vigorously opposed to letting the town become an important LURD base.  
134
 The base was closed in 1997 when Charles Taylor became President of Liberia. 
135
 Most often, refugees were warned of an immediate attack and fled the camps, which were destroyed af-
terwards. Some camps are known to have been destroyed by civilians from the surrounding villages, but 
the invaders as well as the Guinean army are thought to have engaged in demolitions, as all of them per-
ceived the camps as a security threat. 
136
 Kola camp received the first convoy of refugees on 6 August 2001. It remained the smallest camp, hosting 
some 6,000 refugees. In 2002, an additional camp (Lainé) was established. 
137
 I came across several youths in the camp wearing red bandanas, a fairly reliable sign for LURD member-
ship. These seemed to have arrived individually, as unlike Kouankan, no entries of LURD units were re-
ported. In contrast to Kouankan, LURD fighters in Kola were generally not wearing uniforms. 
138
 Although forced recruitment could take place in the camps, flight was more of a drain on the combatants’ 
resources than they were able to recover from humanitarian aid. The LURD realised short-term profits 
from flight by forcing people to buy exit passes, and failing to produce such a pass, the Guinean army 
would return refugees at the border. Yet few males of fighting age were allowed to buy the passes (MSF 
2002:18), indicating that most of those who actually arrived in the camps were lost to the rebels. 
139
 Al Hadji Kromah, drawing from his ULIMO forces, was one of the main founders of the LURD, but 
quickly lost control over its Guinean wing (ICG 2002). In the Liberian presidential elections of October 
2005, Kromah and Sekou Conneh were presidential candidates of two rivalling parties. 
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tance as registered refugees,140 but the support Guinea provided in its military facilities 
most likely was more substantial. The LURD presence in Kouankan seemed to be small 
compared to that in Macenta town.141 Most combatants seemed to stay in the camp for 
short periods only, using it for recovery and recruitment. However, a LURD training base 
was reported to exist some five kilometres south of the camp, indicating that the site was 
used to shelter a probably rather small number of trainees.  
During the refugee crisis caused by the first Liberian war 1989-1996, UNHCR largely 
turned a blind eye to the abuse of its facilities.142 At least since 1995, UNHCR requested a 
relocation of the refugee camps away from the border. The exposure of the refugees to 
cross-border raids, particularly in the “Languette” near Guéckédou, rather than the militari-
sation of the camps seems to have been the motive. Attacks on refugees by the RUF 
sharply increased in the late 1990s, prompting UNHCR to put renewed emphasis on relo-
cation. Some 14,000 Sierra Leonean refugees were relocated in July 1999. Financial con-
straints of UNHCR and objections to relocation by the Guinean government as well as the 
refugees prevented the continuation of the exercise (AI 2001a:40). Refugees were rela-
tively well integrated in the Forest Region. Economically and socially, staying close to the 
border was attractive despite limited security there. The government preferred to have the 
refugees confined to a remote, politically rather insignificant region (Damme 1999:37).143 
Refugees were least likely to cause discontent in a culturally familiar environment, and the 
ULIMO benefited from camps close to the border. UNHCR and human rights organisa-
tions were thus the only ones calling for relocation. The government was little inclined to 
compromise, and UNHCR decided to continue its work under the given conditions. How-
ever, a large-scale relocation of the camps would not have put an end to the 
ULIMO/LURD presence, as even distances of 50 km (Kouankan) or 200 km (Kankan) are 
no obstacle to cross-border activities when irregulars can move freely. The main advantage 
of a relocation would thus have been to put an end to the exposure to cross-border raids 
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 From 1997 to 2000, only a small number of “vulnerable” Liberian refugees received assistance, and con-
sequently humanitarian aid cannot have supported the creation of the LURD. 
141
 It is impossible to give an estimate of the number of combatants. Refugees referred to entries of LURD 
units comprising 10 to 15 soldiers as “arrivals in large numbers”, indicating that the overall presence of 
combatants may have been rather small. The ICG estimated the total number of LURD fighters in Guinea 
at 500 in 2000 (ICG 2002:5), but they gained strength since. 
142
 It seems that before the Kivu experience, militarisation of refugee camps was much less a cause for con-
cern for UNHCR than it is nowadays. A recent report (Milner 2005) suggests that during the first Liberian 
war 1989-1996, camps were not militarised. My sources suggested otherwise, particularly concerning the 
Daro camp. 
143
 While the three other geographical areas are ethnically more homogeneous and support their respective 
candidates, a common Forest identity among the minorities is still in the making. The Union pour le Pro-
grès en Guinée (UPG), headed by Jean-Marie Doré, tries to present itself as representing the interests of 
the Forest Region, but is continually hampered by the weak cohesion of the region.  
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and a consequential decrease of the small contribution looted humanitarian aid made to the 
Sierra Leonean war economy.  
After 2000, the militarisation of the refugee camps became a matter of concern for humani-
tarian organisations (AI 2001:40). During the fighting in Guinea most refugee camps were 
destroyed and the remaining ones were declared closed on the initiative of the govern-
ment.144 It however later allowed UNHCR to maintain the Kouankan camp and relocate 
part of the refugees there. The relocation in early 2001 allowed for reviewing the refugee 
policy. Although the principal aim of the relocation was to ensure security of the refugees, 
the demilitarisation of the camps as well was a major motive. Refugees were segregated in 
different camps according to nationality, ethnicity, and religion. The separation was ex-
plained with reference to camp security and tensions among the different refugee 
groups.145 Liberian refugees were separated with the aim of creating one camp mainly 
composed of Muslims/Mandingo and their allies. This seemed to be motivated by the de-
sire to strengthen security inside the camps as there were tensions within the Liberian refu-
gee population. Approximately 85 to 90 per cent of the Kouankan population were Mus-
lims, about 45 per cent of the inhabitants were Mandingo, and another 35 per cent were 
composed of ethnic Gbandi, thought to be allied with the LURD (ICG 2002:10). In com-
parison, an estimated 85 per cent of the Kola population were Christians, 85 per cent be-
longed to ethnic groups regarded as close to Taylor like the Loma, Kissi and Kpelle, and 
only some 15 per cent were Mandingo.146 27 percent of the Kola inhabitants were not relo-
cated from the combat zone but from the Kouankan camp (UNHCR control sheet: Statis-
tiques provisoires des réfugiés relocalisés, October 2001). In fact, UNHCR concentrated 
the LURD-problem in one of the camps, in Kouankan. The fact that Kola did not become 
militarised, despite its location closer to the border, indicates that UNHCR was at least 
partly successful. Yet, as Kouankan became increasingly militarised, UNHCR considered 
closing the camp and relocating its population to Kola in August 2001. The plan was not 
realised, and it seems unlikely that it would have solved the problem of militarisation.  
                                                 
144
 The Guinean government tried to pressurize the refugees to return and initially did not allow an evacua-
tion of refuges out of the combat zone. Only reluctantly it indicated sites the refugees could be relocated 
to in early 2001. In turn, a greater share of the humanitarian program was allocated to Guineans in the 
refugee populated area. Still, UNHCR allegedly had to bribe its way through the Guinean authorities (In-
terviews in Kissidougou, 20.05.02, N‘zérékoré, 23.05.02). 
145
 UNHCR insisted on separate camps for Liberians and Sierra Leoneans, although the capacities in the 
Liberian camps were insufficient and Sierra Leonean camps became populated below capacity. My re-
search could not substantiate the claim of significant tensions between the two groups, but the LURD 
posed a relatively greater threat to Sierra Leonean refugees whom it had targeted for looting during the 
fighting 2000/2001. 
146
 All figures are estimates obtained in an oral interview in N’zérékoré, 28.05.02, and may differ from 
UNHCR statistics. Yet, because of a lack of resources, UNHCR statistics of the refugee population were 
not too reliable neither (Milner 2005:175, footnote 26). 
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Modelled on the Kivu experience, UNHCR financed the presence of a small Guinean secu-
rity force in the camps, the Brigades Mixtes (BMS) made up of police and gendarmerie 
personnel.147 One of its aims was “to maintain the civilian and humanitarian character of 
the camps” (UNHCR Guinea Briefing Note, December 2001). UNHCR repeatedly com-
plained to the Guinean authorities that the force did nothing to prevent combatants from 
entering the camp and did little to stop forced recruitment. UNHCR informed the authori-
ties when people had been abducted and tried to get them returned but was rarely success-
ful.148 In 2003, two Royal Canadian Mounted Police officers were deployed on the initia-
tive of UNHCR to train the BMS. Results regarding the militarisation of refugee camps 
were anything but impressive (cf. Milner 2005:158). Generally, UNHCR decided to treat 
the problems with the authorities confidentially, and did not publicise its criticism of the 
government. In the background, difficult negotiations were going on. In 2002, UNHCR 
actually threatened to entirely withdraw from Kouankan camp if the situation did not im-
prove (Milner 2005:152). Although the situation hardly changed for the better, UNHCR 
did not realise that threat. It should be added that UNHCR received little backing from the 
international community in its quest to demilitarise the camps. 
Until the late 1990s, the international community largely left a solution to the regional cri-
sis to ECOWAS, and thereby implicitly supported the alliances of the ECOMOG-states 
with Liberian irregulars. Since then, the international community has refocused on the re-
gion, largely on the initiative of Washington.149 The US increasingly stepped up pressure 
against Liberia, while France continued to support Taylor and advocated sanctions against 
Guinea (ICG 2002:25). 150 
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 It was concluded between UNHCR and the authorities that one BMS officer be deployed per 1,000 refu-
gees. They were supported by roughly three times as many unarmed refugee volunteers. 
148
 In one instance in mid-2002, two boys that had already been taken to Liberia and a girl abducted to serve 
the LURD in Macenta were returned. In another instance where humanitarian personnel witnessed an ab-
duction they successfully persuaded the security guards not to allow the combatants to leave the camp 
with their victims. Yet, UNHCR was unable to prevent large-scale forced recruitment in early 2002. 
Around May 2002, refugees in Kouankan staged a demonstration against forced recruitment. 
149
 Most likely, it was a concern for US interests in Guinea that prompted the engagement. Washington lost 
its economic interests in Liberia under Doe (Clapham 1994:74), and had shown no initiative to recover 
them. Guinea has considerable economic potential, and the US are the leading foreign investor. In a report 
prepared for USAID, Guinea was regarded as the “dernier homme debout” (Docking 1999:17) in an un-
stable region and regime stability as a goal in itself, as no alternatives to authoritarian rule were deemed 
realistic (ibid:30-37). Given that the President is critically ill, the “uncertainty of Conté’s succession 
raises profound uncertainty for Guinea’s future. The army holds the power and will likely decide, but 
Conté has deliberately not groomed a successor. A fight is likely, one that Taylor would be likely to ex-
ploit if still in power” (ICG 2002:24). It may be this concern which motivated the US engagement. 
150
 Although Taylor is internationally portrayed as the region’s “bad guy”, both sides have moral arguments 
for their actions. “In many was, political conditions in Liberia and Guinea are similar. [...] Conté’s human 
rights record is in some ways worse than Taylor’s, and his regime is slightly more oppressive. Guinea en-
couraged gross human rights abuses against refugees in 2000-2001, and the army has shown blatant dis-
regard for civilians bombarding towns in Guinea, Sierra Leone, and Liberia. [...] Despite much more for-
eign support, and many natural resources, Guineans remain desperately poor, in contrast to its President’s 
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After the 2000 invasion, the US have – via the private military consulting company Mili-
tary and Professional Resources Inc. (MPRI) - provided “non-lethal assistance” to some 
800 Guinean troops, leading some observers to conclude that the US used Guinea to sup-
port the LURD in order to put a strain on Taylor’s resources (ICG 2002:22). The US never 
publicly condemned the LURD insurgency. State Department officials nevertheless held 
that the training was provided in order to increase capacities of the national army so that it 
could secure the border on its own, and that a continuation of the program was predicated 
on a cut of support for the LURD (HRW 2002:13).151 Eventually, the program was contin-
ued without Guinean support for the LURD being cut, and the trained battalion was de-
ployed to the interior of Guinea and not to the border region. 
The US position dominated in the UN Security Council, and on the whole pressure against 
Liberia increased, while criticism of Guinea was merely formal. A Security Council state-
ment on the events in 2000/2001 “expressed serious concern over reports that external 
military support was provided to the rebel groups [attacking Guinea, F.G.]” and “called on 
all states, particularly Liberia, to refrain from providing any such military support and from 
any act that might contribute to further destabilization [...]”. “The Council also called on all 
states in the region to prevent armed individuals from using their national territory to pre-
pare and commit attacks in neighbouring countries”, “demand[ed] an immediate halt to [...] 
the infiltration of displaced persons camps by armed elements” and “reaffirm[ed] the need 
to respect the civilian character of refugee camps” (UNSC 2000a). Concerning the gov-
ernment-instigated pogroms against refugees, the “Council expressed deep appreciation to 
the Government of Guinea for hosting a large number of refugees. It pronounced itself 
concerned by the growing hostile attitude among the local population towards refugees, 
and urged Guinea’s government to take urgent measures to discourage the propagation of 
such anti-refugee feelings.” Guinea’s is unlikely to have attributed any importance to the 
statement.152  
The Security Council resolution 1343 of March 2001 imposed sanctions on Liberia. It had 
been prepared for some time,153 but its passing clearly took place in the context of the in-
vasion into Guinea. It blamed Liberia for regional instability, but stressed the need for a 
                                                                                                                                                    
wealth. [...] Conté’s democratic legitimacy is even lower than Taylor’s, having blatantly rigged elections 
in 1993 and 1998. The opposition has no right of public assembly, and security forces have gunned down 
such gatherings and student demonstrations on several occasions“ (ICG 2002:23f). 
151
 Given the US interest in Guinean stability and the fact that the LURD presence in Guinea is not regarded 
as helpful by US diplomats, the explanation seems plausible. 
152
 Contrary to Security Council resolutions, statements do not enter the body of international law and are 
mere recommendations. The governmental newspaper published the essential sequences except the one 
concerning the civilian character of refugee camps in correct French translation and clearly treated the 
statement as a solidarity address (Horoya 23-26.12.2000).  
153
 The US publicly threatened to impose sanctions on Liberia for the first time in July 2000. 
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regional environment supporting peace. Paragraph 4 demanded “that all States in the re-
gion take action to prevent armed individuals or groups from using their territory to pre-
pare and commit attacks on neighbouring countries and refrain from any action that might 
lead to further destabilization of the situation on the borders between Guinea, Liberia and 
Sierra Leone”. Guinea’s violation of that paragraph did not trigger any international con-
demnation. On the contrary, on 8 October 2001, the UN General Assembly voted Guinea 
into the Security Council. Its election was almost universally endorsed.154  
3.4 Domestic Aspects 
This chapter analyses the impact of the refugee influx on relations on the national and local 
level, i.e. it is akin to an “impact assessment” identifying the winners and losers of incurred 
social change. It is particularly aimed at explaining the widespread participation of Gui-
nean civilians in the pogroms against refugees in 2000. Focussing on tensions between the 
groups, I will introduce the matter by presenting how Guineans and refugees perceived 
each other and what reactions were informed by these perceptions. This section is mainly 
based on verbal statements and presents evidence gathered from the trend line interviews 
and press analysis. After that, the background of tensions, understood primarily as political 
and economic contradictions, will be analysed.  
3.4.1 Violence and Images of Refugees and Guineans  
The self-image of Guinea is that of the world’s most refugee-friendly country. Guineans 
are convinced of having reacted with exceptional or even unprecedented hospitality to the 
refugee influx. There is some truth to this claim. When the war in Liberia started, large 
parts of the Forest Region were inaccessible and aid organisations had tremendous difficul-
ties to provide aid. During the first months refugees essentially relied on locals, who 
claimed to have felt pity for the refugees as well as an (ethnically based) obligation to help. 
The local population suffered adverse effects, as household density increased, (surface) 
water quality decreased, wells became exploited above capacity and food stocks melted 
away. Yet, the situation was not as exceptional as it might seem. Host populations regu-
larly react with pity to refugee influxes, and refugees often have to rely on the capacities of 
the local population during the first months (UNHCR 2001a). At the time of research, the 
reaction of Guineans to the crisis was clouded in myths, and a foreign observer could 
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 From the outset, Guinea had been one of the two candidates for two vacant seats which were supposed to 
go to Africa (indicating strong support for Guinea within Africa), and with 173 affirmative votes of 177 
valid ballots its result scored highest of all four candidates voted into the Council that day (http://ods-dds-
ny.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/N01/567/97/PDF/N0156797.pdf?OpenElement :10.01.2003).  
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hardly escape the impression that every Guinean family had its refugee guests and that 
refugees were routinely provided lodging free of charge in Guinean homes. In fact, the 
refugee crises was locally concentrated, construction of refugee villages, camps and set-
tlements rapidly went ahead, and refugees still lodging with locals usually paid rent, often 
in the form of food handouts.  
An analysis of press articles, especially those published before the late 1990s, resulted in a 
picture quite consistent with the dominant Guinean perspective. The governmental news-
paper Horoya, the only one available at the beginning of the 1990s, regularly reported 
sympathetically and in some cases passionately in favour of the refugees, recalling tradi-
tional norms of hospitality and pan-African solidarity. Both symbols are emotionally 
charged elements of Guinean identity. Since the referendum of 1958, Guineans consider 
themselves to “faire l’exception à la règle”, and an important feature of that exceptionality 
is the feeling to be particularly African. The conviction of having reacted with exceptional 
and exemplary solidarity to the influx in part reflects that aspect of Guinean culture.155 
Notwithstanding, there was frequent stereotyping of refugees. Especially in the cities, Gui-
neans perceived the clothing and behaviour of refugees as immoral.156 As the private press 
developed, stereotypes of refugees’ “légèreté des mœurs”, ”prostitution”, “vente et con-
sommation de stupéfiants”, “dépravation vestimentaire“, “consommation d’alcool, surtout 
par les filles qui, pour la plupart, fréquentent les boites de nuit et autres lieux mal famés” 
(Démocrate 03.07.2000b), “criminalité” (ibid. 2000a) became publicised.157 The rise in 
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 In some cases, inaction of the government and freedom for the refugees were confounded, and knowledge 
about the situation of the refugees was often sketchy. For example, an article clearly expressing the feel-
ing of exceptionality stated that the freedom of movement, which refugees would not even need a pass-
port for, was unique (Démocrate 03.07.2000b). In 1990 the Government decided that assistance should be 
limited to the Forest Region, which was the main method to control the place of residence of the refugees. 
Secondly, the non-provision of identity cards for refugees which would be accepted by the authorities was 
a constant point of discussion between UNHCR and the Government. The insecure status gave way to 
regular harassment of refugees and the extortion of money by the security forces, which were an informal 
way to restrict movement.  
156
 Already in 1990, President Conté held a speech in N’zérékoré in which he urged his compatriots to be 
more tolerant of different customs. Interventions of the authorities helped a lot to reduce harassment and 
reassure refugees, and relations were remembered by refugees to have subsequently improved. 
157
 Guinea has witnessed a sharp increase in crime since 1984 as the authoritarian system of control broke 
down. Crime is widely attributed to the refugees, despite some evidence to the contrary. The country’s se-
curity forces are themselves a major, if not the major, perpetrator of hard crime (attacks on villas, a bank 
robbery etc.), routinely profit from their impunity on less spectacular occasions, and are widely assumed 
to co-operate with urban gangs. In Kissidougou, residents reported a sharp increase in crime after the 
refugee camp of Massakoundou hosting 30,000 inhabitants at a 4 kilometre distance had been closed – 
and after the Volontaires-militia had been stationed there. Given the generally high crime rate in Guinea, 
the refugee areas appeared comparatively calm, with non-violent crime like stealing from fields during 
night-time being one of the most frequent complaints. Guinean involvement in crime is generally ac-
knowledged, and Guineans are aware that “nos sociétés ne sont pas étrangères à ces pratiques”, but public 
opinion is “que ces pratiques, avec la présence étrangère, ce sont accrues” (Démocrate 03.07.2000a). 
There is a widespread feeling that negative changes did not arise from internal processes, but came from 
outside and infected the society, a belief deeply entrenched in popular and intellectual culture. 
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crime, the state’s financial difficulties (Républicain 10.01.2000), deficits in the health sys-
tem, degradation of roads and the environment (Indépendant 10.04.2000), and rising hous-
ing costs (ibid. 11.05.2000) were frequently attributed to the refugees, leading to some 
demands for a tighter refugee policy.158 Refugees were often considered to be better off 
than locals, receiving supplies and having relatives in the US sending money (Démocrate 
03.07.2000b). Generally, the perception that refugees were privileged because of the sup-
plies they received was more widespread in rural areas.  
Yet on the whole, a sympathetic attitude towards the refugees prevailed. Most newspapers 
condemned the abuses of refugees in 2000. Among the “civil society” organisations, it was 
particularly the Organisation Guinéenne pour la Défense des Droits de l’Homme (OGDH) 
with close links to the Lynx and Lance newspapers which tried to impact positively on the 
public image of the refugees. The Catholic Church, too, was involved in providing assis-
tance and lobbied for the refugees. Archbishop Robert Sarah was one of the most outspo-
ken critics of attacks on refugees and condemned the government for its role in the inci-
dences (Indépendant 14.12.2000).159 As for the Muslim community, most authorities are 
represented in the state-controlled Ligue Islamique, and where Muslim authorities inter-
vened, it was behind the scenes.160  
The results of the trend line interviews showed fair to very good neighbourliness. With a 
few exceptions, relations were described as more or less continuously harmonious, and the 
invasion of 2000 was by far the most important event with a negative impact. Residents of 
Conakry tended to regard the relationship as least problematic with the trend line showing 
little to no variations prior to 2000, probably indicating that life was rather segregated, as 
daily interaction should have let to more frequent, minor problems. Trend lines established 
in the refugee areas showed comparatively more variations, with the beginning of the refu-
gee influx, the repatriation of Liberian refugees around 1997, and the invasion of 2000 
being instances of change, although the perception of an essentially harmonious relation-
ship prevailed here as well. Interestingly, perceptions of refugees and locals seemed to be 
most contradictory at the beginning of the influx: while Guineans reported a slight de-
crease in the quality of the relationship, refugees tended to report an improvement during 
the first one or two years. Guineans estimated that first encounters were quite trouble-free; 
                                                 
158
 As, for example, was expressed in the satirical Lynx. “[... N]os dirigeants tiennent un discours naïve: ’Ce 
sont nos parents. Ils doivent vivre avec nous et partager avec nous gîté et couvert!’ Quelle stupidité! Par-
tout ailleurs dans le monde, les réfugiés sont parqués dans des espaces bien précis. Et leur circulation est 
réglementée!” (Lynx 17.01.2000a). 
159
 Sarah was called back to Rome under strong pressure from the Government, and the Catholic church has 
refused to name a new archbishop to Conakry since. 
160
 My encounters with Muslim authorities suggested that these had intervened to protect individual refugees 
personally known to them, but generally Muslim authorities seemed to believe in the government’s 
propaganda labelling refugees as “rebels”, and did little to stop the abuses. 
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refugees were met with pity, and problems only developed over time as interaction in-
creased and differences became apparent.  
In contrast, while refugees overwhelmingly acknowledged the hospitality they had been 
met with, early interaction was not regarded as harmonious. Most refugees came from 
NPFL territory and were often met with considerable suspicion, resulting in attempts to 
control their movements. Unlike the Guineans who assumed they had well taken care of 
the refugees, the latter felt they largely had to provide for themselves, while access to natu-
ral resources had not been negotiated. This led to frequent minor incidents, for example 
theft or destruction of forest resources gathered by refugees without the consent of the lo-
cals. Not exclusively, but especially refugees without ethnic ties to the local community 
reported that there were frequent, but minor disputes about access to wells, lakes and for-
ests.161  
A right of access was usually established via a local patron, whose mediation was essential 
in order to give the refugees a voice in the host community. The one or two years after 
which the refugees deemed relations to the host community improved were the time they 
needed to establish the patron-client relationship. Traditionally, the most important func-
tion of this relationship is to protect strangers and give them access to the local court sys-
tem (Richards 1996:79), i.e. it empowered the refugees vis-à-vis the locals, and once the 
former could claim some rights, minor disputes for the realisation of these rights followed. 
More integration lead to more conflicts, but as the setting provided for a resolution (e.g. 
through local courts or state authorities), these were only marginally relevant. Complaints 
by refugees centred on not being paid for field labour as concluded, being given rather in-
fertile land (usually in exchange for labour on local peasant’s soil), or being denied access 
to the forests. Although seeking redress through local institutions was often effective, 
many refugees felt that they were relegated to an inferior position. Guineans have a firm 
understanding of being in their ancestral homeland, and refugees have to consent to the 
place destined to newcomers or migrant strangers by traditional practices (cf. Skinner 
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 The following statement made by a Liberian priest is certainly exaggerated and did not represent the opin-
ion of the average Liberian refugee. Yet it summarises refugee complaints. It is most interesting to note 
that no Guinean I have met would have ever imagined that refugees had that kind of complaints. “Unlike 
in the Ivory Coast where Liberian refugees were at liberty to move freely, in Guinea, Liberian refugees 
were restricted to live either in the frontier towns and villages or in refugee camps. Anyone found out of 
bonds was arrested, beaten and even killed without due process of law. A few Liberians may have lived in 
the capital city, Conakry; this was an exception, not the norm. In many parts of Guinea where Liberians 
had to reside, the refugees were not allowed to fetch firewood or cut sticks from the forest, unless there 
was an agreement for some compensation to be given to the owner of the forest. Life in Guinea for the 
Liberian refugees was not ‘a piece of cake’, for they experienced extreme hardships. This was surprising 
because Guineans who lived and worked in Liberia prior to the war lived and worked without much hin-
drance” (Kulah 1999:100). 
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1963). The system does allow for integration, but the status accorded to refugees was a 
relative loss. Particularly Liberians tended to consider Guinea a backward country, and felt 
they should be granted a higher status.  
One of the most important turning points in relations between Guineans and refugees was 
the repatriation of Liberian refugees in 1997. Immediately before leaving, some of the 
refugees destroyed their fields or those they had planted together with Guinean farmers. 
The incidences were confined to a few localities and presumably originated in individual 
quarrels of the sort described above between refugees and their patrons or other villagers. 
Once the interdependency between locals and refugees was broken up, individual refugees 
felt free to revenge. News of the burnings spread widely, effectively damaging the reputa-
tion of the refugees. Virtually none of the Guineans interviewed could imagine why a refu-
gee should behave in such a way. The incidences were regarded signs of maliciousness and 
proof that refugees could not be trusted. Still, refugees were received again, albeit more 
reservedly, when fighting resumed in Liberia. 
The hitherto fair relations between refugees and locals suffered a lasting blow in the con-
text of the invasion into Guinea of September 2000. Already in August 2000 some cross-
border raids on Guinean villages or LURD bases had taken place. These raids had either 
alarmed the government, or plans of the invasion had been disclosed to Conté. On 27 Au-
gust 2000, a few days before fighting started, the President held a speech in which he devi-
ated considerably from his earlier statements, mobilising against the refugees by identify-
ing them as a security threat and the cause of the rise in crime.162 The first major attack 
from Liberian territory took place on 1 September, and on 9 September the President de-
livered a televised speech in which he incited the population to action against the refu-
gees.163 Shortly afterwards widespread abuses against refugees and looting of their prop-
                                                 
162
 The essential sequence of the speech read : “[N]ous pensons que ce sont nos frères qu’il faut aider. Mais 
parmi ces frères, nous avons beaucoup de personnes qui sont là rien que pour faire du mal à la Guinée et 
aux Guinéens. [... F.G] S’il y a trop de vol à travers la Guinée aujourd’hui, [...] ce sont ces gens là qui 
sont parmi nous” (Indépendant 31.08.2000).  
163
 The first part of the speech compared the Liberian/RUF invasion to the Portuguese-led invasion of 1970 
and declared the current combat a matter of national independence. Subsequent parts of the speech, trans-
lated from Soussou into French, read: “Lorsque j’avais été a l’ONU, j’avais dit à Kofi Annan de ne rien 
nous donner, mais de nous débarrasser de ces punaises de réfugiés. Ces gens qui abusent de notre hospi-
talité pour contribuer à détruire notre pays. [... L’ordre a été donné, F.G.] de réunir tous les réfugiés en un 
seul lieu, pour les surveiller [...] En attendant de tout mettre en œuvre pour qu’ils rejoignent le bercail 
tous. [...] La Guinée s’en trouvera soulagée. [...] Aidez les enfants. Vos enfants qui sont dans des 
problèmes, qui sont en train de se battre! [...] Aidez les! N’acceptez pas que ceux qui sont entre nous ici 
bougent. Celui qui bouge, il faut l’écraser! Nous ne sommes plus à une époque où il faut blaguer“ (Lynx 
11.09.2000). “Après tous, on n’a jamais mieux entretenu des réfugiés à travers le monde que chez nous. A 
présent, il y a des rebelles parmi eux. Ils jouent les indices et repartent souvent chez eux pour livrer des 
renseignements. Comme ils n’aiment pas la liberté, ne les laissez plus monter ou descendre là où ils 
veulent. [...] Soyez partout vigilants, en ville comme dans les hameaux! Certains réfugiés ont des fusils, je 
vous dis! ... mais, voyons, écoutez ... s’ils ont des flingots, ces réfugiés sont nulle part ailleurs que dans 
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erty commenced. In the capital, security forces and the ruling party’s youth militia report-
edly took a leading role. They were joined by urban gangs as well as ordinary civilians. In 
the Forest Region, camps were attacked by the invaders, security forces, and local villag-
ers. The situation calmed down several days later in the cities, and after Conté gave a 
speech on 17 September in which he ordered that normalcy be restored, security seemed to 
be re-established. Violence against refugees was still widespread in the rural Forest Re-
gion, and flared up again in Guéckédou town after an attack on the city on 6 December. 
The cause of the pogroms in the cities was rather trivial. The readiness of the Guinean 
population to identify refugees with social vices may have contributed to the outburst. As 
well, a cultural legacy of mistrust against foreigners inherited form the Sékou Touré era 
may have been a background factor (Mc Govern 2002). Essentially, it was the govern-
ment’s playing on emotions and opportunistic motives that were decisive. For many, in-
cluding the security forces, the event constituted the opportunity to loot with impunity,164 
and even in normal times levels of crime are high in urban Guinea. Yet, the violence was 
not confined to the cities, but spread to the rural areas of the Forest Region, where refugees 
were considered to be more integrated and had for years lived in close contact with the 
local population. In order to explain the rural violence, I will examine the situation there in 
more detail later on.  
3.4.2 The Impact of the Refugee Influx on the National Political Scene 
Generally, Guinean opposition politicians estimated that the refugee influx had not 
strengthened the government. This largely explains that they did not try to profit from la-
tent tensions by mobilising against the refugees.165 Notwithstanding, in the run-up to the 
first presidential elections in 1993, the especially outspoken opposition politician 
Mamadou Bâh accused the government of conscripting refugees to vote for the incumbent 
regime. However, the issue subsequently subsided.166 The opposition lamented some 
strengthening of the regime through the humanitarian system, e.g. the requisitioning of 
                                                                                                                                                    
vos concessions, vous les Guinéens! Alors, fouillez-les! Ceux qui ont des fusils, ligotez-les et livrez-les 
aux autorités! N’épargnez personne! Nous, nous pensions qu’ils étaient nos frères, Noirs, comme nous! 
[...] Voila, qu’ils nous font la guéguerre! Eh bien, faisons en sorte qu’ils foutent le camp!“ (Lynx 
18.09.2000).  
164
 It is perhaps indicative of widespread material opportunism that on the question whether Guineans ob-
jected to the violence and who had done so, most often house owners renting rooms to refugees where re-
ported to have tried to prevent the security forces from throwing out the refugees. 
165
 As well, opposition elites are influenced by the dominant ideology of Africanism and African hospitality, 
although the opposition strategy consisted primarily of a politicisation of ethnicity. 
166
 According to a senior diplomatic source involved in election monitoring at the time, the government was 
fairly confident that it would win the election and did not organise fraud early on. It was only when the 
first results came in and the regime realised that it was far from winning a majority that rigging was im-
provised. Opposition elites no doubt were informed of the way in which the official results came about.  
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vehicles of humanitarian organisations to rally government supporters and corruption in 
humanitarian organisations to the benefit of government officials, but did not regard it as 
significant.167 Nor did the opposition consider the government’s alliance with the 
ULIMO/LURD important for the regime’s survival. The opposition has so far pursued a 
remarkably peaceful strategy, and has tried to undermine the military’s power by raising 
popular support. The presence of the ULIMO/LURD in the Forest Region raised concerns 
of the opposition only after the invasion. The leader of the Union pour le progrès en 
Guinée (UPG), Jean-Marie Doré, whose constituency are the Forest Minorities,168 most 
vocally denounced the LURD presence (cf. Observateur 25.12.2000, 05.03.2001). The 
opposition tried to rally support by blaming Conté of having provoked the invasion by giv-
ing sanctuary to the LURD, thus exposing Guineans to insecurity. As for Doré, the accusa-
tions partly built on the latent Forestiers-Mandingo tensions and served to raise his profile 
as the defender of Forestiers’ interests. On the whole, however, the issue did not signifi-
cantly increase tensions between the Guinean political actors.  
Although the refugee influx and the humanitarian system did not become an issue in politi-
cal disputes, both in fact strengthened the government. The humanitarian system repre-
sented a vehicle for tremendous capital import,169 part of which the government could use 
to strengthen its financial basis and by extension its patronage system. Part of the humani-
tarian budget accrued to the state through taxes. The UN enjoy large tax exemptions and 
imports of humanitarian supplies were not taxed, but associated activities such as the use 
of the port of Conakry, works carried out by Guinean subcontractors and NGO rents and 
salaries propped up the state budget. One of the few taxes to be paid by UN-organisations 
as well was the tax on internet satellite antennas, roughly 200,000 US-dollars a year per 
antenna.170  
Secondly, the construction of infrastructures by UNHCR, primarily necessary to deliver 
aid to refugees, complemented governmental efforts in road construction aimed at enhanc-
ing its legitimacy among the population on the one hand and better exploitation of the For-
est Region’s resources on the other. When aid agencies started their work in 1990, large 
parts of the region were inaccessible, and almost all deliveries passed through Côte 
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 As well, the opposition regards the international community as a key resource in the struggle for transpar-
ent elections. Mobilising against the refugees or humanitarian organisations could further damage its in-
ternational reputation, which is already jeopardised by its ethnic strategy (cf. Docking 1999:30-37, cf. 
Groelsema 1998). 
168
 Actually, the Forestiers are an ethnic group still in the making and are divided along linguistic and other 
lines. 
169
 UNHCR Guinea’s budget 1990-1999 totalled some 182.2 million US-dollars (EIU1996:31, 2001:37). In 
1994 alone, the humanitarian sector channelled some 37.3 million US-dollars, or 8.8 percent of Official 
Development Assistance, into Guinea (EIU 1996:20) 
170
 The tax was increased from some 20,000 US-dollars to ten times that amount in 2001. 
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d’Ivoire. UNHCR has greatly engaged in the rehabilitation and construction of rural roads 
and bridges to designated camps and distribution centres since. In the past, there had been 
virtually no road system in the region (Diallo 1992:23), and UNHCR’s activities were cru-
cial in opening it up (ibid., Grovogui 1996:35). Similarly, the development of water sup-
ply, educational facilities, and the health system in the region were greatly supported by 
humanitarian revenues (Diallo 1992, Grovogui 1996).171 Nevertheless, public awareness of 
international engagement particularly in the health sector was low, and the extension of 
“Postes de santé” and hospital facilities was often attributed to government action.172 As 
with basically all internationally financed development projects, the government tried to 
incorporate these into its patronage system, or at least create the impression on the part of 
the beneficiaries that the projects were carried out on the government’s initiative. Gener-
ally, Guineans who had lived close to refugees in the border region felt that they had been 
largely ignored by the humanitarian organisations.  
When the relocation of the refugees became necessary, the quest for new sites considerably 
increased the government’s bargaining power vis-à-vis the humanitarian organisations. 
Authorities in the Albadariah region hosting Sierra Leonean refugees were comparatively 
more successful in imposing their objectives than their counterparts in the N’zérékoré re-
gion hosting Liberians. Most humanitarian activities in the cities served to appease the au-
thorities and assure their cooperation with humanitarian agencies.173 The projects consisted 
almost exclusively of the same activities that were carried out in the camps, e.g. field 
clearance, well-digging, micro-credit schemes, and the construction of latrines, wood-
saving stoves, and school buildings. The construction work was generally done by the aid 
agencies or sub-contractors almost without any contributions from the locals, leading to 
little ownership identification and know-how transfer. It was likely that most of the pro-
jects will have no or considerably fewer long-term effects than the investment implied.  
In the villages near the refugee camps, particularly in the Albadariah-region, the projects 
were nevertheless highly appreciated by the locals and directly attributed to the presence of 
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 During the early months of the refugee influx, health was indeed a serious problem, as the–by West Afri-
can standards–rudimentary health system became even more strained. Not only added refugees to the lo-
cal patients, but the state of health of locals worsened due to rising food problems, an increased popula-
tion density and the importation of infectious diseases (cf. Diallo 1992:25f). The situation gradually im-
proved, and at the time of research, neither international health workers nor locals regarded the refugees 
as having significant negative effects on health care. 
172
 Information gathered in several interviews. 
173
 The projects were part of UNHCR’s conflict prevention scheme, yet except for Kouankan town, the cities 
are far away from the camps, and contact between locals and refugees was minimal. Furthermore, the cir-
cle of beneficiaries was too small to have an impact on public opinion, and beneficiaries interviewed in 
Kissidougou had no idea of a connection between the refugee presence and the projects. In Kissidougou, 
individuals closely connected to the local prefect lead the programs and mediated between the aid agency 
and the beneficiaries.  
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the refugees. They thus effectively contributed to the acceptance of the refugees by the 
locals, who had initially been quite suspicious. Activities in the larger villages and small 
towns were highly vulnerable to integration into the regime’s patronage system. This was 
mainly due to the necessary co-operation with the authorities to “sensitise” potential coun-
terparts on the opportunities offered and to identify actual beneficiaries.174 Occasionally, 
humanitarian resources found their way directly into the regime’s patronage network; for 
instance, a humanitarian NGO supported the NGO of the second wife of the President, El 
Hadja Seth Kadiatou Conté.175  
Another possibility for the regime to profit from humanitarian revenues was corruption. In 
the early 1990s, some assistance was channelled through Guinean ministries (Black/Sessay 
1997:595), giving the regime the opportunity to appropriate some of the resources. Subse-
quently, NGOs replaced the state authorities. Since, there were basically two forms of cor-
ruption that have to be distinguished. One was official corruption, i.e. bribes paid by 
UNHCR and other organisations to government officials to be allowed or able to carry out 
their tasks. The need for a relocation of the refugees provided government officials with 
new leverage, and substantial sums of money and presents, e.g. at least one car, have been 
handed out to get the new sites allocated. The second form of corruption was collusion 
between individual employees of humanitarian organisations and state authorities, enabling 
the former to divert resources to the benefit of both while being protected by the authori-
ties.176 
3.4.3 The Economic Impact of the Refugee Influx: Winners and Losers 
In reading this section, the interface between economy and politics has to be borne in 
mind. All nationally owned big business is held by elites close to the government, and 
gains made automatically strengthen the regime as well. Most importantly, Mamadou 
Sylla, President of the employers’ organisation, is alleged to be a presidential proxy, serv-
ing as a guise for Conte’s personal control of much of the economy.177 Inter alia, he is an 
                                                 
174
 It was concluded between UNHCR and the authorities that one fifth of the humanitarian budget should be 
spent on projects for Guineans in the refugee-populated areas. Although local authorities were not exclu-
sively responsible for determining which projects would be carried out and who would benefit, they had 
an important intermediary role. 
175
 Conté’s NGO seemed to be genuinely interested in achieving its stated developmental goals, yet its politi-
cal implications are obvious. 
176
 For example, in what was a minor incident, a local NGO charged with the distribution of non-food items 
only distributed about 60 to 70 percent of the goods it received from UNHCR. After UNHCR protested, 
the local sous-préfet invited the monitoring team and threatened its members with arrest if the allegations 
were not dropped.  
177
 Sylla was a subaltern government employee until 1998. In 2002, he was deemed to be the richest busi-
nessman of Guinea, and presided over the holding Futurelec. He has made “his” fortune mainly through 
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important provider of means of transport. All deliveries for roughly 60,000 refugees on the 
600 kilometre road from Conakry to Kissidougou were carried out by Guinean sub-
contractors. As well, the military was deeply involved in importing smuggled fuel, and the 
humanitarian system greatly increased demand. Generally, the humanitarian system con-
siderably raised demand for construction, be it roads, wells, latrines, irrigation systems for 
rice fields, or camp facilities, while urban refugees increased demand for housing. Aid 
agencies have developed their own capacities for road construction and rehabilitation, but 
most other activities were carried out by Guinean enterprises. Given the scale on which 
projects were implemented in the Forest Region, humanitarian revenues were of great na-
tionwide importance to the construction sector. While Guinean big business thus profited 
from the refugee influx, refugees stood little chance of competing with Guinean interests in 
that sector, as the Guinean political economy is characterised by heavy protectionism by 
informal means. Conflicts over its control could thus not develop. 
While big business enterprises can be expected to have been aware of the opportunities 
offered by the refugee influx, there was a marked disparity between perceptions and reality 
on the level of the local population. As will subsequently be demonstrated, the refugees 
accelerated effects of long-term developments. Generally, negative effects of these changes 
were largely attributed to the refugees, while the opportunity provided by the refugee in-
flux to adapt to a changing economy were frequently overlooked.  
Guineans interviewed often considered the informal economy to have been dominated by 
refugees before late 2000, i.e. refugees were identified as rivals. The importance refugees 
had in the informal sector is likely to have been overestimated. During the research period, 
the situation resembled that in 1990 described by Lambert (1990), i.e. an ethnically struc-
tured informal economy controlled by Guineans. As the ethnic networks protected their 
interests, the situation was unlikely to have changed considerably in the meantime, al-
though Guineans may have appropriated sectors dominated by refugees during the riots in 
2000.178 My queries regarding the sectors refugees were active in indicated that they occu-
                                                                                                                                                    
monopolising trade in several sectors, but was also a main beneficiary privatisation. Most notably, he 
took over the planes from the national carrier Air Guinée in late 2002, though not the company’s exces-
sive debts, and created Air Guinée Express. 
178
 Refugees experiences were most likely analogous to those of other foreign entrepreneurs after the “liber-
alisation”. When Conté took over, “la Guinée apparaît, dans toute la région, comme le pays où un capital 
commercial donné, fut il initialement petit, offre le rendement le plus considérable” (Morice 1987:112). 
The opening up of the system sparked a run on the opportunities offered, and many exiles and foreign 
merchants, mostly from Niger and Mali, tried to enter the market. In the beginning of the 1990s, the situa-
tion had cooled down, and it became clear who had won the race. A few foreign traders had been able to 
build alliances with Guinean businessmen and managed to engage in import trade, but their role ended at 
the port of Conakry. None of them succeeded to penetrate the interior market of Guinea, which became 
increasingly dominated by Peul commercial networks, while Upper Guinean Mandingo networks mo-
nopolised re-export to Mali and Côte d’Ivoire (Lambert 1991:501). 
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pied niches blocked for Guineans because of a lack of skills. Refugees seemed to have par-
ticularly engaged in the repair of consumer items which had simply not been available in 
Guinea until 1984, such as cars and petroleum lamps, and the recycling of consumer 
goods. Guineans progressively appropriated control of these sectors as well. The main sec-
tors open to locals in which refugees were still significantly engaged in in 2002 was the 
trading of fruits acquired from neighbouring villagers and the market for house maids. 
Other sectors in which significant numbers of refugees where active in seemed to depend 
largely on a refugee clientele, i.e. restaurants, coffee bars and small-scale rice trade. Al-
though Guineans may have considered these enterprises as competition, refugees were 
generally much more important to the Guinean economy as customers than as entrepre-
neurs. Commercial activities have greatly developed in the Forest Region, particularly be-
cause of an increased demand due to the refugees (Grovogui 1996:35). The relocation of 
markets from Liberia, in part stimulated by refugee traders, supported that trend. Most im-
portantly, Guéckédou hosted one of the biggest (according to Guineans, the biggest) mar-
kets in the region until September 2000.179 The town was an important junction for trade 
between Mali, Côte d’Ivoire, Liberia, Sierra Leone, and Guinea. The market had been in 
Kolahun in “Greater Liberia” until traders fled the business methods of the NPFL. Gener-
ally, trade in the region underwent considerable growth, and the region around Guéckédou 
even witnessed an unprecedented boom. 
Another area of competition was the housing market. Rents in urban Guinea, especially in 
the Forest Region and Conakry, sharply increased since 1989, according to locals by about 
300 to 700 percent.180 Somewhat inconsistently, locals in Kissidougou and N’zérékoré 
pointed out that rents had not fallen after the repatriation of Liberian refugees in 1997. 
However, claims that rents there had risen again as a result of the influx of humanitarian 
organisations are credible.181 Urban Guineans tended to blame the housing problem on 
refugees and, as many were indeed able to pay the rents, regarded them as privileged. In 
the Forest Region, prices for essential items, most notably rice, rose as a consequence of 
increased demand due to refugees. The increase in demand refugees caused benefited im-
                                                 
179
 Guéckédou also hosted the bulk of humanitarian head offices. Increases in rents there are probably con-
nected to the boom the town witnessed rather than to humanitarian personnel. The increase in demand 
caused by humanitarian personnel can hardly have led to price rises given the enormous turnover of the 
market.  
180
 These are subjective estimates of Guinean locals, and most likely subjective price increase was higher 
than real increase. Inflation between 1990 and 2001 was about 300 percent (calculations by the author 
based on data from Hemstedt 1991-1998 and EIU sources). It is likely that the refugee influx indeed was 
a factor increasing rents, but inflation and accelerated urbanisation were important as well. It should as 
well be noted that many of the relatively few refugees who managed to establish themselves in the cities 
were lodged with relatives. 
181
 Until 2000, most organisations operated from Guéckédou, which was severely hit during the fighting. 
Since then, most agencies have relocated their offices to Kissidougou and N’zérékoré.  
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porters, producers (particularly peasants), house owners, and constructors, while the asso-
ciated inflationary tendencies were especially detrimental to the urban poor. Some resent-
ment towards refugees in Conakry may be connected to competition for cheap housing. In 
the cities of the Forest Region, the increase in rice prices was countered by the availability 
of cheap humanitarian supplies on the local markets.182 As one woman from a poor house-
hold in Kissidougou put it: “Quand les réfugiés étaient là, il n’y avait pas de famine. Main-
tenant, il y a la famine.”183 
Other benefits to locals (urban as well as rural) emanated from asset transfers (cf. Duffield 
1994). Especially early arrivals had brought with them goods of value, such as cars, agri-
cultural tools, household items etc. As the refugees’ resources dwindled, they had to sell 
their property–at extremely low prices, as high pressure on the refugees to sell caused a 
supply far in excess of demand at reasonable prices. Almost all refugees interviewed had 
sold everything of value they owned within a one-year period, and the number of cars in 
the Forest Region is said to have tripled or quadrupled following the influx (Damme 
1999:49).184 On the whole, refugees have considerably increased opportunities for Gui-
neans to acquire capital goods.  
Notwithstanding, especially during the first months of the refugee crisis the rural popula-
tion suffered adverse effects. Particularly villagers supported the refugees, i.e. accommo-
dated them in their homes and shared food with them, putting additional stress on an al-
ready poor living standard. Near the border, population density tripled due to the refugee 
influx during the 1990s (Black/Sessay 1997:590).185 The increase in population density 
obviously had implications on water, land and forest resources. The situation gradually 
improved as rural refugees started building their own houses, either in camps or as self-
settlers, and humanitarian organisations became engaged. Although rural Guineans inter-
viewed realised that effects of the refugee influx were not entirely negative, the perception 
that refugees had a largely negative impact on the living standard was widespread.  
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 Most of the rice consumed in Guinea and particularly in Conakry is imported. Poor transport infrastruc-
ture means that imported rice is comparatively more expensive in the Forest Region, and locally produced 
rice is of greater importance there. 
183
 The statement refers to the closure of the Massadou camp some three to four km away from Kissidougou 
in early 2001 (Interview 10.05.02). 
184
 Almost all the public transport cars I used in the region were driven by Guineans, who, according to my 
queries, were most often employed by a relative owning the car.  
185
 The figures are disputed, but Diallo 1992:14 and Grovogui 1996:9f cite similar numbers in their case 
studies. Refugees are estimated to make up half of the population of the Forest Region (Black/Sessay 
1997:590), while in some districts the population even quadrupled during the 1990s. As a rule, most refu-
gees were located within a 15 km distance from the border and in the cities, while most communities fur-
ther inland had no or very selective contact (for example through direct family links or market transac-
tions) with the refugees. However, Fairhead/Leach 1994:507 cite statistics which report population 
growth of 120 percent from 1932-1993, 40 percent of
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Access to drinking water was often mentioned by refugees–especially those without ethnic 
ties to the local community–as a critical point in early contacts with the local population, 
and access to the wells was frequently denied. Water quality and supply was indeed a prob-
lem. In the early 1990s, only the prefectures of Lola and N’zérékoré had some “puits amé-
liorés”,186 and Macenta, Guéckédou and Kissidougou were only equipped with traditional 
wells. Most people still depended on surface water, the poor quality of which further dete-
riorated due to population growth (Diallo 1992:19). The humanitarian organisations had 
since greatly engaged in digging wells, and throughout the region supply with safe fresh 
water had markedly improved. During the research, villagers simply did not mention water 
as a source of tensions in the past, even where relations were quite strained, as in Kola.  
Land-related issues were considered the most important source of tensions by government 
officials, humanitarian workers and ordinary Guineans alike, arguing that the population 
increase resulted in unbearable pressure on natural resources. However, population density 
in the Forest Region was just re-approaching its level prior to colonisation and the land can 
actually support a population increase (Fairhead/Leach 1994, 1996),187 while cultural 
strategies for coping with increased demand on land still exist (Black/Sessay 1997:598f).188 
Refugees generally had no claim to land, so they had to negotiate access with the local 
villagers. A precondition for successful negotiations stressed by all the refugees inter-
viewed was to establish friendly relations with one of the villagers. The traditional institu-
tion of finding a local patron is operated in the whole region and is well understood by the 
refugees (Black/Sessay 1997:602). According to the refugees interviewed, getting access to 
land was less a question of providing material benefits to locals than proving one’s “good 
character”. Speaking the same indigenous language considerably facilitated establishing 
personal relations. Refugees of different ethnicity than the locals usually entered the sys-
tem through the mediation of refugees already incorporated.  
There were clear incentives for the villagers to establish such a relationship. Firstly, it 
raised the prestige of the local patron, crucial to establishing some kind of authority at the 
village level. Village positions have become more important and more contested due to the 
decline of state control after the death of Sékou Touré (Black/Sessay 1997:603). Secondly, 
“proving one’s good character” involved helping the patron doing field work, and, al-
though villagers usually did not explicitly demand rent, refugees held that as a matter of 
custom and an expression of gratitude, 10 to 20 percent of the harvest would be given to 
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 The term designates wells with cemented walls and cover in order to prevent pollution. 
187
 The Forest Region was a major battlefield in inter-African and French-African wars during the colonisa-
tion period (see below), depopulating the area. 
188
 Black/Sessay’s case study was carried out in three localities in Yomou prefecture near the Liberian border, 
but as patterns which govern the access to land as well as politico-economic conditions in the region are 
quite similar, their findings are probably representative. 
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the land owner. Thirdly, the refugees provided an opportunity for local villagers to estab-
lish a claim to land on the one hand and to shift to more profitable production, particularly 
swamp rice farming and cash crop cultivation, on the other.189 Generally, locals maintained 
control over land farmed by refugees, and access had to be renegotiated annually. Often, 
land was cleared by refugees and farmed for one season, after the end of which locals 
could convert it to cash crop cultivation, causing the rapid expansion of plantations. During 
my research, cash crop production was shifting from coffee to hybrid oil palms. For almost 
all of the rural refugees interviewed, doing work on villagers’ fields or on the few com-
mercial plantations was one important source of revenue.190 Setting up irrigation systems 
for rice fields is labour intensive, and Liberians were considerably more experienced with 
the system than locals (Black/Sessay 1997:600). There are strong indications that we can 
generalise findings of Black/Sessay’s analysis,191 i.e. the refugee influx accelerated a long-
term process of rural modernisation benefiting the local population, while at the same time 
furthering refugees’ interests. 
By 1995, three quarters of the refugee households covered in Black/Sessay’s study 
(ibid:596) had access to land.192 While locals generally maintained their fallow cycles of 
ten years on average, in 75 percent of the cases fallow cycles were shortened on refugees’ 
land, basically meaning that refugees were offered land of inferior quality (ibid.). None of 
the refugee households covered in Black/Sessay (ibid:602) had been allocated land through 
the mediation of aid agencies. At the sites of my research, the relocated refugees’ access 
was increasing rapidly, but humanitarian organisations there had a comparatively more 
substantial role in mediating. After the relocation of 2001, the principle of directing 20 
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 Rights over bush land were not definitely established, and the first one to farm it himself or through refu-
gee clients thus established a claim to it against other villagers and, more importantly, against other vil-
lages.  
190
 Daily wages for refugees were at 300 to 500 FG, while for the locals they were at 750 to 1,000 FG in 1995 
(Grovogui 1996:34) (1,000 FG = 1 US Dollar). In 2002, daily wages for fieldwork were at 1,000 to 1,500 
for refugees and about 2,000 to 2,500 for local jouths (1,000 FG = 0.50 US dollar). Purchasing power loss 
from 1995-2002 was about 30 percent (author’s own calculations, based on Hemstedt 1996-1998 and EIU 
sources), suggesting a real wage increase for refugees. Although locals often perceived the refugees as 
privileged, the difference in wages suggests that locals had far better access to means of subsistence. Yet 
refugees may have had better access to education, health services, and clean drinking water. 
191
 Data from Grovogui’s (1996) study which was conducted in the more northerly sous-préfecture of Fas-
sankoni (Macenta prefecture) equally suggested that the refugees stimulated local demand for land. While 
refugees officially made up 70 percent of the population, the part of the population actually farming only 
increased by 36 percent (wage labour excluded). Yet the number of rice fields rocketed by 112.5 percent, 
from 200 in 1990 to 425 in 1995 (ibid:33), most likely stimulated by a price hike of 100 percent for rice 
(ibid:34) due to increased demand. Additionally, coffee plantations, which were exclusively held by lo-
cals, were rapidly expanding (ibid:17). Data used from Grovogui (1996): local population: 1,379 (p.9); 
refugees: 3,216 (p.10); local population active in agriculture: 93 % (p.13); peasant refugees: 73% of all 
refugees (p.19); peasant refugees having access to land: 20% (p.33). 
192
 However, in Black/Sessay’s area of research no primary forests were cleared except in one area, where 
rubber and oil palm plantations had considerably diminished the overall availability of land. At the new 
sites I visited, no primary forests were cleared. 
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percent of the humanitarian resources to locals had been firmly established.193 Access to 
plains and hill slopes was still directly negotiated by refugees, but as one fifth of the seeds 
(and sometimes tools) would be given to the villager providing the land, humanitarian or-
ganisations increased incentives for the latter. The aid agencies concentrated their agricul-
tural programs on irrigated swamp rice cultivation, which is roughly four times as produc-
tive as upland cultivation and twice as productive as natural swamp farming. Additionally 
swamps are usually not left fallow. Access to irrigated swamps at the new sites was 
achieved exclusively through aid agencies. Locals willing to improve their swamps were 
encouraged to contact the respective organisations, who would subcontract Guinean enter-
prises to carry out the necessary works. 20 percent of the land–usually the best part–were 
immediately used by the Guinean farmers, while the remaining 80 percent would be given 
to “vulnerable” refugees for a period of three years. Guinean farmers could thus expect to 
have considerably improved land at their disposal once the refugees had left or their land 
rights expired. Inhabitants of the Albadariah sub-prefecture were benefiting particularly 
from the relocation, and were quite aware of the benefits the refugees brought with 
them.194 In sum, the refugee presence did not only increase the locals’ capacities to engage 
in cash crop production, but also provided means to improve the productivity of agricul-
ture. As locals developed an interest in the refugees’ presence, they were unlikely to act 
against the refugees. 
3.5 The Refugee Crisis and Identity Formation 
The question to be dealt with in this section is that of the refugees’ identity, important to 
understand between which groups conflicts could occur. To what extent did refugees main-
tain or develop a sectarian identity, and how did refugee identities relate to Guinean identi-
ties? 
In the Forest Region, identity is complex and manifold. Before the Liberian war, “la 
grande partie des populations frontalières était tournée vers le Libéria et se sentait plus 
libérienne que guinéenne” (Grovogui 1996:32). A trans-border ethnic identity overlaps 
with Liberian and Guinean identity aspects. A regionally based Guinean “Forestier” iden-
tity further adds to the complexity. Self-identification is extremely variable and depends on 
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 Before the relocation, a host of agencies was operating in the agricultural sector, and their practices re-
portedly varied considerably. According to Diallo (1992) and Grovogui (1996), aid agencies had included 
the local population in their programs early on, but it seems that more than 80% were destined for the 
refugees.  
194
 In contrast to the Kola (which hosted a camp between 1993 and 1997) and Kouankan sites for Liberian 
refugees, the Albadariah region knew no refugee presence before the relocation. In Albadariah, the con-
struction of roads and wells etc. of benefit to the locals had just commenced, while at the Liberian sites 
the provision of these infrastructures was somewhat taken for granted by the locals. 
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the situation. The wars weakened foreign-country identity aspects among Guineans, as the 
reputation of Guinea’s southern neighbours suffered,195 Guinean migrant labourers and 
traders had to return, and the government increased its military and administrative presence 
in the region. “L’assistance du Gouvernement aux populations frontalières prouva à ces 
dernières qu’elles font partie d’une entité nationale et jouissent de la sécurité de cette na-
tion” (Grovogui 1996:32).196  
When the wars in Liberia and Sierra Leone started, the refugees chose their place of refuge 
according to criteria of ethnicity (Grovogui 1996:20). Independently of the mode of set-
tlement, refugees and locals kept–or developed–their separate identities (Damme 1999:37), 
the latter being the “citizens” (“citoyens”) or “autochtones”, the former simply being 
“refugees” (réfugiés). The trend line interviews revealed that despite considerable interac-
tion and frequent friendly relations between Guineans and refugees, the distinction re-
mained latent. However, it is likely that given the events of 2000/2001, refugees tended to 
overestimate the importance of that distinction in retrospective. Some of the symbols Gui-
neans use to distinguish themselves from refugees have been mentioned in section 3.4.1. 
Generally, the imagined difference between Guineans and refugees largely followed the 
tradition-modernity dichotomy. Refugees were considered and frequently considered 
themselves to favour western fashion, be more entrepreneurial and materialist, be less def-
erent to elders, and have less rigid norms regulating sexual behaviour (cf. Andrews 2003). 
Liberia and Sierra Leone clearly were more modernised than Guinea before the wars, and 
the wars additionally accelerated processes of modernisation. Yet, it is quite likely that 
flight as well contributed to modernisation, as the theoretical framework suggests. 
The qualification as “refugee” also applied to returnees having resided outside Guinea for 
considerable periods of time. In a Mandingo-village near Kouankan, old case-load “refu-
gees” made up roughly 25 percent of the population. Virtually all of the “refugees” had 
chosen the village as place of settlement because of family links to the inhabitants, and 
considered themselves Guineans and “refugees” at the same time. They had, however, es-
tablished their own parallel political institutions and had their own representative, who was 
to consult with the “citizens’” representatives. Different from other refugees, these “refu-
gees” had been accorded an indefinite right to cultivate the village’s land, and were better 
integrated politically as well as economically.197 Generally, village and ethnic identities 
became subdivided into new entities, i.e. a refugee and a citizen identity. The overarching 
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 Before the wars, Liberia and Sierra Leone symbolised a higher living standard, and both countries enjoyed 
a remarkably good reputation (cf. Andrews 2003). Nowadays, these countries are no more associated with 
anything desirable by Guineans. 
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 According to Jacobsen (2002) security problems associated with wars or refugees quite often compel the 
state to increase its presence, possibly having positive effects on state building.  
197
 Interview in Kanela II (sous-préfecture de Kouankan), 28.05.2002 
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ethnic identity nevertheless remained important. After the events of 2000/2001 many refu-
gees–Mandingo and “indigenous” Liberians alike–acquired Guinean identity cards.198 This 
move was motivated by the security Guinean nationality conferred, rather than a change in 
self-identification. The way in which the identity documents were acquired nevertheless is 
indicative of the level of integration. Guineans befriended with refugees posed as their 
relatives, giving wrong testimony to the authorities as to the origin of the refugees.199  
The private Guinean press, international humanitarian personnel and non-Mandingo refu-
gees tended to regard the Mandingo as Guinean returnees and not as refugees. Although 
Mandingo emigration had already occurred in pre-colonial and colonial times, the bulk of 
migrants left Guinea during the 1960s and 1970s. In 2002, most of the Liberian refugee 
camp population was of Mandingo ethnicity. Given that most Mandingo refugees had ar-
rived in mid-1990 (Damme 1999:39),200 integration does not appear to have been as easy 
for them as their returnee-status suggests. The Mandingo interviewed in the camps did not 
consider themselves Guineans. Many have been born in Liberia and hardly speak any 
French. They legitimise their claim to Liberian nationality with reference to a historical 
Mandingo kingdom, a kingdom which “indigenous” Liberians tend to regard a mere ham-
let where Mandingo were granted the right to settle down by an “indigenous” king. The 
Guinean government was equally reluctant to consider the Mandingo refugees Guineans. 
Both due to their involvement in Liberian politics, the ethnic factor in Guinean politics, 
and their predominantly urban background, they were regarded as potential troublemakers. 
The LURD forces represented a reliable ally of the Guinean regime for basically the same 
reason they previously represented an ally of Samuel Doe: they were a vulnerable, foreign 
minority. Not furthering their integration arguably reserved the option of expulsion for the 
Government,201 and made humanitarian aid available which was needed to subsidise them.  
In addition to other identities, refugees developed a distinct “refugee” identity uniting Li-
berians and Sierra Leoneans. Especially in the Parrot’s Beak isthmus in the Guéckédou 
prefecture, there was considerable cohabitation of and interaction between Liberians and 
Sierra Leoneans. The refugee identity was mainly based on the use of a common language, 
and the common experiences of war, refuge, and exile. Pidgin English was the lingua 
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 A substantial number of refugees, including those in the camp, held Guinean identity documents. One 
refugee estimated that some 20% of those speaking an indigenous Guinean language had acquired Gui-
nean identity cards, though this account is likely to be exaggerated. 
199
 Given the poor state of Guinea’s records on its own population, the authorities often depend on testimony 
from relatives to issue documents.  
200
 Most Liberian refugees repatriated around 1997, yet most of the Mandingo camp population in 2002 was 
made up of old case-load refugees who had refused to return given that they were still considered subver-
sive in their home country.  
201
 For instance, once President Conté stated that “[t]ous ceux qui sont de l’ULIMO ne sont pas des 
Guinéens, mais des libériens. Ils doivent retourner au Libéria” (Horoya 24-26-04.1999. 
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franca in the camps, and became much more widely spoken than had previously been the 
case in the refugees’ home countries.202 Refugees’ trade relations were often limited to the 
refugee community, partly explaining the development of a common identity.203 The de-
pendence on a refugee clientele may have been the most important reason for which many 
of the Mandingo choose to settle down in the camps.  
Inside the Kouankan and Kola refugee camps inhabited by Liberians, there was a discerni-
ble antagonism between Mandingo and “indigenous” Liberians. There was frequent stereo-
typing, but as well a substantial willingness to cooperate. “Indigenous” refugees over-
whelmingly considered the LURD insurgency illegitimate. They almost universally re-
garded it as the selfish attempt of foreigners to monopolise power. There was a marked 
rejection of the Mandingo’s claim to Liberian nationality and their right to have a say in 
the country’s political affairs. In contrast, while there was little open support for the LURD 
from the Mandingo refugees, these stressed the need for a respect of Mandingo interests 
and tended to approve what they considered the rebels’ motives. Despite some tensions due 
to these contradictory positions, there were also many conciliatory voices, especially from 
the upper strata of the refugee population such as camp authorities, religious authorities, 
and teachers, and cohabitation improved. UNHCR acted upon the camp administration in 
order to encourage cooperation. 
In Kola, day-to-day relations were relatively unproblematic. Kola’s respected chairman of 
the camp administration, an ethnic Krahn married to a Kpelle wife, actively promoted rec-
onciliation. He denounced stereotypical prejudices, advocated a “forgive and forget” ap-
proach, mediated between the groups, and encouraged people to speak English and to re-
ject “tribalism”. Liberian origin and the common use of Pidgin English were strong sym-
bols for the unity of the Liberian refugees, underlying such an attitude. In similar vein, it 
was frequently acknowledged that beliefs rooted in traditional African religions as well as 
the experiences of war and exile where features shared by the refugee community. Perhaps 
more significant than the symbols mentioned is that refugees, once asked, were quite pre-
pared to find common ground between the groups.  
In Kouankan, intra-camp relations were much more difficult than in Kola. The “indige-
nous” Christian representatives newly incorporated into the camp administration on an 
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 In rural settings, indigenous languages had dominated before.  
203
 The main reason for the limitation of trade relations seemed to be credit arrangements. Refugee merchants 
disposed of better mechanisms to enforce the repayment of debts from refugees, while they stood little 
chance to recover debts from Guineans, and the same was true for Guinean merchants. Day-to-day busi-
ness was quite dependent on the willingness and capacity of traders to grant (and recover) credits. Cus-
tomers often only buy from traders who are willing to provide them with credit in times of need. As the 
economic situation is precarious, consumers are regularly in need of credit to acquire items of basic ne-
cessity.  
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informal basis upon pressure of UNHCR reported that relations with the Mandingo repre-
sentatives were essentially fair and improving,204 but their view did not seem to be shared 
by those they were expected to represent. On the contrary: Several informants rather re-
garded the situation as becoming more difficult and not a few actually feared clashes. The 
difference between Kola and Kouankan demonstrates the impact the rebel presence had on 
intra-camp relations. Most of the non-Muslim refugees had fled the LURD and not gov-
ernment troops, and a climate of fear overshadowed relations between Mandingos and “in-
digenous” Liberians. In Kola, the impact of the few LURD combatants had a negligible 
impact on camp life. The Muslim community tended to regard Kouankan a Mandingo 
camp, and was hardly sensitive to the “indigenous” population’s concerns.205 Yet, there 
was little ethnic propaganda, as the LURD seemed interested in altering its image of an 
alien force and not in further dividing its Mandingo constituency from other Liberians (cf. 
ICG 2002). The LURD, in fact a coalition of different groups, had never openly advocated 
an ethnic agenda, although its Guinean wing clearly was a Mandingo force. 
Subsequently, instances of refugee-related violence in Guinea will be analysed, taking into 
account the findings presented above on political, economic and symbolic contradictions. 
3.5.1 Refugee-Related Violence in Guinea 
As has been stated in chapter 1, land questions per se are unlikely to lead to armed conflict, 
as refugees usually have little resources to engage in confrontation, and would rather starve 
to death if not provided with aid or land. A closer examination of the relation between 
Guineans and refugees showed that the reciprocal nature of the system made confronta-
tions unlikely. Furthermore, the danger of an overexploitation of the soil was not as appar-
ent as the numbers of refugees suggest, as agricultural change towards more efficient pro-
duction could be observed. Yet, in at least two cases, confrontations that were considered 
to be land-related took place. In order to understand the role land played in these inci-
dences, we have to look at the wider politico-economic context in which agrarian change 
unfolded, and the way refugees impacted on these processes. 
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 Kouankan received several waves of refugees. The first were almost exclusively Muslim/Mandingo, 
whereas later arrivals were mostly “indigenous” Liberians. These had not yet been formally incorporated 
into the camp administration, but elections were scheduled. “Indigenous” Liberians remained a minority 
in Kouankan. 
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 Remarkably, when I asked the Mandingo refugee chairman of Kouankan about features uniting the refu-
gees, he first mentioned the Muslim religion, implying that refugees of other religions were not on his 
mind. The chairman was suspected of being a LURD member, but seemed to be committed to mediating 
between the rebels and other refugees. For instance, a former NPFL fighter interviewed in the camp had 
disclosed his identity to him in order to be protected against possible LURD harassment.  
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The Forest Region has witnessed substantial Mandingo immigration from the north since 
pre-colonial times (Fairhead/Leach 1994:495). Generally, immigrants came as traders and 
settled among the local population. Yet, war has played a crucial role in forming relations 
between locals and Mandingo. During the 19th century, several wars were fought for the 
control of regional trade routes, and between 1874 and 1909 the region was the site of con-
tinuous warfare. By the mid-nineteenth century the first Mandingo chiefdom of Buzié had 
been established, with Kouankan as its capital. Several of the “Forestiers” political entities 
became tributaries to Buzié, and later to the Muslim-Mandingo kingdom of Samory 
Touré.206 Samory was expelled from the region in 1894 by the French, and Kouankan was 
taken and burned to the ground by Forestiers-forces in 1897 (ibid:495-497). These historic 
experiences provide a point of reference in the locals’ interpretation of contemporary con-
flicts of interest.  
Many immigrants became integrated into the agricultural economy, even though they most 
often had arrived as traders. Usually, immigrants negotiated a right to cultivate the land 
according to traditional practice. Even after considerable time had passed, Forestiers still 
tended to consider the right a temporary one. Currently, the temporary nature of the ar-
rangement is often challenged, as the descendants of the immigrants now claim a custom-
ary right to the land. The region has witnessed several clashes between Konia and Forestier 
in the last decades (cf. Indépendant 01.03.2001). At the same time, as individual land own-
ership developed (Grovogui 1996:34) and the rural economy became commercialised, state 
intervention in questions of land ownership increased. The state began distributing owner-
ship titles to those engaging in the mise en valeur of the land, i.e. in cash crop production 
and the set-up of irrigation systems, a move which has particularly benefited the Konia 
immigrants (Fairhead/Leach 1994:504). State intervention has become increasingly impor-
tant to establish a claim to land. 44 percent of all swamp-farming Guinean nationals, or 13 
percent of all Guinean peasants covered in Black/Sessay (1997:602), named the state as 
their source of access to land, compared to 41 percent who traditionally “owned” the 
swamps they farmed. These agricultural changes have to be kept in mind when analysing 
contemporary conflicts. 
On 12 and 13 May 2002, about 70 youths from Kola village, inhabited by ethnic Kpelle 
Forestiers of Christian and Animist religion, invaded the camp site. They closed down of-
fices and activity centres of humanitarian organisations and threatened their personnel into 
leaving. The community hall and the foundations of a mosque were torn down, and several 
private refugee huts were damaged. Although some refugees were hurt when the youths 
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 Samory was a Mandingo, but he based his legitimacy on religion rather than ethnicity. Due to the current 
political situation in Guinea, the ethnic component has become more important in retrospective. 
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threw stones, the attackers met no physical resistance. Instead people fled in great numbers 
to the Muslim town of Gouécké four kilometres away. The conflict was prevented from 
escalating further by the Guinean military. 
According to a local youth leader, the problem was one between the village and the aid 
agencies, rather than between the village and the refugees.207 UNHCR was accused of hav-
ing broken promises, and he demanded that villagers get the same treatment as refugees, 
i.e. they should receive food rations. Additional demands presented to UNHCR included 
building a youth activity centre, a maternity hospital, three new classrooms (in addition to 
the existing six in the village and twelve in the camp), filling up of a local water pool, drill-
ing of pump-equipped wells, improvement of the local road, and payment of 10 million 
Guinean francs (approximately 5.000 Euros) to the village authorities. The youth leader 
pointed out that the village had to be compensated for the loss of fields and the “deforesta-
tion” at the camp site. The site, including the refugees’ fields, measured some 43 hectares. 
The term “deforestation” usually means a loss of primary forests, yet the youth leader re-
ferred to the loss of coffee and fruit trees. Fruit trees on the site were not felled, for eco-
nomic reasons as well as for protection against sun and wind. Compensation for the loss of 
fields and plantations had been paid to the affected farmers,208 but not to the village au-
thorities. Paradoxically the youth leader denied that a shortage of arable land or wood had 
indeed affected the village. Competition for these resources was thus unlikely to be a cause 
of conflict between refugees and locals, and the argument that the village had to be com-
pensated for the losses brought about by refugees was unconvincing.  
In order to understand the apparent contradiction, we have to explore the motives behind 
environmentalist rhetoric. International concern for the region’s primary forests has be-
come an important source of revenue, and the villagers are well aware that “presenting a 
degrading or threatened environment has become an imperative to gain access to donors’ 
funds” (Fairhead/Leach 1996:116). Although villagers tried to create the impression that 
the dispute was between UNHCR and the villagers, it clearly was the construction of the 
mosque which sparked the invasion. Locals tried to profit from the tensions with the refu-
gees by proposing a “solution” to UNHCR that would have brought them benefits but bore 
no relation to the cause of the hostilities.209 When I expressed my doubts about land and 
“deforestation” being a cause of conflict, the villager’s argumentation changed. They 
claimed to have always resisted the manifestation of Muslim belief on their ancestor’s soil, 
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 Interview in Kola Village, 25.05.02 
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 Accepting compensation for the coffee plantations was quite attractive to the farmers, as most plantations 
were not harvested anymore due to the slump in coffee prices on the world market in the late 1990s. 
209
 This interpretation is supported by the locals’ unwillingness to allow the construction of the mosque in 
exchange for humanitarian benefits. 
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and the refugees would not change that. Apparently the mosque was considered a symbol 
for land tenure claims. The denial of a construction permit therefore served to underline the 
villagers’ claim to the land and to stress that the refugee’s presence was merely temporary. 
Both villagers and the refugees considered their relationship strained, and negotiating ac-
cess to land was universally described as difficult, while it was hardest for the Muslims.210 
Muslim refugees stood much better chances to establish friendly relations and negotiate 
land with the inhabitants of the Muslim town of Gouécké. However, by August 2002, 
3,633 refugees (or 519 individuals, each of them statistically representing a household of 
seven) had negotiated access to land, mostly with Kola villagers.211 The surprisingly high 
number indicates that the villagers realised benefits from temporarily ceding land–provided 
they maintained control. Given that most Kola camp refugees were Christians, that these 
refugees could build a church and that they could more easily negotiate access to land, the 
concerns which the Muslim refugees raised can only be understood in the context of intra-
Guinean competition. The villagers’ desire to increase production implied an extension of 
cultivated surfaces. This process had obvious implications on relations between Kola and 
neighbouring Gouécké. 
These relations are crucial to understanding the problem between the (Muslim) refugees 
and the villagers. A representative of the Gouécké Muslim community considered relations 
with Kola as being and having been strained.212 Land is one of several contentious issues. 
Gouécké is much larger than Kola, and the sheer size of the town suggests that it will en-
croach on land claimed by the “first-comers”. The Muslim refugees became integrated into 
the Gouécké Muslim community. In local perspective, Gouécké was encroaching into Kola 
territory via the refugees. Gouécké supported the refugees, potentially jeopardising Kola’s 
control over “its” territory. This potential threat almost materialised after the destruction of 
the mosque’s foundations. The imam of Gouécké turned to the Ligue Islamique (LI) on 
behalf of the Muslim refugees.213 The LI is quite influential but did not succeed to per-
suade the authorities to intervene so that the refugees could build a mosque. However, the 
impact the refugees might have on the balance of power between Gouécké and Kola was 
the primary concern of the Kola villagers–who then reached the conclusion that they had to 
prevent a precedent of Muslim/Mandingo manifestation on their soil. While in this case 
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 Interview in Kola Camp, 29.08.02 
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 An additional 1,477 (or 211 individuals) refugees had been granted access to irrigated swamps through the 
mediation of an aid agency. All in all, 5,110 refugees thus had access to land, while the official camp 
population figure of 6,000 inhabitants was inflated. 
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 Interview in Gouécké, 29.08.02 
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 The Ligue Islamique is the organisation representing most of Guinea’s imams and is–much more than the 
Christian churches–firmly incorporated into the national patronage network. 
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violence occurred between refugees and Guineans, in another incident refugees were con-
sidered to have sparked intra-Guinean violence. 
In January 2000, fighting erupted between a Tomamania and a Toma village in the 
Macenta prefecture. At least 30 people were killed during the fighting (Lynx 17.01.2000). 
The Toma represent a Forest Minority, while the Tomamania are descendants of immigrant 
Mandingo. They continue to speak a Mandingo dialect, but have intermarried with local 
Toma and have assimilated in several respects. The Toma village had given the right to 
cultivate a piece of land to Mandingo who had newly arrived from Upper Guinea and had 
settled down with the Tomamania. The piece of land, which had been planted with coffee 
and cocoa in the meantime, was reclaimed by the Toma village in 1997, but the Tomama-
nia refused to return the field. A governmental mission intervened in the dispute and ruled 
that the Toma owned the land, but the right to cultivate remained with the Tomamania. The 
Toma did not accept the decision (Lynx 17.01.2000). The press considered increasing land 
pressure caused by the refugees to be behind the dispute (ibid.). In the light of the dynam-
ics described above, the background rather seemed to have been the competition for new 
sources of revenue arising in a process of modernisation. This process of modernisation 
was drastically reinforced by the influx. Nevertheless, the Tomamania are relatively well 
integrated into the forest societies and have more links with the “Forestiers” peoples than 
most other immigrant groups, circumstances which should prevent disputes from escalat-
ing. Additional factors able to break up these relations have therefore to be taken into ac-
count. These factors were provided by the ULIMO/LURD presence, their relation to the 
Forest Mandingo, and armed banditry. Arguably, Tomamania had provided shelter to the 
ULIMO, who were suspected of being behind the looting of Forestiers villages in 1997 
(Républicain 18.01.2000).214 Generally, as the Forest Region became more violent due to 
looting Liberian factions, relations between Guinean groups suffered. 
In contrast to these cases where land was an issue, the attacks on refugees in late 2000 
were essentially motivated by security interests. As has been said above, locals remained 
suspicious of the refugees. Occasional security breaches such as the one involving the 
Toma and Tomamania reinforced that attitude. When the invasion took place, the combina-
tion of a direct threat to the locals’ security and government propaganda sparked the hos-
tilities.  
                                                 
214
 Whether the Tomamania village had indeed provided shelter to the rebels is doubtful. Yet Forestier vil-
lages seemed to have been selectively targeted, while the Tomamania had not come under attack. They 
were thus suspected of complicity with the bandits (Interview in Conakry, 13.04.02). 
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3.6 Conclusion: Refugees in Guinea and Political Violence 
The ULIMO and the LURD had conventional as well as humanitarian sanctuaries in 
Guinea. The original motivation for the rebels to engage in hostilities was the loss of their 
former status during the war, yet the attitude of the host government was decisive for its 
ability to establish humanitarian sanctuaries in Guinea. The Guinean government sup-
ported the Liberian rebels for reasons of regime security and economic interests. This sup-
port can only be understood when personal politico-economic trans-border networks be-
tween rebels and the Guinean government are taken into account. The Liberian warlord 
and later President Charles Taylor was perceived a military and economic security threat. 
He symbolised neo-colonial interference in regime sovereignty and his appropriation of 
trade routes destroyed a source of revenue of the Guinean government. Guinea’s alliance 
with the ULIMO thus represented an attempt to preserve its position in trans-border net-
works. Although humanitarian assistance partly supported the rebels’ economy, the mate-
rial support and rear bases provided by the Guinean government were of much greater im-
portance. All in all, refugee assistance played a negligible role in the war economy, and 
foreign rebels would have maintained their bases in Guinea even if aid had not been pro-
vided or all bona fide refugees had been repatriated.  
The impact the refugee influx had on the Guinean polity has been analysed as reinforcing 
or creating contradictions. The refugee influx strengthened the government, thus reinforc-
ing the contradiction between the government and the opposition, but the refugees were in 
no way crucial to the regime’s advantage over the domestic opposition. The opposition’s 
interest in international support, a rational analysis of the sources of the government’s 
power, and an ideology of African hospitality filtered the opposition’s interpretation of the 
effects of the influx. As a consequence, it did not mobilise action against the refugees, and 
latent contradictions between refugees and Guineans did not lead to organised confronta-
tion until September 2000. Then, the invasion from Liberia and Sierra Leone altered the 
government’s perception of the refugees. They came to be considered a cover for enemy 
infiltration and the government instigated a pogrom aimed at forcing the refugees to leave 
or assembling them in spaces were they could be easily controlled. Rural Guineans adopted 
the government’s perception of the refugees as a security threat and participated in hostili-
ties against them, while in urban Guinea the chance to loot was a more important motiva-
tion for civilian participation in the riots. However, except for a few refugees acting as 
guides for the invaders, refugees did not seem to have been among those attacking Guinea. 
The refugees caused few conflicts of interest in the urban informal economy. The informal 
market is protected by informal structures, and refugees overwhelmingly occupied eco-
nomic niches in which Guineans had not yet become active. In rural Guinea, two 
contradictions between Guineans and refugees developed. The first is a traditional patron-
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dictions between Guineans and refugees developed. The first is a traditional patron-client 
contradiction, while the second is a modern one between Guinean owners of means of sub-
sistence and refugee labourers. Still, the relation was of relative benefit for both parties, 
and interdependence between the groups largely prevented hostilities. There is consider-
able evidence that the refugee influx did not lead to a declining living standard of locals. 
On the contrary, locals by and large seem to have economically benefited from the refugee 
presence. It was when interdependencies were broken up in the context of the repatriation 
of Liberian refugees that some Liberians engaged in what Guineans considered a hostile 
act, i.e. the destruction of planted crops. Generally, refugees had the greatest impact on 
Guinean stability where they intensified intra-Guinean tensions, primarily related to the 
modernisation of agriculture. Refugees accelerated that process.  
Due to considerable interaction between the different refugee groups on the one hand and 
refugees and Guineans on the other, refugee identity was multiple and overlapping. These 
overlapping identities facilitated peace. Generally, sectarian identities were much less em-
phasised than could be expected given the ethnic aspect of the Liberian wars. Nevertheless, 
sectarian identity aspects remained and could still be mobilised when a political actor 
chose to do so. In the Liberian camps there was–often substantial–cooperation between the 
different groups. The camp administration, to which UNHCR gave incentives to encourage 
co-operation and equal representation, can be considered a political microcosm where co-
operative attitudes were tested and learned.  
Peace building studies identify three different layers of society on which conflicts can take 
place: the top level involving political and economic elites, the middle level involving 
community and “civil society” leaders, and the bottom level involving the grass roots. 
Adopting this terminology, the main antagonisms in the region’s conflicts, be it in Liberia, 
Guinea or Sierra Leone, are situated at the “top” level. Liberians and Sierra Leoneans at 
the “middle” and “bottom” levels mostly desire peace and are prepared to make consider-
able concessions. Any potential for peace at the lower levels could only become significant 
once changes at the “top” level occurred in August 2003. Both Liberia and Sierra Leone 
have made considerable progress since this study was conducted, but it remains to be seen 
whether elites will permanently adopt more peaceful attitudes. 
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4 General Conclusion 
This paper aimed at establishing refugees as a relevant social category in the analysis of 
causes of war. It explored the phenomenon of refugees engaging in armed conflict from the 
perspective that wars tend to become independent from the causes of their outbreak, and 
subsequently re-create causes explaining their persistence. The creation of refugees has 
been considered one of these causes, as refugees may constitute a specific social basis of 
warring parties. The dynamics explaining refugee involvement in wars have been pre-
sented by establishing an abstract societal order of refugees. Particular attention has been 
paid to refugees’ exclusion from home country systems of reproduction, their (partial) in-
tegration into host societies, and conflicts arising in these processes. The concept of a so-
cietal order of refugee existence can serve as an analytical framework for exploring refu-
gee involvement in wars and has proved to yield intelligible results when applied to the 
case of refugees in Guinea. A distinction contained in the “grammar of war”, that between 
potentials for conflict and combat capacities, has been emphasized in the analysis. The 
“grammar”-model is usually employed to structure and put into logical hierarchy diverse 
information on war causes. The logical hierarchy is established using four major distinc-
tions. In similar vein the “grammar” is now employed as a methodological tool to summa-
rise the reasons for which refugees become armed actors. That is, the essential findings of 
this study are presented in the form of a “grammar of refugees in war”. 
During wars, contradictions are exacerbated to a point at which they take on a qualitatively 
new form, the contradiction between those included in and those excluded from a system 
of societal reproduction. Geographically manifested exclusion, i.e. the flight of one party, 
represents a definite solution to a conflict of interests for the excluding party. Nevertheless, 
flight exacerbates contradictions, and thereby represents a solution not overcoming but 
furthering causes of war. Displacement may also represent a temporary solution for elites 
of the excluded, as the sharpening of contradictions enables them to maintain their social 
basis and consequently an influential position in the excluded community. Centrifugal ten-
dencies in a society may be instrumental to some, and these will consequently reject inte-
gration in the home and the host country alike, as the case of the PALIPEHUTU and the 
PLO demonstrates. Exclusion occurs in political, economic and symbolic dimensions of 
reproduction. Political exclusion means the definite denial of access to decision making, 
patronage and public goods, particularly security. Economically, exclusion becomes mani-
fest as ejection from patronage networks and appropriation or destruction of the means of 
subsistence. Exclusion from symbolic reproduction is represented by ideologies defining 
the adversary as alien to the in-group, i.e. categorically rejecting a solution to a conflict 
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that respects interests of the other. Exclusion from home country societal reproduction is 
the basic root cause of refugee involvement in wars. In the long term, contradictions be-
tween refugees and nationals in the host country become more relevant as the background 
of immediate motivations for an armed return, but the condition necessary for these con-
tradictions to become causal factors remains the refusal of the sending country to re-
integrate the refugee population. Contradictions in the host country centre on the alien-
national divide. As integration increases, conflicts of interest that can be analysed as con-
tradictions will emerge in several areas of competition. The alien-national divide remains 
the basis for denying a solution to these conflicts that would respect the interests of the 
refugees. Refugees often remain aliens for generations, and the insecure standing this 
status implies explains the continuation of refugees’ visions of a–probably armed–return to 
a place where they would be “at home”.  
The “crisis” stage of the “grammar of war” model assembles the paradigms through which 
actors interpret contradictions and on the basis of which they judge that resistance has to be 
mobilised. Flight and the circumstances under which it occurs alter refugees’ perceptions 
of subsequent developments. The common experience of flight and exile as well as the 
social transformations accompanying it strengthen the cohesion of the refugee group. 
Flight and exile become symbols of a collective identity. Contradictions are interpreted 
through sectarian worldviews, e.g. an ethnic consciousness, expressing interests of the in-
group and producing subjective motives to engage in armed struggle. The experience of 
actual exclusion often increases fear of a repetition of the experience when new conflicts 
arise. Flight then constitutes a precedent symbolising the perceived marginal standing of 
the refugee community and its consequences. Actors may come to the conclusion that only 
sufficient military power can guarantee the group’s integrity. Nevertheless, refugees may 
also come to the conclusion that political violence was responsible for their plight, and that 
competition for opportunities should be non-violent. Whether this position becomes domi-
nant among the refugee population is partly dependent on its leaders. As the case of Tan-
zania demonstrates (see 1.3), patterns of settlement determining the degree of influence 
these leaders exert and whether refugees subjectively recognise alternative, non-violent 
ways to fulfil their aspirations, are important variables. Furthermore, the host state has a 
prominent role in weakening or strengthening actors competing for influence over the 
refugee community.  
On the “conflict” stage of the model, the genesis of organisational, economic and mental 
fighting capacities is analysed. The institution of the refugee camp furthers rebels’ organ-
isational capacities, as access to and communication with civilians is facilitated. Impor-
tantly, the home state is deprived of most of its capacities to destroy rebel organisations, 
while flight makes new economic and mental combat capacities accessible. 
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Refugee-related economic fighting capacities can accrue from humanitarian assistance, 
refugees’ economic activities in the host country, trans-border trade and host state support. 
The relative importance of humanitarian aid differs from case to case. It may be of great 
importance in some cases, but an analysis of the economics of refugee involvement in vio-
lence cannot be restricted to that aspect. Generally, humanitarian aid to refugees only occa-
sionally supports war economies, as the host state has capacities to prevent its abuse and 
often does use them. Mental fighting capacities specific to refugee situations are consti-
tuted via the experience of flight in the first place. The experience of a direct threat to 
physical integrity and material livelihood is most effective in legitimising “counter”-
violence (even though the rebel group may in fact have started the fighting). Refugee 
camps then constitute an environment in which discourses producing mental fighting capa-
bilities can effectively reach masses.  
Yet refugees in camps and their movement can comparatively easily be controlled by host 
governments. Most often, the transformations of the societal order leading to war are 
blocked at the conflict stage. Contradictions between refugees and home country actors as 
well as between refugees and host country actors arise frequently, and they are often per-
ceived as critical. The host country regime most often prevents that these subjectively rec-
ognised contradictions translate into organisational combat capabilities. Generally, refu-
gees are weak actors in their host countries, and they need support from within these states 
to continuously engage in political violence. Refugees can establish the organisational ca-
pacities necessary to engage in political violence within the host state usually only when 
supported by actors of the host polity. The attitude of influential host country actors, par-
ticularly the regime, towards the refugee insurgents is thus decisive. They either allow for-
eign rebels to consolidate their organisation, or prevent them from establishing meaningful 
organisational capacities by repressing armed actors and monitoring their movement. Host 
country actors may consider the refugees an opportunity to enhance their political station. 
Rather than being a burden, refugees can open up opportunities for national elites. Ethnic, 
religious and ideological affiliations can strengthen or facilitate political trans-border alli-
ances, yet the alliances are essentially strategic.  
Host countries classically characterised as instable are most likely to tolerate refugee-
warriors. Specifically, host states in which authority is largely exercised through informal 
networks, where manifest challenges to the regime’s claim to power are present, and where 
the competition for political power is barely institutionalised are most vulnerable to an 
integration of foreign armed actors into the state’s security apparatus or into oppositional 
military formations. A factor increasing the probability of integration into the state’s secu-
rity apparatus are hostile relations between the home and the host state. In case of hostile 
relations, refugee insurgents are frequently employed by the host state to weaken the 
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home state or to guard the border area. Trans-national political networks and their relation 
to domestic politics can partly explain hostile relations between Third World states: Re-
gimes consider each other a threat because their respective regional networks are economi-
cally or politically linked to dissidents in the neighbouring state. Likewise, neighbouring 
states can be perceived a threat because they undermine the symbolic basis of the regime’s 
rule, thereby potentially strengthening domestic oppositional actors. When host country 
actors realise opportunities to strengthen their military capabilities by aligning with refugee 
armies, refugees become a trans-national as well as a domestic security problem. Gener-
ally, it is the host country regime rather than the opposition which profits from refugee-
warriors, as it usually is the strongest actor and would expel the refugees if these strength-
ened oppositional forces. 
The above stated transformations–contradictions caused by the war, the perception of these 
contradictions as causing a crisis, and a subsequent re-creation of fighting capacities–
combine to alter the dynamics of war and what war is about. They can constitute a closed 
circle, leading to the permanent re-creation of war causes. 
The preceding reflections largely confirm the hypotheses expressed in the introduction. 
Refugees, linked by common political, economic and symbolic features, indeed constitute 
a distinct social basis for warring parties created by war (or by massive violence akin to 
war). The social basis is related to the combatant organisation by providing personal, mate-
rial and moral support to it. Root causes for refugee engagement in war can be attributed to 
dynamics in the home country, i.e. exclusive policies. Host country conditions marginaliz-
ing refugees add to and reinforce these root causes, and in the long run become more rele-
vant for the refugees’ motivations to engage in warfare, as particularly the case of the RPF 
demonstrates. Host country politics are decisive for allowing root causes to translate into 
actual fighting as these allow refugees to acquire the necessary organisational capacities. 
The reasons for which host country political forces tolerate cross-border activities–interests 
in power accumulation rather than logistical constraints–are not only an important cause of 
refugee involvement in that type of violence, but are equally important to explaining refu-
gee engagement in fighting in the host country. Humanitarian assistance may further com-
bat capabilities, but cannot be regarded decisive, as refugees not receiving assistance have 
similarly engaged in war.215  
The hypothesis that flight constitutes a break with the order of war and refugees thus con-
tribute to ending wars is equally valid under certain circumstances. The decisive variable 
however is the host country rather than humanitarian assistance, most important in that the 
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 Pre-1967 Rwandan refugees, those invading Rwanda in 1990, Senegalese in Guinea-Bissau, and the 
Kuomintang-groups in Burma are examples mentioned in this paper.  
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host state can block developments situated on the conflict-stage of the grammar of war, i.e. 
it can take action against the formation or maintenance of organisational combat capabili-
ties. 
However, the circle of violence can be blocked at each of the stages of the “grammar of 
war”, which is important for international refugee policies. Integrative politics in the home 
country allowing for a peaceful processing of societal contradictions provide one option. 
Rather than being compensated for, these politics can be complemented by reintegration in 
the host country. Long-term stability involves changes in the home country because refu-
gees are a population segment likely to be discriminated against once competition in the 
host country becomes intense. When return is envisaged after a prolonged period of exile 
because of changes in the host polity, it is more likely to be armed in the absence of change 
in the home country. Yet integration in the receiving country can be an option reducing the 
costs of a political settlement in the home country and benefiting the host state. The present 
paper challenged the conventional wisdom that refugees are a burden to the host country. 
Refugees and the international humanitarian system often contribute to economic 
growth.216 In some cases, refugees have deliberately been employed in national develop-
ment strategies. Often, however, local economic growth stimulated by refugees presents 
few benefits to elites, while the perception that refugees impact negatively on social stabil-
ity and the fear they might constitute a drain on state resources incite most governments–in 
the industrialised as well as in the developing world–to adopt a rather reserved policy on 
refugee integration.  
Patterns of thought identified with the “crisis” stage of the model can also change in exile. 
The place of residence is outside the centre of conflict, and co-operative thinking may be 
more highly valued and rewarded there than in the home country. Host country conditions 
can contribute to changing the way in which situations are interpreted and promote non-
violent reactions, as the case of urban refugees in Tanzania suggests. Most importantly, the 
host state can block fighting capacities, primarily on the organisational level of rebel 
groups. At the same time, its attitude has great importance for the security of humanitarian 
personnel and consequently the ability of rebel groups to divert humanitarian resources. 
Generally, refugee assistance may be the least problematic form of humanitarian aid, as it 
can allow people to remain civilians and not integrate into the order of war. Humanitarian 
organisations have few possibilities to act against the diversion of supplies when the host 
state does not provide adequate security backup, and can ultimately only threaten with 
withdrawal or withdraw when their resources are being abused.  
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 In this paper the cases of Jordan, Tanzania and particularly of Guinea have been extensively discussed. 
Observations from Syria (Viorst 1989), Sudan (Harrell-Bond 1986), and Kenya (Crisp 2000) suggest that 
refugees regularly stimulate economic growth. 
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Nonetheless, security is a humanitarian affair in the sense that it is concerned with further-
ing the well-being of people, and humanitarian organisations must assume their share of 
responsibility, i.e. integrate regional and home country security considerations into the 
humanitarian rationale. “[R]efugee policy must be measured against the yardstick that it 
does not directly contribute to the creation of future refugees by keeping alive the cycle of 
conflict” (Zolberg et al. 1989:278). For withdrawal to be an effective means of pressure 
that can be used as a threat, it must be a realistic option. However, in most cases, wars 
would continue in the absence of humanitarian assistance, and the international community 
will still have to not only think about interventions that prevent or end wars, but as well 
about interventions that make them less devastating to human welfare. Refugee assistance 
is fairly effective in preventing human suffering, most importantly by forestalling forced 
repatriations. There can be little doubt that many host states only accept refugees because 
the international community provides assistance and host country governments can profit 
from the humanitarian system. If it was not for humanitarian aid, incidents of forced repa-
triation would drastically increase worldwide. This could lead to an ending of some con-
flicts, but given the practices employed in many wars, it would mean an ending caused by 
deaths on a genocidal scale. A negative peace thus achieved not only is hardly a basis for 
future peaceful processing of conflicts but further strengthens the impression that the em-
ployed counterinsurgency tactics are a viable means for guaranteeing stability. 217 In order 
to achieve long-term stability, however, countries need to establish mechanism that relia-
bly allow for a peaceful processing of conflicts (cf. Senghaas 1997).   
Legally and empirically, the host state is the most important actor preventing operations of 
irregulars from its territory. When a host state does not assume that function, it rarely is 
because of technical or logistical problems, i.e. insufficient repressive capacities and a lack 
of infrastructures, but because of political considerations. It is exactly because humanitar-
ian refugee assistance is most problematic where the refugees get involved in host state 
politics that humanitarian organisations have to analyse the political implications of assis-
tance, and cannot pretend that the “political” in refugee situations relates exclusively to the 
politics that cause refugee flows. The international community may decide to support flee-
ing oppositional groups and use humanitarian assistance as a means. This is a political 
choice which humanitarian organisations should be aware of. In order not to discredit hu-
manitarian assistance generally, this political decision should be made clear. Provided that 
the international community is interested in preventing the abuse of refugee assistance, its 
main option remains to hold the host state accountable for cross-border raids and support 
promising regional security initiatives. Humanitarian organisations tend to consider inter-
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 Negative peace is defined as the absence of war. In contrast, positive peace is defined as a social setting 
reliably allowing for the peaceful processing of conflicts (cf. Senghaas 1997). 
  
 
123
national military interventions the key to prevent the abuse of assistance in extremely vola-
tile situations. Yet for two reasons military interventions are an unlikely solution to the 
problem. Firstly, an international security structure imposing humanitarian interests in the 
use of assistance for civilian purposes only is anything but in sight. Secondly and more 
importantly, military interventions would usually involve the consent and support of the 
host state. Given the direct link between elite interest in the host country and the activities 
of refugee-warriors, host states are likely to obstruct international efforts. They are thereby 
very likely to worsen the cost-effectiveness ratio of interventions beyond levels acceptable 
to the international community. Interventions are thus most likely ineffective. 
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